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ABSTRACT

ELECTIVE AFFINITIES: HEIDEGGER AND ADORNO

By
Michael R. Kilivris
December 2010

Dissertation supervised by Dr. James Swindal.
In spite of their historical, geographical, and intellectual proximity, Heidegger and
Adorno never entered into dialogue with one another. Heidegger claimed not to have
read Adorno, while Adorno wrote only polemically on Heidegger. In the past thirty
years, scholars have attempted to initiate communication between the two in a number of
areas, from epistemology to ethics. The first and most comprehensive effort is Hermann
Mörchen‘s Heidegger and Adorno: Examination of a Refused Philosophical
Communication (1981). Unfortunately, Mörchen‘s text has still not been translated into
English.

This leaves the Anglophone world with preliminary studies such as Fred

Dallmayr‘s Between Freiburg and Frankfurt: Toward a Critical Ontology (1991),
wherein one (of eight) chapters pairs Heidegger and Adorno, and Iain Maconald‘s and
Krzysztof Ziarek‘s Adorno and Heidegger: Philosophical Questions (2008), a short book
of essays.
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Thus this project is the first sustained comparison of Heidegger and Adorno in the
English language. Just as important, it brings them together in an original way. In
particular, it explores the similarities between their respective critiques of modernity,
focusing on the areas of subjectivity, aesthetics, and environmental philosophy. My thesis
is that while Heidegger and Adorno both valorize the self, art, and nature, seeing them as
victims of as well as potential antidotes to modernity, they do so from fundamentally
different perspectives. I attribute these differences to larger debates in twentieth-century
Continental thought such as those between existentialism and critical theory,
phenomenological ontology and dialectics, and anti-humanism and humanism. As these
debates continue to offer productive ways of thinking about the self, art, and nature,
understanding their frameworks, and Heidegger‘s and Adorno‘s places within them, leads
to an enhanced comprehension of our own time.
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Introduction:
Philosophical Chemistry
―…the differentiation of positions is the root of (common) philosophical labor.‖ – Heidegger
―…the decisive differences between philosophers are concealed in nuances.‖ – Adorno

Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and Theodor W. Adorno (1903-1969) were two of
the most important philosophers of the twentieth century.

Like Kierkegaard and

Nietzsche before him, Heidegger was a prime mover of existentialism, which became
quite popular in the postwar era, as well as the founder of ―fundamental ontology,‖ or the
philosophy of Being. In addition, Heidegger‘s writings on language, after his so-called
―turn‖ (die Kehre), were highly influential on postmodern figures such as Derrida, the
originator of ―deconstruction.‖ Adorno was one of the major members of the (first
generation) Frankfurt School of critical theory, a group of Hegelian-Marxist thinkers who
were among the first to bring philosophy to bear on popular culture. His and Max
Horkheimer‘s critique of what they called the ―culture industry‖ remains essential
reading today for those interested in the relationship between art and society. Adorno
was also one of the most insightful and eloquent of twentieth-century progressive
intellectuals; this is perhaps best expressed in his famous statement, ―to write poetry after
Auschwitz is barbaric.‖

Philosophical and Political Differences
Yet, although Heidegger and Adorno lived and thought at approximately the same
time (the 1930‘s through the 1960‘s), and in approximately the same place (Heidegger in
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Freiburg, Germany, Adorno in Frankfurt, Germany), the two never entered into dialogue
with one another. Apart from a ―furtive meeting‖ in 1929, which ―failed to generate
discussion,‖1 communication between Heidegger and Adorno was either non-existent or
one-sided and hostile, as Heidegger ―never addressed a single word to Adorno in
public,‖2 claiming to ―have read nothing by him,‖3 while Adorno wrote only polemically
on Heidegger, most notably in The Jargon of Authenticity (1964) and Negative Dialectics
(1966). The reasons for this ―refusal‖ of dialogue, as Hermann Mörchen refers to it, are
both philosophical and political.

Philosophically, Heidegger‘s existentialism and

Adorno‘s critical theory are fundamentally at odds. Whereas the latter, inspired by Marx,
is ethically normative, insofar as it ultimately seeks social justice, the former, inspired by
Nietzsche, the ―annihilator of morality,‖ is amoral, even immoral. To the extent that
existentialism posits ideals, they are individualistic (i.e., Nietzsche‘s Übermensch), and
thus contrast with Marxism‘s/critical theory‘s social or collective ideals (i.e., Marx‘s
classless society).
As for Heidegger‘s fundamental ontology, which better characterizes his thought,
since existentialism was largely a detour for him, it too conflicts with Adorno‘s critical
theory. Heidegger‘s interest in Being, the ―is-ness‖ of all beings, obviously seems remote
from sociopolitical concerns. While Heidegger at times used ontology to analyze society,
as in his ―The Question Concerning Technology‖ (1954), wherein he takes issue with the
(mis)understanding of Being as ―standing reserve,‖ fundamental ontology mostly had the
air of a purely philosophical affair. To Adorno, for whom philosophy must always be
critical, and critical of society in particular, Heidegger‘s ontological perspective could
thus only appear apolitical at best, and ideological at worst.
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In a discussion of

Heidegger‘s ontology in relation to his own dialectics, the method of critical theory,
Adorno asserts, ―The concept of critique, as far as I can see, has no place in Heidegger‘s
philosophy.‖4
Of course, the main obstacle to communication between Heidegger and Adorno
was not philosophical, but political.5

Infamously, Heidegger was a member of the

National Socialist Party until its dissolution. What is worse, from 1933 until 1934 he was
the Nazi-endorsed and Nazi-endorsing rector at the University of Freiburg. During this
time, Heidegger made pro-Nazi speeches and led smear campaigns against Jewish
colleagues. Worse still, though he lived another thirty years after the war, Heidegger
offered neither a compelling explanation nor any apology for his involvement with
National Socialism. The closest he came was in an interview with Der Spiegel in 1966
(published posthumously, in 1976, at Heidegger‘s request), in which he suggests that by
taking up the rectorship, he was protecting the university. However, recent scholarship
has raised serious questions about this and other claims, making an already unsatisfactory
account all the more disappointing.
Heidegger‘s involvement with the Nazis was the ultimate betrayal for Adorno,
whose father was Jewish.6 Because of this, Adorno was forced to flee Germany, which
he did as early as 1934, when he emigrated to Oxford, England. In 1938, he emigrated
again, to New York City, where the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research had
temporarily relocated (at Columbia University) and where he worked on the Princeton
Radio Project. In 1941, with Horkheimer, he relocated once more, to southern California,
where he would stay until returning to Germany in 1949. Adorno was thus affected in
the most personal way by National Socialism (as well, his close friend and literary critic,
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Walter Benjamin, died escaping the Nazis). That Heidegger was associated with Nazism,
even playing an active role in it, made him not just a theoretical, but also a practical
enemy for Adorno. Adorno‘s many charges of fascism in Heidegger‘s thought must be
read in, and justified by, this light.

Heidegger-Adorno Scholarship
In spite of these glaring, perhaps irreconcilable differences, however, Heidegger‘s
and Adorno‘s respective philosophies have several affinities. In general, both can be said
to take a critical stance toward (late) modernity, understood as industrial, capitalist,
secular, scientific, and/or technological society.7
makes for more particular agreements.

This shared position, furthermore,

For instance, Heidegger and Adorno each

challenge ―scientism,‖ the ideology that the scientific worldview is the only or best
description of reality.

For Heidegger, scientism is just another problematic

(mis)interpretation of Being that turns beings into objects for manipulation. Likewise, for
Adorno, scientism wrongfully reduces everything outside of the subject to ―mere
objectivity,‖ the better to ―dominate‖ it. As such, scientism is an example of what
Heidegger calls ―calculative thinking‖ or ―representational thinking,‖ and Adorno calls
―instrumental reason‖ or ―identity-thinking‖ (or ―identitarian thinking‖) another area
where the two approximate each other.
While Heidegger and Adorno themselves never noticed these similarities, or at
least never explicitly acknowledged them, others have.8 Hermann Mörchen was the first
to explore them, in Macht und Herrshcaft im Denken von Heidegger und Adorno (1980),
and then more thoroughly in Adorno und Heidegger: Untersuchung einer
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philosophischen Kommunikationsverweigerung (1981). A student of Heidegger who also
lived for many years in Frankfurt, Mörchen holds that there are a number of
―convergences‖ in the thinking of Heidegger and Adorno, owing to mutual ―underlying
or motivating experiences,‖ by which he means the problems of modernity enumerated
above. In the latter text, which has not been translated into English (the former has not
been translated either), Mörchen pairs Heidegger and Adorno under six ―examples‖
(Beispiele): 1) world (Welt); 2) science (Wissenschaft); 3) system (System); 4) clarity
(Klarheit); 5) picture (Bild); 6) language (Sprache).
Taking after Mörchen, Fred Dallmayr, in Between Freiburg and Frankfurt:
Toward a Critical Ontology (1991),9 argues that Heidegger and Adorno begin from
―common concerns and shared agonies,‖ which lead them to ―moments of rapprochement
and latent affinity… a subterranean linkage.‖10 Their common concerns and shared
agonies, Dallmayr contends, stem from the ―dilemmas of late modernity, that is, the
predicaments engendered by the sway of modern science and technology.‖ 11

The

moments of rapprochement and latent affinity, or ―incipient modes of dialogue… covert
liaison… involuntary complicity,‖12 according to Dallmayr, revolve around the issues of
science and language, as Mörchen points out, as well as time and temporality, which
Dallmayr claims is the ―the deepest, but also the most hidden (and overtly controverted)
liaison between the two thinkers,‖13 and the ―correlation and mutual dependence of
irrationalism and rationalism, especially where the latter stands as synonym for an
instrumental or calculating rationality.‖14
With the exception of a brief discussion of Heidegger and Adorno by Rüdiger
Safranksi, in his biography of Heidegger, Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil
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(1998), wherein he too notices a ―dangerous philosophical affinity‖ in their ―similar
diagnosis of the modern age,‖15 scholarship on the Heidegger-Adorno connection fell
silent after Dallmayr‘s book until Iain Macdonald and Krzysztof Ziarek revived it in
2004, by holding a three-day conference on the topic at the University of Montréal.
Some of the papers presented there have since been assembled into a book, Adorno and
Heidegger: Philosophical Questions, published in 2008.

In their introduction,

Macdonald and Ziarek, proceeding from the ―openness to dialogue‖ of Mörchen and
Dallmayr, state that ―there are undeniable points of proximity between Adorno and
Heidegger,‖ especially where ―technology, positivism, and the vapidity of contemporary
social existence‖ are concerned.16 Other ―parallels,‖ which Macdonald and Ziarek are
careful to distinguish from Mörchen‘s preferred term, convergences (so as ―not to dismiss
as unfounded the oppositional character of the [Heidegger-Adorno] dispute‖17), include
such ―areas of tension‖ as aesthetics, ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, nature, and
modernity.

Thesis
These attempts at pairing Heidegger and Adorno are legitimate and promising.
However, they cannot be the final word on this topic. For one thing, the only sustained
treatment of Heidegger and Adorno, Mörchen‘s Adorno und Heidegger: Untersuchung
einer philosophischen Kommunikationsverweigerung, is inaccessible to the Anglophone
world; although both in English, Dallmayr‘s discussion is limited to one chapter (of
eight), and Macdonald‘s and Ziarek‘s text comprises short, preliminary essays. For
another, the arguments made in these texts do not exhaust the range of possibilities
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afforded by a comparison of Heidegger and Adorno. While all of the efforts thus far tend
to agree that Heidegger and Adorno can be read as having compatible critiques of
modernity, each takes a relatively unique position as to what exactly they critique, and
why and how they do so.
This project, then, seeks to fill the void of thorough analyses of affinities between
Heidegger and Adorno in the English language (indeed, it will be the first of its kind in
this regard), as well as to propose an original viewpoint, distinguished from Mörchen‘s
and (especially) Dallmayr‘s in general, and several of Macdonald‘s and Ziarek‘s
commentators in particular.

Overall, it aims to challenge Dallmayr‘s thesis that

Heidegger and Adorno ―start from similar predicaments, but proceed to set diverse
accents.‖18 Somewhat to the contrary, it will be argued that while, or precisely because,
Heidegger and Adorno start from similar predicaments, this leads them to set similar, not
diverse, accents. These accents, I will show, pertain to the three areas of subjectivity,
aesthetics, and environmental philosophy. For in their respective critiques of modernity,
Heidegger and Adorno are both concerned with the fate of the self, art, and nature, each
of which, it will also be proposed, they (re)affirm as potential antidotes to modernity.

Form and Content
Thus, it will be advanced in the following that Heidegger and Adorno are aligned
negatively and positively in their assessments of modernity, or that both their diagnoses
of and prescriptions for modernity have commonalities. On the negative or diagnostic
side, Heidegger and Adorno each identify and express misgivings about the ―levelling‖
(Heidegger) and ―liquidation‖ (Adorno, although he also uses the term levelling) of the
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self, particularly at the hands of ―the they‖ (Heidegger) and late capitalism (Adorno); the
degradation of art by an ―equipmental‖ ontology (Heidegger) and ―culture industry‖
(Adorno); and the ―enframing‖ (Heidegger) and ―domination‖ or ―exploitation‖ (Adorno)
of nature due to a calculating (Heidegger) and instrumental (Adorno) rationality. On the
positive or prescriptive side, Heidegger and Adorno both (re)affirm an ―authentic‖
(Heidegger) and ―autonomous‖ (Adorno) self, ―great‖ (Heidegger) and ―autonomous‖
(Adorno) art, and the ―not-forgetting of Being‖ (Heidegger) and ―remembrance of
nature‖ (Adorno).
Each one of these areas will be given its own chapter. Chapter I, ―The Self:
Authenticity and Autonomy,‖ will compare Heidegger‘s anxiety over the levelling of the
self, as well as his ―destruction‖ of the modern (Cartesian) subject, to Adorno‘s worry
about the liquidation of the subject, in addition to his critique of the modern (Baconian
and Kantian) subject. This will give way to a consideration of the possible connections
between Heidegger‘s idea(l) of authentic selfhood and Adorno‘s concept of the
autonomous subject. Chapter II, ―Art: Strife and Semblance,‖ will pair Heidegger‘s
destruction of the equipmental view of artworks and his (re)construction of great art as a
site of truth (aletheia) and a ―new beginning,‖ with Adorno‘s critique of the culture
industry and (re)affirmation of autonomous art for its ―truth content‖ and transformative
capacity. Chapter III: ―Nature: Enframing and Exploitation,‖ will bring Heidegger‘s
questioning of the enframing of nature, regarded as physis, together with Adorno‘s
challenging of instrumental reason‘s domination of nature, conceived of as the ―nonidentical.‖
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The foregoing will also be distinguished within the Heidegger-Adorno
scholarship, moreover, in making a connection between Heidegger and Adorno and the
(early) German Romantic tradition.

This link will be justified by showing how in

critiquing modernity generally, and focusing on the self, art, and nature specifically,
Heidegger and Adorno echo the Romantics‘ critique of modernity, or the Enlightenment,
as ―alienating‖ or ―dividing‖ the self from itself, others, and nature, to which they
countered the ―fundamental values‖ of Bildung, or self-realization, aesthetic education,
and the re-mystification of nature.19 Thus, each chapter closes with a ―Romantic Coda,‖
wherein these Romantic values are elaborated and related to Heidegger‘s and Adorno‘s
views of the self, art, and nature. However, these sections will be more like afterthoughts
than essential parts of the main argument; their purpose is simply to suggest tenuous
correspondences to be more rigorously addressed elsewhere.20
Combining Heidegger and Adorno in these ways, of course, does not mean that
their differences will be explained away or ignored. To the contrary, the recurring
conclusion will be that while in certain, highly qualified ways, Heidegger and Adorno
resemble each other in both their problems with and solutions for modernity, these
resemblances hold only at the level of spirit, as opposed to letter, or form, as opposed to
content. When turning to the latter – that is, the actual letter or content of each figure‘s
thought – it becomes clear that Heidegger and Adorno are finally separated by an
unbridgeable abyss. This is due, with some variation depending upon the topic, primarily
to the distinctions mentioned above between their basic standpoints. Whether it is the
existentialist Heidegger and the critical theorist Adorno, or the ontological Heidegger and
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the dialectical Adorno, these standpoints cannot be reconciled, not without doing
injustice to one and thereby both.
In general, though, the fundamental differences between Heidegger and Adorno
can be attributed to the ontological perspective of Heidegger and the sociopolitical
perspective of Adorno. This disconnect plays itself out in each of the three areas under
investigation here. In Chapter II, for example, Heidegger‘s aesthetics are shown to be
inseparable from his ontological viewpoint. He sees modernity‘s degradation of art as
symptomatic of a wider (mis)understanding of Being, which interprets all beings,
including works of art, as ―useful.‖ His (re)affirmation of art is thus made in hopes of
correcting this misunderstanding, or initiating a new relation to Being.21 By contrast,
Adorno relates modernity‘s degradation of art to the culture industry of late capitalism,
which views everything in terms of ―exchange value.‖ His reaffirmation of autonomous
art is therefore not simply an affront to ―low‖ or ―mass‖ art, but also an overture to a
transfigured society, wherein the ―exchange principle‖ is no longer dominant.

Objectives
These differences are formidable, yet they do not and should not make dialogue
between Heidegger and Adorno impossible or unfruitful. As contrary as their outlooks
can be, they can also overlap in surprising and interesting ways. In Goethe‘s Elective
Affinities, it is proposed that ―antithetical qualities make possible a closer and more
intimate union.‖22 This is a theory about chemicals, to be sure, but it is also an attempt to
account for ―affinity of mind.‖ As such, it suggests that in spite of, indeed because of,
their differences, Heidegger‘s and Adorno‘s thinking could combine to form a ―higher
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determination.‖

Perhaps this would be a deeper, more critical, understanding of

modernity than either offers by itself.
No less promising is the very process of bringing Heidegger and Adorno together.
As Mörchen holds, the ―first precondition of understanding‖ is ―solidarity with the
‗agony‘ of the contestants,‖ a ―willingness to ‗suffer‘ one another – and to learn from
suffering.‖23 Heidegger and Adorno themselves seem to believe this. According to
Heidegger, ―…the differentiation of positions is the root of (common) philosophical
labor.‖24 For Adorno, ―…the decisive differences between philosophers are concealed in
nuances,‖25 a claim inviting communication, however painstaking. While any dialogue,
especially between thinkers as distinct as these, can lead to standstill or worse, they can
just as often broaden and deepen the positions of each participant. At the very least,
communication requires and encourages openness, a subjective quality that Heidegger
and Adorno both esteemed.
Finally, focusing on the self, art, and nature was not only necessitated by
Heidegger‘s and Adorno‘s own emphases, but also inspired by the sense that these things
remain endangered by modernity (despite Heidegger‘s and Adorno‘s warnings), and that
a rethinking and reaffirmation of them is crucial to alleviating modernity‘s flaws. The
arrogant modern subject, whether Cartesian, Baconian or Kantian, that Heidegger and
Adorno each critique, along with the conformist contemporary self, have depleted
subjectivity as well as art and nature. What is needed today is thus an alternative ideal of
subjectivity, along the lines of Heidegger‘s authentic self and Adorno‘s autonomous
subject, both of which stress a balancing of consciousness and being, ego and id, in
addition to social non-conformity. The reigning subjectivity has also seriously damaged
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the arts and humanities, which are now seen as ―wastes of time‖ in the ceaseless pursuit
of wealth. Against this tendency, the arts and humanities must be re-seen, as Heidegger
and Adorno suggest, as sites of truth and transformation. Nature has also been a victim
of the current mode of subjectivity. Viewed as dead matter for human consumption for
centuries, nature is now nearing a point at which it will become uninhabitable for
humanity.

To stop this from occurring, Heidegger‘s not-forgetting of Being and

Adorno‘s remembrance of nature should become guiding ideas.

In short, what is

essential now is a redefinition of the concept of growth, development, or progress, so that
the self and society can be enriched, the arts and humanities restored, and nature saved.
It was one of the primary motives for this project that Heidegger and Adorno be seen as
figures whose thought furthers these ends.

xx
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I.
The Self: Authenticity and Autonomy
Everyone is the other, and no one is himself. – Heidegger, Being and Time
Odysseus loses himself in order to find himself. – Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment

The self is not what it used to be. Long gone are the days of Romantic Bildung
(self-realization), when people were inspired to develop both their human (intellect and
sensibility) and individual (talents and passions) capacities. Even existentialist selfinvention, which held sway in the postwar era, is nowhere to be found, as consciousness
of personal freedom has somehow led only to mass conformity. To the extent that the
ideals of self-realization and self-creation exist at all today, it is as generally practical,
and particularly economic, forms of subjectivity. This has been a triumph for those on
the Right, who endorse a kind of entrepreneurial self, one which actualizes its potential
by maximizing its profits. Meanwhile, the Left has been unwilling or unable to assert a
rival subjectivity, viewing the self as either necessarily bourgeois (Marxists/critical
theorists) or else a metaphysical fantasy (postmodernists). Indeed, the latter‘s theory of
the self, that it is in fact nothing but a multiplicity of selves, has arguably aided and
abetted the Right‘s economic individualism.

Hence Žižek‘s scene of a ―yuppie‖

identifying with the ―exploding of self-contained subjectivity‖ recommended by Deleuze,
who Zizek thus suggests calling, in true contrarian fashion, the ―ideologist of late
capitalism.‖1
Of course, postmodernism‘s pronouncement of the ―death of the subject‖ (a
decidedly un-Nietzschean echo of Nietzsche‘s pronouncement of the death of God) was
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simply the logical conclusion of what other theorists had been proposing decades earlier.
Both Heidegger and Adorno, admittedly, were foremost among such thinkers. In his
―Letter on Humanism‖ (1946), Heidegger asserts that ―Every humanism is either
grounded in a metaphysics or is itself made to be the ground of one.‖2 What is implied
here is that any attempt to assert the human subject (as a ―rational animal,‖ ―child of
God,‖ or ―thinking thing‖) is always already an act of metaphysics, which
presumptuously transcends the self‘s basic ―ek-sistence,‖ or its ―standing in the clearing
of Being.‖ Derrida‘s deconstruction of the ―metaphysics of Subjectivity‖ can obviously
be traced back to this claim by Heidegger. For Adorno‘s part, his observation of the
―liquidation of the subject,‖ by which he meant the loss of individual autonomy in late
capitalist society, anticipated Foucault‘s outlook that the self is threatened from all sides
by so many points of ―power.‖ Likewise, Foucault‘s theory that the self is thoroughly
constructed, even created, by a given ―knowledge-power regime‖ (e.g., schools, prisons,
hospitals, workplaces) radicalizes Adorno‘s view that the subject is constituted (by
society) as much as, and perhaps more so, than it constitutes itself.
Thus, it is best to place Heidegger and Adorno somewhere in the middle of the
continuum running from modernity to post-modernity when it comes to the self. As each
figure developed his thinking in the late modern period, it makes sense that both
challenged, and gestured beyond, some of modernity‘s central concepts, of which the
constitutive subject was one of the most important. However, it is precisely this inbetween position that also precluded Heidegger and Adorno from letting go of the self
altogether.

Hence the early Heidegger, in Being and Time (1927), simultaneously

―destroys‖ the modern notion of subjectivity and provides an idea(l) of another kind of
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self— ―authentic‖ Dasein, the idea for which Heidegger is perhaps still most famous.
Authentic Dasein (―being there‖), in effect, is everything that the modern subject is not;
that is a being, no less than a consciousness, that is aware of its temporality, as opposed
to immortality. Somewhat similarly, for all of Adorno‘s talk of the liquidation of the self,
he at the same time urges an alternative sort of subjectivity, primarily one that is strong
(in the Freudian sense) as well as critical or resistant to what he calls the ―false totality,‖
even as he holds that such a stance is reserved for a lucky few.
It

is

this

at

once

negative

(destructive/critical)

and

positive

(constructive/affirmative) relation to the self that will be explored in this chapter as a
possible affinity between Heidegger and Adorno. For just as Heidegger rejects the
conception of subjectivity handed down by modernity (especially by Descartes), and
offers up authentic Dasein as a substitute, so Adorno takes issue with the modern view of
the self (particularly that of Bacon and Kant), and seeks to supplant it with a strong and
critical, or (semi-)―autonomous,‖ self. Thus, Heidegger and Adorno will be read as
aligned in the project of critiquing the modern subject, as well as in the effort to replace it
with something else, rather than disposing of it completely á la postmodernism. In this
way, moreover, Heidegger and Adorno will each be seen as trying to keep an alternative
mode of subjectivity alive; Heidegger inasmuch as authenticity entails throwing off the
yoke of the ―they‖ to discover one‘s ―ownmost possibilities,‖3 and Adorno insofar as he
more or less advocates rebellion against late capitalism. Yet, while these prescriptions
for the self are equally subversive, they will be shown to diverge in two significantly
different directions, ones which point up a fundamental difference between Heidegger
and Adorno; this difference will be discussed in terms of the larger debate between
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existentialism and critical theory, as well as eudaimonistic ethics and deonotological
morality.
But before making these matters clearer, a consideration of the Heidegger-Adorno
scholarship is necessary in order to orient and distinguish this viewpoint. The structure
of this chapter will thus be as follows: after examining the work of Hermann Mörchen,
Fred Dallmayr, David Sherman, and Jusuf Früchtl, Heidegger‘s destruction of the
Cartesian subject will be explained, followed by a rehearsal of his notion of authenticity.
Next, a brief sketch of Adorno‘s critique of Heidegger‘s concept of authenticity will
ensue, followed by an exploration of Adorno‘s critique of the modern subject, and
thereafter, a look at his concept of the autonomous subject. Finally, in concluding,
deeper differences between Heidegger and Adorno on the topic of the self will be
discussed.

1. Heidegger-Adorno Scholarship
To pair Heidegger and Adorno where the self is concerned is counter-intuitive for
obvious reasons. For one thing, Adorno ferociously rejected Heidegger‘s notion of
authenticity, above all in The Jargon of Authenticity (1964), wherein he accuses it of,
among other things, ―provincialism,‖ ―noble philistinism,‖ ―a cover for arbitrariness,‖ ―a
prudish metaphysics,‖ ―flowering nonsense,‖ and of course, ―petit-bourgeois ideology.‖4
This alone perhaps explains why so few have ventured such an endeavor. Indeed, to date
there are only a handful of attempts to bring Heidegger and Adorno together on this topic.
Hermann Mörchen‘s Adorno und Heidegger: Untersuchung einer philosophischen
Kommunikationsverweigerung only briefly discusses Heidegger and Adorno in
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connection with the self, as Mörchen is more concerned with the issues of value, science,
system, clarity, picture, and language. The same can be said of Fred Dallmayr‘s Between
Freiburg and Frankfurt: Toward a Critical Ontology, insofar as it too takes a general
look at the similarities between Heidegger and Adorno.
Recently, more concentrated efforts have been undertaken. However, what they
make up for in depth they lack in duration. David Sherman, in Sartre and Adorno: The
Dialectics of Subjectivity (2007), devotes his second chapter (of eight) primarily to
Heidegger and Adorno in connection with the self, but his broader agenda (namely, that
of repudiating Mörchen‘s and Dallmayr‘s very project of ―rapprochement‖) ultimately
takes precedence. Josef Früchtl‘s ―The Struggle of the Self Against Itself: Adorno and
Heidegger on Modernity,‖ in Macdonald‘s and Ziarek‘s Adorno and Heidgger:
Philosophical Questions, is slightly better in this regard, inasmuch as he deals exclusively
with the topic of subjectivity. Yet, overall it reads in a preliminary manner, as it is only a
brief treatment, and one which Früchtl admits is a ―new‖ project; in his first endnote, he
relates that ―The part on Heidegger is completely new.‖5

Mörchen and Dallmayr
According to Mörchen and Dallmayr, Heidegger and Adorno each call for a
―departure (or turning away) from metaphysical foundationalism, particularly from
modern metaphysics rooted in the category of subjectivity.‖6 This explains Heidegger‘s
stance against humanism which, as noted above, he sees as a result of metaphysics, and
Adorno‘s critique of both the Baconian and Kantian subjects, which he holds are
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themselves metaphysical concepts. While these are doubtlessly distinctive viewpoints,
there appears to be some agreement between Heidegger and Adorno that modernity has
overestimated the subject, and/or refused to recognize its relation to Being (Heidegger) or
objectivity (Adorno). Thus, both suggest a more modest self, one that is ―open‖ to Being
(Heidegger) or prepared to ―lose itself‖ in the ―non-identical‖ other (Adorno). Mörchen
and Dallmayr take this call for openness to be the other point of contact between
Heidegger and Adorno in relation to the self. Dallmayr‘s statement of it is worth quoting
at some length:
For both thinkers, the central task of thought and experience was to
venture beyond givenness or beyond the range of the familiar and safely
appropriated into an uncharted terrain which Heidegger thematized in
terms of ‗openness‘ and Adorno under the rubrics of ―otherness‖ and nonidentity. Ever since Being and Time, Heidegger conceived human
existence literally as ek-sistence or as standing out or ekstasis – namely, a
standing out into the domain of ‗being‘ where every form of selfpossession or appropriation simultaneously implies an expropriation
(Enteignung). Similarly Adorno castigated as ideological the modern
infatuation with selfhood and self-possession, and particularly the
presumed centrality of self-preservation – applauding instead the readiness
for dispossession or the willingness to ‗lose oneself‘ in the experience of
strangeness (schöne Fremde). For both thinkers, the critique of
egocentrism (and anthropocentrism) implied a distancing from modern
―individualism‖ – to the extent that the latter amounts to a compact,
ideological doctrine; in Mörchen‘s words, ―both concur tacitly or
implicitly in refusing to acknowledge the primacy of the individual and
treating it instead as a ‗historical category.‖7

Sherman
Apart from these two quotations, there is very little in Mörchen‘s and Dallmayr‘s
texts that addresses the issue of the self. Because of this, Sherman‘s Sartre and Adorno:
The Dialectics of Subjectivity is a more helpful resource on this topic. In leading up to
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his central discussion of Sartre‘s and Adorno‘s respective conceptions of subjectivity,
Sherman considers the relation of Heidegger and Adorno to the self. Herein he submits,
contra Mörchen and Dallmayr, the general thesis that ―despite superficial similarities, the
differences between [Heidegger and Adorno] are deep and irreconcilable,‖8 and the
specific argument that Heidegger and Adorno in fact hold antithetical positions vis-à-vis
the self. While Sherman concedes on several occasions Mörchen‘s and Dallmayr‘s claim
that Heidegger and Adorno converge in discrediting the modern notion of subjectivity, he
argues that upon closer scrutiny there are in fact significant, unbridgeable disagreements
even in this area.
Since he is mainly concerned with and partial to Adorno, much of Sherman‘s
discussion consists of distinguishing Adorno‘s view of the self from that of Heidegger,
rather than the other way around. However, the points that he enumerates in doing so are
nevertheless helpful for highlighting key distinctions. Beginning from the premise that
―Although Adorno and Heidegger both reject what Adorno refers to as the ‗constituting
subjectivity‘ of metaphysics, after this initial accord they rigorously part company,‖9
Sherman proceeds to qualify this accord, contending that whereas Heidegger rejects
subjectivity as such, Adorno takes issue with this particular view of subjectivity, thus
allowing for alternative conceptions. Hence, Sherman contends that ―Adorno does not
just hold on to a notion of subjectivity in his philosophy, but that the notion of
subjectivity is, arguably, at the heart of his philosophy.‖10 Sherman supports this claim in
three ways. First, he argues that ―Adorno tenaciously holds on to the subject-object
paradigm… while Adorno rejects the notion of a ‗constituting subjectivity‘ because it
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cannot open itself up to the object, which he privileges, Adorno is, for the most part,
motivated in this regard by the desire to free up subjectivity itself.‖11 Second, he points
out that ―much of Adorno‘s critique of Heidegger in Negative Dialectics is principally
directed against Heidegger‘s rejection of subjectivity.‖12

Third, he reminds us that

―Adorno (qualifiedly) holds on to a number of enlightenment concepts that are tied up
with subjectivity, including ‗humanism‘ and ‗responsibility‘.‖13

Früchtl
Sherman concludes his refutation of Mörchen and Dallmayr by exposing a
fundamental difference between Heidegger and Adorno where the self is concerned:
As to seeing ―the primacy of the individual‖ as a ―historical category,‖
Mörchen is surely right, but the point is that Heidegger and Adorno value
this ―historical category‖ in diametrically opposed ways. While for
Heidegger the primacy of the individual arises from the philosophical
tradition‘s wrong turn into metaphysics, for Adorno the primacy of the
individual is the promise of the enlightenment, a promise to which Adorno
remains firmly committed.14
Yet, as Früchtl shows, in ―The Struggle of the Self against Itself: Adorno and Heidegger
on Modernity,‖ while Sherman‘s conclusion is ultimately correct, matters are not so
simple. For one thing, only the later Heidegger is dismissive of subjectivity; the early
Heidegger, by contrast, advocates authentic selfhood. For another, Adorno was indeed
loyal to the Enlightenment, however he was also critical of it, as well as mostly
pessimistic about its realization. For these reasons, Früchtl argues that although Adorno
ultimately sides with the Enlightenment, whereas Heidegger remains opposed or
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indifferent to it, they overlap momentarily due to a similar ―Romantic-agonistic style of
thought.‖15
Früchtl makes a distinction between the Enlightenment, or ―expanded-classical,‖
and the Romantic, or ―agonistic‖ (agon meaning ―struggle‖ in ancient Greek) conceptions
of modernity in general, and subjectivity in particular.

The former, he explains,

emphasizes reconciliation á la Hegel, whereas the latter dwells on the ―ineliminable
moment of conflict.‖16

He then reveals the Romantic ―style of thinking‖ in both

Heidegger and Adorno such that each appears to view the self as agonistic. As per
Heidegger, this can be seen in either his early interest in ―heroic nihilism‖ (inspired by
Nietzsche), which champions a creative/destructive self, or his later embrace of
―releasement‖ (Gelassenheit), or letting-be, which involves ―a simultaneous posture of
yes and no with regard to the world of technicity.‖17 Similarly, Adorno‘s thesis, from
Dialectic of Enlightenment (1943), that self-preservation is self-destruction shows the
subject to be essentially at odds with itself. As Früchtl elaborates, for Adorno ―The birth
of the individual is only possible through the concomitant mortification of that individual
as a sensuous and hedonistic being. In Dialectic of Enlightenment this specific process is
captured in the pregnant formula: ―self-preservation through self-destruction.‖18
However, while Heidegger and Adorno both discern an irreparable split at the
heart of the self, Früchtl argues that they arrive at, and depart from, this insight in
different ways; Heidegger having also a ―hybridistic concept of the self,‖ and Adorno
maintaining an Enlightenment, or ―classically Hegelian,‖ perspective. Thus, Früchtl
concludes that ―Whereas Adorno [strikes] a certain balance between a more classically
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Hegelian and a Romantic-agonistic style of thought, Heidegger operates in a space
between an agonistic and what I called a „hybrid‟ style of thinking.‖19 This means that
while Adorno holds out hope for eventual harmony of the self (with society and thus
itself), Heidegger advocates a ―hybridistic‖ self, that is a self that is literally hubristic, or
self-exalting. Another way of framing this difference is to say that Adorno awaits
(real/true) autonomy, or self-determination, whereas Heidegger urges authenticity, or
self-realization. Früchtl clarifies this distinction aptly:
the dimension of self-determination is fractured by an inner conflict,
namely, that between autonomy and authenticity, between (deontological)
morality and (eudaimonistic) ethics, between self-determination in the
strict sense and self-realization in general. ―Enlightenment‖ in the
properly Kantian sense is directed essentially toward the first alternative in
each case, toward autonomy and morality, while the Romantic approach is
primarily concerned with the second, with the self-realization, selfcreation, and self-expression of concrete individuality.20

Assessing the Heidegger-Adorno Scholarship
This last point by Früchtl – that Heidegger‘s notion of authenticity belongs to the
tradition of eudaimonistic ethics, while Adorno‘s concept of autonomy belongs to that of
deontological morality – will provide the basis for my own conclusion that, as Sherman
claims, Heidegger and Adorno are finally irreconcilable when it comes to the issue of the
self. However, in arriving at this position, Mörchen‘s and Dallmayr‘s observation of
―latent affinity‖ between Heidegger and Adorno with regard to the self will be accepted,
inasmuch as each endeavors to destroy/critique the modern view of subjectivity. Thus,
the first affinity to be explored in the following will be the parallel between Heidegger‘s
destruction of the modern (Cartesian) subject, and Adorno‘s critique of the modern
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(Baconian and Kantian) subject. Furthermore, and here I will depart from the HeideggerAdorno scholarship, it will also be shown how in negating the subject of modernity,
Heidegger and Adorno both affirm alternative selves that not only improve upon the
shortcomings of the former, but also stand as ideals. Hence, the second affinity herein
will be the similarly subversive tendencies of Heidegger‘s authentic self and Adorno‘s
autonomous subject. Thus, while I will start from the same place as Mörchen and
Dallmayr, and end up in the same place as Sherman and Früchtl, I will offer an original
path between these two points.

2. Heidegger‘s Destruktion of the Modern Subject
Heidegger and Being
Heidegger‘s Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, 1927), his first major work and the
one he remains best known for, is at bottom an attempt to reveal the ―meaning of Being‖
as such. According to Heidegger, the meaning of Being was approximated by some of
the pre-Socratic philosophers, but then quickly eclipsed by Plato‘s and Aristotle‘s
(mis)understanding of Being, a wrong turn that he claims has persisted through the
medieval era (from Plotinus to Aquinas) and the modern period (from Descartes to
Hegel) to the very writing of Being and Time. The principle problem with the reigning
conception of Being, for Heidegger, is that it rightly associates Being with time, but
wrongly confines it to only one ―mode of time‖; namely the ―present‖:
it will be manifest that the ancient way of interpreting the Being of entities
is oriented towards the ―world‖ or ―Nature‖ in the widest sense, and that it
is indeed in terms of ‗time‘ that its understanding of Being is obtained…
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Entities are grasped in their Being as ―presence‖; this means that they are
understood with regard to a definite mode of time—the ―Present.‖21
This interpretation of Being can be seen in Book VII of Plato‘s Republic, also known as
the ―Allegory of the Cave,‖ wherein Socrates pits against the ―world of becoming and
perishing‖ (signified by the cave), against the ―world of being,‖ characterized as eternal
and unchanging. Hence for Plato, Being is a kind of permanent presence, time without
past or future; the entities that comprise the world of being, or that have being, the
Forms/Ideas (i.e., the Good, the Beautiful), neither begin (become) nor end (perish), but
exist forever in the same way, which is to say are invariably present.

Heidegger and Human Being
To ―overcome‖ this interpretation of Being, which in part entails a recovery of the
―primordial,‖ pre-Socratic conception of Being, necessitates passage through human
being or Dasein, in Heidegger‘s view, a detour that ends up lasting the entirety of Being
and Time. Heidegger operates on this methodological impulse for two reasons. First,
only Dasein, he points out, can be ―interrogated‖ about the meaning of Being, because
only Dasein is ―ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an
issue for it... Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological‖;22 thus, in
Heidegger‘s breakdown of the ―formal structure of the Question of Being,‖ which guides
his inquiry, the part of Befragtes, or ―that which is interrogated,‖ goes to Dasein, which
in turn will ―ask about‖ Being (Gefragtes) in order to ―find out‖ the meaning of Being
(Erfragte). Second, the very ―structure‖ of Dasein, which Heidegger will ultimately call
―care,‖ exhibits the basic temporality of Being (the driving thesis of Being and Time), for
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Dasein‘s being cannot be understood as being qua presence, but only as being qua the
threefold past, present, and future. Hence ―the being of Dasein,‖ that is its ―structural
whole,‖ in Heidegger‘s terminology, must be formulated as Being ―ahead-of-itselfBeing-already-in-(the world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-theworld),‖ whereby ―Being-already-in-the-world,‖ refers to Dasein‘s past, ―Beingalongside‖ refers to Dasein‘s present, and ―Being-ahead-of-itself‖ refers to Dasein‘s
future.23
Thus, Heidegger is very much concerned with the self in Being and Time,
although he soon after dispenses with it in full pursuit of the meaning of Being, a move
that he begins to make in the ―Letter on Humanism,‖ and which he increasingly carries
out in his later writings. Of course, even as early as Being and Time, Heidegger is
already radically distancing himself from the problem of subjectivity. He does so in part
because, again, his central concern here is the meaning of Being itself, rather than any
particular being, human being included. Additionally, the conception of subjectivity
handed down by the philosophical tradition, ultimately from Plato in his estimation, but
more directly from Descartes, is just as tainted by ―ancient ontology‖ for him as is the
dominant interpretation of Being. Thus, Heidegger sets up in Being and Time not only to
rewrite the meaning of Being, but also to reinterpret the subject in light of this new
meaning. We could do worse, then, than read Heidegger‘s efforts with respect to the self
in Being and Time as both negative and positive; the former because he indeed looks to
destroy the traditional view of the self and the latter because he posits an alternative view
of the self intended to take its place; that is, authentic Dasein.
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Heidegger‟s “Destruktion” of the Cartesian Subject
In a key section of the introduction to Being and Time, entitled ―the task of
destroying the history of ontology,‖ in which he makes his case for freeing the meaning
of Being from the fetters of post-Socratic philosophy, Heidegger also traces the effects of
this ontology on the history of ideas relating to the subject. Saying nothing about Plato‘s
tripartite soul or Augustine‘s free will, his discussion focuses primarily on the modern
period, and above all on Descartes. Heidegger‘s argument runs backward and forward
here, to the extent that it locates the roots of Descartes‘ conception of subjectivity in
ancient ontology, by way of ―medieval scholasticism,‖ as well as tracks its influence on
German Idealism‘s notion of the subject. The problem with Descartes‘ understanding of
the subject, for Heidegger, is that while purporting to restart philosophy on a ―new and
firm footing,‖ it unwittingly falls back on a ―baleful prejudice, which has kept later
generations from making any thematic ontological analytic of the ‗mind‘ [‗Gemütes‘]
such as would take the question of Being as a clue and would at the same time come to
grips critically with the traditional ancient ontology.‖24
In Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), Descartes arrives at his ―first
principle‖ – the famous formulation cogito, ergo sum (I think, therefore I am) – which
leads him to define the ―I‖ as a res cogitans, or ―thinking thing.‖ However, in the third
meditation, when inquiring into the origin of his existence (an exercise that founds his
―second principle,‖ the existence of God), he asserts that God is his creator, or that he is a
creature of God.

The res cogitans thereby suddenly becomes, in addition, an ens
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creatum, or created thing. Thus, what began as radically new, or ―modern,‖ in Cartesian
thought ends up back in the paradigm of medieval ontology, precisely the tradition
Descartes sought to displace. What is worse, Heidegger points out, is that the medieval
concepts of ens infinitum and ens increatum are themselves a relapse; namely, into
ancient ontology, which also viewed beings as created, or produced (hence the central
ancient Greek notion of poiēsis, or ―bringing-forth‖). Thus, Descartes not only fails to
escape medievalism, but also fails to escape the ontology of Western philosophy at large.
As Heidegger explains:
[Descartes] regarded this entity as a fundamentum inconcussum, and
applied the medieval ontology to it through the fundamental
considerations of his Meditationes. He defined the res cogitans
ontologically as an ens; and in the medieval ontology the meaning of
Being for such an ens had been fixed by understanding it as an ens
creatum. God, as ens infinitum, was the ens increatum. But createdness
[Geschaffenheit] in the widest sense of something‘s having been produced
[Hergestelltheit], was an essential item in the structure of the ancient
conception of Being.25
Yet, it is not just Descartes‘ recapitulation of medieval and thus ancient ontology,
but also his unawareness of having done so, with which Heidegger takes issue. For
Descartes‘ very negligence of the significance of Being is just what allows him to think
of the subject as essentially a thinking thing, or mind, as opposed to an ―extended thing‖
(res extensa), or body. Descartes is thus guilty of the transgression, so criminal for
Heidegger, of both forgetting Being, and of forgetting this forgetting itself. As he asserts,
in measuring the impact of Descartes‘ disregard of Being on that of Kant:
In taking over Descartes‘ ontological position Kant made an essential
omission: he failed to provide an ontology of Dasein. This omission was a
decisive one in the spirit [im Sinne] of Descartes‘ ownmost tendencies.
With the ―cogito sum‖ Descartes had claimed that he was putting
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philosophy on a new and firm footing. But what he left undetermined
when he began in this ―radical‖ way, was the kind of Being which belongs
to the res cogitans, or – more precisely – the meaning of the Being of the
―sum.‖26

Dasein v. the Cartesian Subject
It is Descartes‘ forgetfulness of the being of the subject, a negligence that endures
through Kant and Hegel, which arguably motivates Heidegger‘s notion of Dasein in
Being and Time. If we consider for a moment the very term Dasein, which literally
means ―being there‖ or ―being here,‖ we at once notice that the emphasis is plainly on the
being of the self, instead of its consciousness. And when Heidegger begins to unpack the
fundamental traits, or ―existentialia,‖ of Dasein, this accent becomes even more
pronounced; the definition of Dasein is further refined to ―Being-in-the-world,‖ which
can be reduced in turn to ―Being-in‖ and ―Being-with.‖ ―Being-in,‖ moreover, includes
―Being-alongside,‖ as in Dasein is ―such that it is always ‗outside‘ alongside entities
which it encounters and which belong to a world already discovered.‖27 This is what it
means to refer to Dasein, in the simplest sense, as ek-sistence, or ―standing out toward‖
other beings.
Thus even in ―knowing‖ the world, Dasein, since it is at bottom a ―Being-outside‖
amidst other beings, does not encounter it simply as a consciousness, which is to say
something ―inside,‖ but necessarily as an inside that is always already outside. In a direct
attack on Cartesian epistemology, which is inextricably bound up with the Cartesian view
of the subject, Heidegger claims that ―the perceiving of what is known is not a process of
returning with one‘s booty to the ‗cabinet‘ of consciousness after one has gone out and
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grasped it; even in perceiving, retaining, and preserving, the Dasein which knows
remains outside, and it does so as Dasein.‖28 Hence solipsism, which haunted Descartes
in the first two of his Meditations, does not present a problem for Heidegger, as being
cannot be siphoned off of consciousness, since for Heidegger being is the very ground of
consciousness.

3. Heidegger‘s (Re)construction of the Self: Authentic Dasein
We have now considered the negative project of Heidegger‘s Being and Time visà-vis the modern, Cartesian subject. This has yielded two major insights: first, Heidegger
rejects the Cartesian subject on the basis that it reasserts medieval, and even ancient,
ontology, which provide a faulty account of both human being and Being as such;
second, Heidegger traces this reversion to Descartes‘ negligence of the importance of
Being, a tendency that itself goes unacknowledged by him.

These problems with

Descartes‘ treatment of the subject thus lay the groundwork for Heidegger‘s positive or
(re)constructive account of the self. More specifically, Heidegger‘s misgivings about the
Cartesian subject are precisely what move him to anchor his own notion of Dasein firmly
in a carefully worked out ontological standpoint. Hence the terms Dasein, ―being-in-theworld,‖ and ek-sistence, all of which underscore the being of human being, unlike
Descartes‘ preferred terms cogito and res cogitans, which privilege consciousness.
Yet the positive task of Being and Time with respect to the self goes well beyond
the simple inversion of the being/consciousness binary. For the question remains what,
or rather ―who,‖ in particular, is this Dasein with which Heidegger seeks to replace the
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Cartesian subject? Further, and more important perhaps, in what sense does Heidegger
conceive of Dasein beyond the bounds of the old ontology that has hitherto ensnared the
entire philosophical enterprise, in his view?

In other words, if the problem with

Descartes is that he unconsciously fell back on an ill-conceived ontology due to a general
forgetfulness of Being, how will Heidegger, in ―not-forgetting‖ Being (the ancient Greek
word for this term, which Heidegger invokes in nearly all of his writings, is alētheia),
provide an account of Dasein that corrects the Cartesian conception? In order to venture
answers to these questions, we must as a matter of course turn to Heidegger‘s concept of
authenticity.

The Origin of Heidegger‟s Critique of “the They”: Kierkegaard and Nietzsche
First, however, the ―authentic self‖ must be differentiated from what Heidegger
calls the ―they-self.‖ The they-self is simply ―average everyday Dasein,‖ the self that
exists in a largely practical fashion, viewing other beings as ―ready-to-hand‖ or as
possible sites of ―equipment‖ with which it can accomplish its various projects. As a
they-self, Dasein goes about its day-to-day life – commuting to and from work, checking
in from time to time with mass media – in an ―ontic‖ or ―pre-ontological‖ manner, which
is to say in a ―public environment‖ that is far removed, in Heidegger‘s opinion, from
consideration of the meaning of Being, including the meaning of one‘s own being. This
is less a condemnation on Heidegger‘s part, it must be stated, than a description of
Dasein as it is exists most of the time; the they-self, he holds, is a ―structural,‖ or
permanent, feature of human being and not something that can be simply cast off once
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and for all, even if Dasein so wished. Hence Heidegger writes, ―The ‗they‘ is an
existentiale; and as a primordial phenomenon, it belongs to Dasein‘s positive
constitution.‖29
However, Heidegger‘s dispassionate ―analytic‖ of the they-self occasionally takes
on a more critical tone.

Echoing the spirit, and to some degree the letter, of

Kierkegaard‘s assault on ―the crowd,‖ which he branded ―the untruth,‖ as well as
Nietzsche‘s many swipes at ―the herd,‖ Heidegger attacks ―the they‖ (das Man, which
can also mean ―the one‖), from which the they-self derives. Heidegger‘s hostility to the
they must in part be read in light of the uneasiness over the supposed loss of individuality
wrought by so-called mass society in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a pressing
threat to existentialists from Dostoevsky to Sartre. For Kierkegaard, what was above all
at stake was saving the Protestant individual from an increasingly ―spiritless‖
Christendom.

Nietzsche, by contrast, saw the individual as threatened by the very

Christianity, and its hold on the ―rabble,‖ that Kierkegaard took pains to resurrect.
Whatever their motives, however, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger share a sense
that the absorption of individuality in the crowd/herd/they is categorically troubling.
Hence Nietzsche‘s lament, ―No shepherd and one herd! Everybody wants the same,
everybody is the same: whoever feels different goes voluntarily into a madhouse,‖30 and
Kierkegaard‘s complaint that ―in the world a self is what one least asks after, and the
thing it is most dangerous of all to show signs of having. The biggest danger, that of
losing oneself, can pass off in the world as quietly as if it were nothing; every other loss,
an arm, a leg, five dollars, a wife, etc. is bound to be noticed.‖31

19

If Heidegger‘ Being and Time contains any such phrase, it is the briefer and less
shrill, but certainly similar, ―Everyone is the other, and no one is himself.‖32 This claim
emerges in the context of Heidegger‘s portrayal of the they as a ―dictatorship‖ that
colonizes Dasein, ―covering up‖ or ―dispersing‖ its ―mineness‖ such that the self is
―levelled down‖ or made ―average.‖ Again, the influence of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche
here is palpable.

In The Present Age (1846), Kierkegaard‘s scathing reproach of

nineteenth-century European society, he asserts that ―levelling is eo ipso the destruction
of the individual,‖33 and even goes so far as to predict that ―No single individual (I mean
no outstanding individual – in the sense of leadership and conceived according to the
dialectical category ‗fate‘) will be able to arrest the abstract process of levelling, for it is
negatively something higher, and the age of chivalry is gone.‖34 Nietzsche likewise
bemoaned the effects of levelling, particularly its role in the alleged decline of ―European
man.‖ Thus, in On the Genealogy of Morals (1887) he writes:
For this is how things stand: the withering and levelling of European man
constitutes our greatest danger, because it is a wearying sight… Today we
see nothing with any desire to become greater, we sense that everything is
going increasingly downhill, downhill, thinning out, getting more goodnatured, cleverer, more comfortable, more mediocre, more indifferent,
more Chinese, more Christian— man, there is no doubt, is ―improving‖ all
the time… This and nothing else is the fate of Europe— along with our
fear of man we have also forfeited our love, respect, and hope for him,
even the will to him. The sight of man is now a wearying sight— what is
nihilism today, if not this?... We are weary of man…35
The following passage from Being and Time virtually expresses the same concern, albeit
via Heidegger‘s less passionate discourse:
Thus the ―they‖ maintains itself factically in the averageness of that which
belongs to it, of that to which it grants success and that to which it denies
it. In this averageness with which it prescribes what can and may be
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ventured, it keeps watch over everything exceptional that thrusts itself to
the fore. Every kind of priority gets noiselessly suppressed. Overnight,
everything that is primordial gets glossed over as something that has long
been well known. Everything gained by a struggle becomes just
something to be manipulated. Every secret loses its force. This care of
averageness reveals in turn an essential tendency of Dasein which we call
the ―levelling down‖ [Einebnung] of all possibilities of Being.36

Fallenness, Anxiety, and Authenticity
Of course, the difference between Heidegger on the one hand, and Kierkegaard
and Nietzsche on the other hand, is that the former sees the levelling of the self as an
―essential tendency of Dasein,‖ which is to say that the individual, for Heidegger, cannot
entirely escape the they, but is in fact continually ―tempted‖ to ―fall‖ into it. One gets
the sense when reading Kierkegaard and Nietzsche that the self can eventually, with
enough passion or will power respectively, successfully liberate itself from the
crowd/herd; and arguably Kierkegaard and Nietzsche each proved this in their own lives,
notwithstanding the tragic endings for both. With Heidegger, however, this not the case,
since the they-self is an ―exisentiale‖ of Dasein, meaning a kind of default mode, and
because the they has the pleasant effect of ―disburdening‖ Dasein, or of making things
―easy‖ for it.
In this way, though not a psychoanalytic thinker (the analytic of Dasein, we are
told in the introduction to Being and Time, is not that of psychology), Heidegger
addresses a significant cause of Dasein‘s preference for remaining in the mode of the
they-self. In his phenomenology of ―fallenness‖ (Verfallen) which, he claims, is not to be
confused with the Catholic doctrine of Original Sin, but rather designates Dasein‘s
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―Being-lost in the publicness of the ‗they‘,‖ Heidegger underscores the ―constant
temptation‖ offered by the ―tranquility‖ of fallenness, a tranquility that assures Dasein
that ―everything is ‗in the best of order‘ and all doors are open.‖37 While this seduction
also brings about ―uninhibited ‗hustle‘‖ and ―exaggerated ‗self-dissection,‘‖ it
nevertheless holds at bay the much more unsettling mood of ―anxiety,‖ which runs
directly counter to tranquility. Yet, so long as Dasein is a they-self, which is to say ―lost‖
or ―fallen‖ or ―tranquillized,‖ it is thereby missing something; hence Heidegger‘s claim,
―This very state of Being, in its everyday kind of Being, is what proximally misses itself
and covers itself up.‖38
Anxiety (Angst), then, is what commences the shift from the they-self to the
authentic self. If Dasein qua they-self is tranquil, then anxiety induces the shock that
jolts it from its fallenness, thereby furnishing it with the possibility of authentic selfhood.
Thus Heidegger contends that anxiety ―individualizes‖ Dasein, catapulting it out the they
and back onto its ―mineness,‖ or ―ownmost potentiality-for-Being.‖ In a time when
moods, especially of the ―darker‖ variety, are swiftly dismissed as illnesses of the mind
that can and should be eliminated by modern medicine, it may be hard to fully appreciate
Heidegger‘s point here; for rather than confronting anxiety as something like an obstacle,
he sees it as precisely what allows Dasein to get a hold of itself, as it were. Of course, by
anxiety Heidegger does not mean anything like depression or irrational fear. Rather, he
suggests that whereas those moods are of something, anxiety is of nothing, which is to say
the ―nullity‖ or nothingness at the very core of Dasein.
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Heidegger‘s contention that Dasein is permeated by nothingness, is not a claim
about the insignificance of the individual, but instead that the self has no essence besides
its existence. For Heidegger, the human being‘s essence is existence. This means that
the self is never a settled thing like a table or horse, but always fundamentally a ―Beingfree for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself.‖39 As the they-self,
Dasein does not notice this ―Being-free,‖ much less act on it. However, when anxiety
strikes (and this can ―arise in the most innocuous Situations‖40), Dasein is suddenly
brought face-to-face with its freedom. Now recognizing itself as a ―solus ipse‖ (hence
―existential solipsism,‖ not to be confused with Cartesian, epistemological solipsism),
Dasein experiences the feeling of ―uncanniness‖ or ―not-being-at-home.‖ This, in turn,
places Dasein squarely before its ―structural whole,‖ the ―care‖ structure mentioned
earlier, which refers to the basic temporal character of Dasein; thus, the being of Dasein
is comprised of the threefold past, present, and future.
The most important of these three modes of time, according to Heidegger, is the
future. Since the past is already fixed, and the present is always slipping into the past,
Dasein must project itself into the future. Yet, in doing so Dasein realizes that its future
does not extend out into the distance indefinitely, but must at some point come to a halt.
In this way, anxiety communicates to Dasein that it is a finite, or mortal, being whose
possibilities will one day cease. What is worse, ceasing to be, or death, can occur at any
moment, making Dasein‘s anxiety all the more acute: ―As soon as a man comes to life, he
is at once old enough to die.‖41 There is no way out of this decidedly dis-eased state for
Heidegger other than ―impassioned freedom towards death,‖ which is to say authenticity
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(Eigentlichkeit).42 Of course, Dasein can just as easily, and often does, slip back into
being a they-self; as Dasein is essentially a Being-free, existing authentically or
―inauthentically‖ is a matter of choice, one which only Dasein itself can make:
…anxiety individualizes. This individualization brings Dasein back from
its falling, and makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are
possibilities of its Being. These basic possibilities of Dasein (and Dasein
is in each case mine) show themselves in anxiety as they are in
themselves—undisguised by entities within-the-world, to which,
proximally and for the most part Dasein clings.43

The Meaning of Authenticity
But what is authenticity more precisely, or to take Heidegger‘s cue in his own
questioning of Being, what is the meaning of authenticity? That is, what does it mean to
be authentic? Right at the outset of Being and Time, Heidegger implies that authenticity
does not connote a ―greater‖ or ―higher‖ kind of Dasein: ―the inauthenticity of Dasein
does not signify any ‗less‘ Being or any ‗lower‘ degree of Being.‖44 Elsewhere, he
asserts, ―Authentic-Being-one‟s-Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the
subject.‖45 To help explain these quotations it must be stressed, once more, that for
Heidegger, Dasein – even so-called great Dasein‟s – exist inauthentically the majority of
the time, as everyone can be said to function primarily in the mode of the they-self. An
additional point that is useful in this connection is that the methodology of Being and
Time is that of phenomenology, which seeks to be descriptive rather than prescriptive.
Hence, when it comes to examining Dasein, Heidegger wishes only to show, or let it be
shown, how Dasein is rather than how Dasein ought to be.
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Nevertheless, it is hard to resist the sense that Heidegger‘s description of
authenticity is not entirely value-free.

As Taylor Carman argues, ―notwithstanding

Heidegger‘s frequent protestations to the contrary, ‗authenticity‘ also obviously functions
as an evaluative term describing a desirable or choice-worthy mode of existence; it is
something good.‖46 Charles Guignon concurs here, even going so far as to use the term
―higher‖ in relation to authenticity: ―Heidegger‘s concept of ‗authenticity‘ is supposed to
point to a way of life that is higher than that of average everydayness.‖47 Michael
Zimmerman also looks upon authenticity as something of an ideal, in his case of
―integrity;‖ in surveying the status of authentic selfhood in the context of post-modernity,
which both accepts and lauds the disintegration of the individual, he proposes:
―Arguably… early Heidegger‘s concept of authentic selfhood as anxious being-towardsdeath retains considerable force today, when millions of technologically advanced people
report being plagued by anxiety, panic attacks, and other ‗disorders‘ linked to perceived
threats to egoic subjectivity.‖48
Assuming contemporary scholarship is right in this regard, we still need to be
clear about, for our purposes, just how authenticity serves as an ideal. If we recall
Heidegger‘s destruction of the Cartesian subject, the exact problem there was that in
ignoring the being of the cogito, Descartes was forced to recycle traditional ontology.
Since Heidegger assures us that he will not be making such mistakes in Being and Time,
with respect to Being or the self, we must now ask how precisely he accomplishes this
vis-à-vis Dasein. We already know that for one thing, Heidegger makes being just as
important, more so perhaps, than consciousness in his very formulation of Dasein as a
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being-in-the-world. We have also noted, by way of exploring Heidegger‘s concept of
anxiety, that anxiety reveals the kind of being that Dasein truly is, namely a ―Beingtoward-death.‖

In these two moves, Heidegger overturns the Cartesian subject,

supplanting it with his own view of the self; again, as a being (and not just a
consciousness), and a temporal (as opposed to an eternal) one at that.
Thus, at the center of Heidegger‘s notion of authenticity arguably lies the
injunction for Dasein itself to recognize these insights, and more importantly, to actually
incorporate them in an existential, or ―existentiell,‖ way; that is, to live the
individualized, temporalized being that Dasein is.

For this reason, such Romantic

phrases as ―being oneself‖ or ―being true to oneself‖ often come up in discussions of
Heidegger‘s concept of authenticity. Of course, what one is exactly has always been the
hardest part to figure out when attempting to make these sayings concrete. (Apparently,
Heidegger‘s students used to joke that they were ―resolute,‖ or authentic, though they
knew not what for.) Hence Heidegger‘s concept of authenticity has been accused of
―formalism,‖ insofar as it offers really nothing in the way of content; it begs the question,
what must one do to be authentic?

As Rüdiger Safranski, one of Heidegger‘s

biographers, notes, ―Authenticity discovers no new areas of Dasein. Everything can, and
probably will, remain as it was; only our attitude to it changes…

Authenticity is

intensity, nothing less.‖49 But the charge of formalism is perhaps somewhat amiss. For
to be authentic, according to Heidegger, means concretely to exist as a being-here, which
is also a being that will not be here for very long.
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4. Adorno‘s The Jargon of Authenticity
As mentioned above, to even suggest similarity between Heidegger‘s and
Adorno‘s conceptions of the self is a kind of betrayal of Adorno himself, who goes to
great lengths to repudiate Heidegger‘s notion of authenticity. He does so throughout his
corpus, from some of his earliest writings to Negative Dialectics, in which he spends all
of Part One (of three) on distancing his thought from that of Heidegger where
subjectivity, as well as other issues, is concerned. Of course, it is in The Jargon of
Authenticity (Jargon der Eigentlichkeit) that Adorno launches his most direct attack on
Heidegger‘s view of the self. In general, this text reads as a standard critical theorist‘s
critique of existentialism, of which there were several, such as Marcuse‘s review of
Sartre‘s Being and Nothingness.50 As in that essay, which accuses the early Sartre‘s
emphasis on the subject‘s ―radical freedom‖ of masking and thereby reinforcing the
glaring ―unfreedom‖ of the early 1940‘s, the Jargon of Authenticity aims to shatter the
aura shrouding Heidegger‘s call to authenticity by exposing it as equally ideological.
Since Adorno‘s argument here is fairly straightforward, however complex its
presentation, I will characterize it briefly and in rough outline.
While he levels a number of different criticisms at Heidegger, Adorno‘s basic
concern can be characterized as follows. Just as Hegel took issue with Kant‘s view of the
subject for being ―transcendental,‖ so Adorno regards Heidegger‘s account of Dasein,
what with its ontological ―structures,‖ as ―[historically oblivious]‖ at best, and
ideological at worst. Take anxiety, for example. According to Heidegger, anxiety is a
mood that must sooner or later be confronted, whether Dasein is a Roman gladiator,
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medieval monk, or twenty-first century Swiss banker; in other words, anxiety is a feature
of the human being as such. In Adorno‘s view, however, anxiety is not something built
into the subject to last for all time, but is rather a response to a particular socio-historical
condition; namely that of what he elsewhere calls the ―administered world‖:
Angst, busily distinguished from inner-worldly, empirical fear, need by no
means be an existential value. Since it is historical, it appears in fact that
those who are yoked into a society which is societalized, but contradictory
to the deepest core, constantly feel threatened by what sustains them.
They feel threatened without ever being able in specific instances to
concretize this threat from the whole of society.51
Adorno likewise critiques Heidegger‘s other central ideas, which at the time
Adorno was writing The Jargon of Authenticity had become staples of existentialist
discourse. Hence the following passage on ―powerlessness and nothingness‖:
In the jargon, however, the word ―Man‖ no longer relies on human dignity
as idealism, in spite of the cult of historical figures and of greatness in
itself. Instead, man is to have his powerlessness and nothingness as his
substance; this becomes a theme in the philosophers in question. This
powerlessness and nothingness of man is coming close to its realization in
present society. Such a historical state of affairs is then transposed into
the pure essence of Man. It becomes affirmed and eternalized at the same
time.52
The problem, then, for Adorno, is not so much that existential philosophy expresses the
mood of impotence so (understandably) common in the first half of the twentieth century
(if this were all that Heidegger‘s Being and Time, and those who followed in its footsteps,
deigned to do, then Adorno would probably have greeted it as he did modernist literature;
that is, with great interest). But this is not, as Adorno points out, what Heidegger and his
adherents were up to; for instead of seeing anxiety, powerlessness, and nothingness as
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symptomatic of their historical milieu, these symptoms were ―ontologized,‖ which is to
say turned into the ―essential structures‖ of Dasein, or the universal ―human condition.‖
The true peril, then, of Heidegger‘s ontology of Dasein, in Adorno‘s view, is that
it ultimately encourages surrender: ―As it runs in the jargon: suffering, evil, and death are
to be accepted, not to be changed.‖53 This is precisely what makes it ideological, since
by turning anxiety into an ahistorical attribute of the self, Heidegger ends up leaving the
―true‖ or ―real‖ source of anxiety – society, for Adorno – intact. The only antidote
Heidegger prescribes for anxiety is authenticity. But authenticity, Adorno argues, is not
intended to address, let alone change, the social conditions from which anxiety ultimately
emerges. Yet this is the only way to be finally rid of anxiety, according to Adorno. For,
―the only help lies in changing the conditions which brought the state of affairs to this
point.‖54 Only then, Adorno suggests, can there be improvement in ―the psychology of
real individuals which is dependent on that society.‖55

5. Adorno‘s Critique of the Modern Subject
Dialectic of Enlightenment
In order to fully grasp Adorno‘s critique of the modern subject we must look first
at Dialectic of Enlightenment (Dialektik der Aufklärung, 1947). Co-authored with his
friend and philosophical mentor Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, written
during the early 1940‘s while the two were in exile in Southern California from Nazi
Germany, seeks to take stock of the Enlightenment, which in the beginning made the
promise of universal liberation, but during the first half of the twentieth-century was
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headed toward total destruction. The first two lines of the book aptly capture this
reversal: ―In the most general sense of progressive thought, the Enlightenment has always
aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the fully
enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant.‖56 Contra the postmodernist reading of
Dialectic of Enlightenment as an indictment of the Enlightenment wholesale, an
interpretation that even later critical theorists such as Habermas endorse, however,
Adorno and Horkheimer are not criticizing the Enlightenment as such, but rather the
betrayal of the ends of the Enlightenment by its own means.
One such end was autonomy (Autonomie), or freedom. Indeed, the birth of the
Enlightenment marked a transition from authority to autonomy at several levels. In the
realm of epistemology, for example, the Cartesian Method of hyperbolic doubt
encouraged individuals to think for themselves, an injunction echoed by Kant‘s slogan
sapere aude, or ―dare to know.‖ Yet, what began as a ―disenchantment‖ of authority
ended up establishing another, no less authoritarian regime; that is, one in which not God,
the Church, or monarchies and aristocracies reigned, but instead the very rationalism that
was called upon to dethrone them.

In the language of Adorno and Horkheimer,

Enlightenment reason, which sought to overcome mythology, had itself become
mythological. Hence they write, ―enlightenment with every step becomes more deeply
engulfed in mythology.‖57

More specifically, this mythology, which is not at all

recognized as such, involves the unthinking worship of ―instrumental reason‖ which,
while rightly dispelling certain superstitions, endangers everything from nature to society
to the self.
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Adorno‟s Critique of the Baconian Subject
Unlike Heidegger, who considers Descartes to be the founder of the
Enlightenment (or modernity), Adorno and Horkheimer attribute this role to Francis
Bacon (1561-1626). Yet, while there are important differences between Descartes and
Bacon, Adorno‘s and Horkheimer‘s critique of the latter is similar to Heidegger‘s
destruction of the former. The most obvious parallel is that just as Heidegger faults
Descartes for his forgetfulness of Being in general, and of the subject‘s being in
particular, so Adorno and Horkheimer reproach Bacon‘s disregard not only of ―first‖ or
―external‖ nature (nature in the conventional sense), but also of ―internal‖ nature
(understood in Freudian terms as the id).

Thus, when Adorno and Horkheimer

recommend the ―remembrance of nature in the subject‖58 as a remedy to Enlightenment
rationalism, they mean a remembrance of the nature without and within. The proximity
here to Heidegger‘s ―not-forgetting of Being‖ has not gone unnoticed. According to
Habermas, it is ―shockingly close‖:
as opposed as the intentions behind their respective philosophies of history
are, Adorno is in the end very similar to Heidegger as regards his position
on the theoretical claims of objectivating thought on reflection: The
mindfulness of nature comes shockingly close to the recollection of
being.59
However, there is another parallel between Adorno‘s critique of the Baconian
subject and Heidegger‘s destruction of the Cartesian subject. In the same way that
Descartes‘ forgetfulness of Being causes him to view the self as primarily a thinking
thing according to Heidegger, so Bacon‘s negligence of the subject‘s internal nature leads
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him to see the self as mainly a ―systematic spirit,‖ which thus has dominion over external
nature. Quoting Bacon in the opening pages of Dialectic of Enlightenment, whereby we
hear him claim that ―now we govern nature in opinions, but we are thrall unto her in
necessity: but if we could be led by her in invention, we should command her in
action,‖60 Adorno and Horkheimer demonstrate the extent to which Bacon equates the
subject with instrumental reason, which stands over against nature as the Other. The
Baconian subject thereby becomes a kind of god, even a replacement for God: ―The
creative god and the systematic spirit are alike as rulers of nature. Man‘s likeness to God
consists in sovereignty over existence, in the countenance of the lord and master, and in
command.‖61 Yet, as Adorno and Horkheimer point out, Bacon‘s conflation of the
subject with instrumental reason, and the attendant conversion of nature into ―mere
objectivity,‖ was a tragic mistake, inasmuch as today ―nature is broken,‖ both internally
and externally.

Adorno, Heidegger, and the Kantian Subject
Adorno‘s critique of German Idealism‘s, especially Kant‘s, concept of the subject
likewise bears some resemblance to that of Heidegger, though here deeper differences
begin to emerge. With regard to Kant, Heidegger argues that he ―took over Descartes‘
position quite dogmatically‖ insofar as he failed to ―give a preliminary ontological
analytic of the subjectivity of the subject,‖ which left the ―connection between time and
the ‗I think‘… shrouded in utter darkness.‖62 In Negative Dialectics (Negative Dialektik)
Adorno also takes issue with Kant‘s negligence of ontology, suggesting that ―An
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ontological moment is needed in so far as ontology will critically strip the subject of its
cogently constitutive role without substituting it through the object, in a king of second
immediacy.‖63 Obviously, these are distinctive claims— Heidegger wishes Kant had
noticed the subject‘s basic temporality, while Adorno wishes Kant had noticed the
socially constituted character of the subject. Still, there is at least a formal agreement that
Kant‘s thought is missing an ―ontological moment.‖
Of course, this moment is all Adorno will allow for ontology. For whereas
Heidegger‘s basic perspective is that of fundamental ontology, Adorno‘s is ―dialectical
thinking,‖ which holds that just as the subject is mediated by objectivity, so objectivity is
mediated by the subject (conceptually and materially). While Heidegger appears to
concede the former, it is not clear that he grants the latter. But what, Adorno asks, is
Being if not, at least in part, a human concept; that is, something mediated by the subject?
Although Heidegger shows signs of thinking of Being as mediated by Dasein – why else
would he have written Being and Time, which aims to correct the misunderstanding (false
mediation) of Being? – from Adorno‘s perspective, he only ends up ―hypostatizing‖ or
―reifying‖ Being once more, turning it into a facta bruta. As such, Heidegger‘s theory of
Being violates Adorno‘s principle of ―non-identity,‖ which states that objects always
elude concepts.

Hence Adorno accuses Heidegger of trying to ―express the

inexpressible‖:
Heidegger gets as far as the borderline of dialectical insight into the
nonidentity in identity. But he does not carry through the contradiction in
the concept of Being. He suppresses it. What can somehow be conceived
as Being mocks the notion of an identity between the concept and that
which it means; but Heidegger treats it as an identity, as pure Being itself,
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devoid of its otherness. The nonidentity in absolute identity is covered up
like a skeleton in the family closet.64
Yet, even on the issue of the subject‘s mediation by objectivity, Heidegger and
Adorno are largely at odds. The difference lies precisely in how the two conceptualize
objectivity. For Heidegger, objectivity is ultimately reducible to Being. In Adorno‘s
view, by contrast, to claim that Being pure and simple is what mediates the self is an
abstraction, since the subject does not merely exist in the midst of Being, but amongst
beings that are themselves mediated— in economic, social, political, cultural, and
linguistic ways. Thus, in short, objectivity for Adorno refers in the main to society. To
say that the subject is mediated by objectivity means, then, for Adorno, that society
constitutes the self.
It is this latter point that Adorno brings to bear on Kant‘s concept of the subject.
In splitting the self into two halves, one of which is ―transcendental‖ (the faculty of
concepts), the other ―empirical‖ (the faculty of intuitions), Adorno contends that Kant
(unknowingly) projects the class structure of bourgeois society, whereby one class
performs intellectual labor and the other manual labor, onto the subject: ―the
transcendental subject can be deciphered as a society unaware of itself.‖65 This is ironic,
since Kant was the first to propose, in his Copernican turn, that objects conform to
concepts, or that the self shapes reality. According to Adorno, however, the concepts
with which the subject mediates objectivity are simultaneously mediated by objectivity.
Thus Kant‘s own concepts, which he took to be a priori, or independent of experience,
were in fact thoroughly a posteriori, or dependent on experience; that is, the experience
of early capitalist society. In this way, Adorno follows Hegel, for whom ―society comes
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before the individual consciousness and before all its experience.‖66 However, as we will
now see, Adorno refuses Hegel‘s call – ―like a father chiding his son,‖67 – for the self to
thereby surrender to society.

6. Adorno‘s Concept of Autonomy: Strong, Critical Subjectivity
Adorno, Marxism, and Postmodernism
That Adorno holds on to the subject rather than encouraging its absorption into
society is decidedly surprising, and not just because of his commitment to Hegel. As
mentioned above, Marxist theory, to which Adorno was even more partial, sees the self
as a product of capitalism that should and will be overcome by the classless society.
Hence in Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer locate the origin of the self
in bourgeois society: ―The social work of every individual in bourgeois society is
mediated through the principle of the self.‖68 In their view, capitalism enacts a process of
―individuation,‖ which in effect creates subjects, as (especially) self-interested,
competitive, etc. In this way, Adorno can also be said to anticipate the postmodern idea
of ―subjectivization,‖ which views the self as ―invented‖ by society, if not capitalist
society per se. Thus Foucault suggests, albeit more in the spirit of Nietzsche‘s ―God is
dead,‖ that ―man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end… like a
face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.‖69
But whereas Marxists and Postmodernists alike tend, for these reasons, to dismiss
the subject altogether, Adorno occupies more of a middle ground concerning the self.70
For one thing, the problem with individuation in his view is not so much that it gives rise
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to fictional subjects, as that it constitutes individuals in a certain way, one which
undermines their fundamental individuality: ―Men were given their individuality as
unique in each case, different to all others, so that it might all the more surely be made
the same as any other.‖71 In other words, there is a kind of Faustian bargain between the
self and society, according to Adorno; the former denies a part of itself in order to ensure
its survival in the latter: ―But the more the process of self-preservation is effected by the
bourgeois division of labor, the more it requires the self-alienation of the individuals who
must model their body and soul according to the technical apparatus.‖72 For another,
Adorno rejects the Hegelian-Marxist call to sacrifice the self to society, since the latter, in
his view, is ―false,‖ ―bad,‖ or ―wrong.‖ For the individual to conform or ―join,‖ then,
even to a revolutionary group, would only end up strengthening ―wrong life,‖ as Adorno
held that political activity is often co-opted by the very system it opposes. Thus the
subject has a kind of duty to ―resist,‖ at least as long as society withholds true autonomy
from it.

Strong Subjectivity
While Adorno holds that late capitalist society affords at most semi-autonomy for
a minority of individuals, he does imply what greater autonomy would look like. Given
the right social conditions, he suggests, the subject would be able to ―strengthen‖ itself.
By strength Adorno does not mean anything Nietzschean; rather, he is referring to a
balance of the id, motivated by the pleasure principle, and the ego, governed by the
reality principle.

Thus Freud is most influential on Adorno here.
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In Dialectic of

Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer show how Odysseus‘ renounces pleasure for the
sake of self-preservation. The best example of this, they contend, is when he ties himself
to the mast of his ship so that he can hear, but not succumb to, the music of the Sirens.
Since Odysseus is the ―prototype of the bourgeois individual,‖ they are suggesting that
today‘s society demands the same of nearly everyone. That is to say, the vast majority of
people under late capitalism must, like Odysseus, forgo pleasure in order to simply
survive. Of course, in repressing the id half of the self is lost, Adorno and Horkheimer
point out. Hence their thesis that self-preservation is self-destructive.
Yet, on the rare occasions that Odysseus ―loses himself,‖ or gives in to pleasure,
he also ―finds himself,‖ or (re)discovers his whole self. What happens at such moments
is that the subject opens itself to objectivity, achieving what Yvonne Sherratt calls
―absorptive unity.‖73 The result is not a dissolution of self, however, but instead an
enhancement of it. As Sherratt explains, what before was ―low subjectivity‖ becomes,
after the loss of self, ―strong Subjectivity,‖ the ―capacity of the self to preserve itself
which includes the idea of both physical and psychological survival.‖74 Thus, to reach
strong subjectivity the self must remember nature. That is, the subject must continually
lose the ego in internal nature (and external nature), if it wants its entire self to survive.
If the individual can do this, moreover, it will not only free itself, but also gain the
strength to struggle for autonomy for all. As Sherratt writes,
In Adorno‘s positive dialectic we see how the enlightenment sense of self
can be strengthened so that Subjects do survive, that they are strong
enough to reach the goals of enlightenment and furthermore, that they are
enriched in and of themselves. For Odysseus to reach Ithaca, for the
enlightenment Subject to achieve his aims, each must drown in their
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respective song. As Adorno puts it, quoting Hölderlin: ―where there is
danger, there salvation grows too.‖75
We find a similar view in Sherman:
As I interpret Adorno, the chief utopian particular that has been buried
underneath the particular reason of the universal is the sensuous, selfdetermining individual—that is, the individual with ‗a certain degree of
ego firmness,‘ whose autonomy resides in the self-conscious recognition
of his own heteronomy, and whose aim is a world in which he can afford
to be heteronomous.76

Critical Subjectivity
Yet, Adorno‘s suggestion of absorptive unity should not be seen as a relapse into
identity-thinking, as if subjectivity and objectivity could be ―one.‖ Rather, as Susan
Buck-Morss reminds us, Adorno was no less interested in ―critical subjectivity‖ than
strong subjectivity; indeed, as suggested by Sherratt and Sherman, the latter serves the
former. Thus, in explicating his notion of ―exact fantasy,‖ Buck-Morss shows how the
loss of self in the object must be coupled with a certain distance:
Instead of simply taking in reality as it was immediately given (and being
taken in by it), the subject‘s ―fantasy‖ actively arranged its elements,
bringing them into various relationships until they crystallized in a way
which made them cognitively accessible. Even as the subject ―entered
into‖ the object, then, it was not swallowed up but maintained the distance
necessary for critical activity… As critical configurations, the constructs
of Adorno‘s exact fantasy were polemical: they were meant to break the
spell of second nature and to liquidate reified consciousness.77
This helps to open up the other part of Adorno‘s concept of autonomy. In addition to the
psychologically free self, then, Adorno prescribed the intellectually free self; hence he
encouraged ―intellectual nonconformity,‖ the ―individual‘s capacity for refusing to
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identify with the status quo,‖ or ―the individual subject‘s nonidentity with the world.‖78
As Buck-Morss also points out,
Not accidentally, Adorno‘s intellectual heroes were ―outsiders,‖ men like
Shoenberg, Freud, Benjamin, Kafka, Trakl, who dared single-handedly to
defy the traditions of their trades. None, of course, were from workingclass backgrounds, none except Benjamin were even armchair Marxists.79
This emphasis on critical subjectivity has a practical dimension for Adorno as
well. In his lecture series entitled Problems of Moral Philosophy (published in 1996)
Adorno advocates what Espen Hammer calls an ―ethics of resistance.‖ Claiming that
―The only thing that can perhaps be said is that the good life today would consist in
resistance to the forms of the bad life that have been seen through and critically dissected
by the most progressive minds,‖80 Adorno warns against joining or conforming, even
going so far as to urge restraint from movie-going:
I would even go so far as to say that even the apparently harmless visit to
the cinema to which we condemn ourselves should really be accompanied
by the realization that such visits are actually a betrayal of the insights we
have acquired and that they will probably entangle us – admittedly only to
an infinitesimal degree, but assuredly with cumulative effect – in the
processes that will transform us into what we are supposed to become and
what we are making ourselves into in order to enable us to survive, and to
ensure that we conform.81
Since the realm of culture is complicit in wrong life, according to Adorno, the subject
must keep a critical distance from certain movies, television shows, music, and books; in
short, from the products of what he called the ―culture industry.‖ Other than critique,
however, Adorno saw few possibilities for resistance, with the exception of ―autonomous
art.‖ Hence his ethics of resistance is ―negative,‖ insofar as it prescribes what not to do,
rather than proposing any particular course of action: ―We are incessantly urged to join

39

in, and for goodness‘ sake do not imagine that I am being even the least bit pharisaical in
proclaiming that you should refrain from joining in.‖82

7. Conclusion: Existentialism v. Critical Theory, Ethics v. Morality
We have seen how both Heidegger and Adorno critique the modern subject, as
well as provide their own ideals of subjectivity. More specifically, we have seen how
their respective criticisms of the modern subject are similar, insofar as each takes issue
with the forgetting of Being (Heidegger) and the forgetting of nature and constitutive
subjectivity (Adorno).

Likewise, we have seen how their positive accounts of the

individual are somewhat aligned, inasmuch as both point to a decidedly subversive self.
However, it is in this latter parallel where the fundamental differences between
Heidegger‘s and Adorno‘s views of the self begin to emerge. For, as Früchtl points out,
Heidegger‘s authentic self belongs to the tradition of eudaimonistic ethics, which stresses
personal happiness, while Adorno‘s autonomous subject belongs to the school of
deontological morality, which emphasizes duty to others. Another way of framing this
distinction would be to say, on the one hand, that Heidegger‘s authentic self is selfrealizing, while on the other hand, Adorno‘s autonomous subject is self-determining, and
ought to be so. Or, more simply still, that Heidegger‘s is an apolitical self, whereas
Adorno‘s is a sociopolitical self.
Again, Heidegger and Adorno are both being subversive here, insofar as each is
promoting non-conformity. However, what exactly the individual is to rebel against
differs, depending on the figure. We know that for Adorno, the subject should resist the
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―false whole,‖ meaning late capitalist society. For Heidegger, by contrast, it is the they
from which Dasein must liberate itself. While the they can be the bourgeoisie, it can also
be anyone, including those who oppose bourgeois society. Thus, Heidegger‘s authentic
Dasein has no (essential) sociopolitical commitment; its loyalty is only to itself. As
Safranski elaborates,
Dasein is authentic when it has the courage to base itself on itself and not
to rely on Hegel‘s so-called substantial morality of state, society, or public
morals; when it can dispense with the unburdening offers on the part of
the world of They; when it finds the strength to bring itself back from
‗being lost‘; when it no longer toys with the thousand possibilities existing
but instead seizes the possibility that one is oneself… What matters in
Heidegger‘s authenticity is not primarily good or ethically correct action
but the opening up of opportunities for great moments, the intensification
of Dasein. Insofar as ethical aspects are concerned at all, Heidegger‘s
ideas in Being and Time can be summed up in one sentence: Do whatever
you like, but make your own decision and do not let anyone relieve you of
the decision and hence the responsibility.83
Lambert Zuidervaart concurs with this point, concluding, after showing how Heidegger
and Adorno ―touch‖ in their views of the self, that Heidegger‘s is a ―nonpublic or
antipublic self,‖ while Adorno‘s is faithful to societal principles such as solidarity and
justice.84
Of course, perhaps the best explanation for this difference, and one mostly in
keeping with the eudaimonistic ethics/deontological morality framework, is that
Heidegger is finally Nietzschean, whereas Adorno is in the end Marxist. While there is a
Nietzschean moment in Adorno‘s thinking – in Problems of Moral Philosophy, he
confesses that he ―[owes] him by far the greatest debt – more even than to Hegel,‖85
Adorno ultimately faults Nietzsche for being ―in thrall to existing social conditions‖: ―he
was able to get to the bottom of what people had become, but was not able to get to the
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bottom of the society that made them what they were.‖86 This criticism obviously
reflects Adorno‘s fundamental partiality to Marxism which, as Sherman argues, he saw as
―the highest achievement of the philosophical tradition… Adorno is neither a ‗postMarxist‘ nor a ‗postmodernist‘ avant la lettre.‖87 Heidegger, by comparison, largely
accepted Nietzsche‘s insights, especially his revelation of nihilism, whereby all morals
are rendered groundless. Indeed, it was this discovery that led Nietzsche to dismiss not
only Christian morality, but also Marxism, which he regarded as merely secularized
Christian morality. Hence the Übermensch, or superman, would become such precisely
by going over, or ―beyond,‖ conventional accounts of good and evil. It is not hard to see
a version of the superman in Heidegger‘s notion of authentic Dasein. Although the latter
is not as driven by the ―will to power‖ as the former, it is not thereby any less nihilistic.

Romantic Coda
The convergence of Heidegger and Adorno, then, in connection with the self, is in
conclusion only a formal one. For as we have seen, upon closer inspection, both the
negative and positive aspects of their thinking on this topic vary considerably. While
there are other points of contact – Heidegger‘s insistence on Dasein‘s openness to Being
and Adorno‘s call to lose oneself – there are also other instances of disagreement –
Heidegger seems to valorize self-possession, the reclaiming of oneself from the they,
whereas Adorno recommends (occasional) self-abandonment. Hence their respective
views of the individual diverged as soon as we looked at their actual content.
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Yet, this formal affinity is not insignificant. That Heidegger and Adorno both
worried over the decline of individuality – whether due to the they or late capitalist
society – as well as reaffirmed the importance of the self – whether in and of itself or for
the sake of collective autonomy – makes them congruous in spirit, if not in letter. This
spirit, as we proposed in the introduction, is decidedly quasi-Romantic of neo-Romantic,
since the Romantics too lamented the loss of individuality (in early modernity), and
likewise sought to reassert it. Their remedy for this was Bildung, or self-realization,
understood in both the holistic and individualistic senses.

Thus, according to the

Romantics, for the self to recover from the alienation of modernity, which divided the
self against itself, it had to rediscover its entire self, in addition to its individuality.

Romanticism
But before we foist the label of quasi-Romanticism or neo-Romanticism onto
Heidegger and Adorno, a decidedly problematic move, especially as regards the latter, we
must first try to articulate the concept, or core, of Romanticism, if only briefly and
simplistically. Even this is no small feat, however, since Romanticism was a multifarious
phenomenon that defies facile definitions. Part of the difficulty is that Romanticism was
not a monolithic movement that can be limited to any particular place. Hence there was
English Romanticism, French Romanticism, German Romanticism, and American
Romanticism. As William Barrett asserts, ―The Romantic movement was not confined to
one country, but passed like a great spasm of energy and enthusiasm over the whole of
Europe—England, France, Germany, Italy—finding different national expressions in
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each country…‖88 Nor was Romanticism confined to any particular time. For example,
in the case of German Romanticism, Storm and Stress (Sturm und Drang) spanned the
late 1760‘s to the early 1780‘s, while early German Romanticism (Führomantik), which
followed Storm and Stress, lasted from about 1796 until 1802. Discerning the figures of
Romanticism can be just as complicated. Hence Goethe is sometimes considered a
Romantic, insofar as his early writings such as The Sorrows of Young Werther (1774)
epitomize Storm and Stress, yet he is also associated with Classicism (Klassik), which
turned against Romanticism, as seen in Wilhelm Meister‟s Apprenticeship (1795/6)
wherein the title character outgrows the passion and attendant despair of young Werther
on a longer journey of self-discovery.
For all of these variations, however, Romanticism does have central themes. As
Barrett argues, while Romanticism found differing national expressions, it ―always
[preserved] the same inner characteristics.‖89 These characteristics are somewhat wellknown, as most descriptions of Romanticism highlight at one point or another its
exaltation of desire/feeling over reason, the individual over the collective, art over
philosophy, and nature over modern society. Barrett, for instance, portrays it thus: ―as a
protest of the individual against the universal laws of classicism, or as the protest of
feeling against reason, or again as the protest on behalf of nature against the
encroachment of industrial society.‖90

According to Beiser, the three ―fundamental

values‖ of Romanticism were Bildung, ―cultural renewal,‖ and ―remystification of the
world.‖
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These values were affirmed in the face of modernity, or the Enlightenment, which
the Romantics blamed, in Beiser‘s words, for ―three forms of alienation‖: 1) ―the division
within the self,‖ which took ―two forms‖— the clash between reason and sensibility
(emotions and desires), especially in social life, and the specialization of one part of the
self at the expense of all of the others, demanded by economic life; 2) ―the division
between the self and others,‖ which led to ―anomie or atomism,‖ and ―arose from the
decline of the traditional community—the guilds, corporations, and family—and the rise
of the competitive marketplace, where each individual sought his self-interest at the
expense of others‖; 3) ―the division between the self and nature,‖ which came from two
sources— modern technology and mechanical physics, both of which ―made nature into
an object of mere use, having no magic, mystery, or beauty.‖91

Romantic Bildung
In his Ideas (Ideen), F. Schlegel writes, articulating the ethos of Romanticism at
large, ―The highest good, and the source of everything useful, is Bildung.‖92 For the
Romantics, Bildung was taken to be the antidote to the ailments wrought by modernity in
general, and not just to the alienation of the self. Thus it was intended to heal the
divisions within the human realm (the ethical and political spheres) in addition to those
between the human and non-human worlds. But in order to understand these broader
consequences, it is important to first establish what Bildung meant for the Romantics at
the level of the self.

This requires underscoring the holistic and individualistic

dimensions of Bildung.

45

While the ideal of Bildung can be traced back all the way to Platonism, in the
Romantic tradition it takes a novel shape.

Coterminous with ―acculturation,‖

―development,‖ or ―formation,‖ Bildung generally denotes education; hence the link to
Plato, whose ―Allegory of the Cave‖ depicts the transformative process of education, or
the elevation of the mind/soul (pysche) from opinion (doxa) to wisdom (sophia). For the
Romantics, however, as Beiser stresses, Bildung indicates something more like selfrealization, or self-actualization. Although this connotation can also be found in ancient
Greek thought, in Aristotle as well as Plato, insofar as both figures urge us to become
most human (indeed, this makes for happiness, or the ―good life,‖ according to each),
Romanticism turns self-realization into a more holistic project.

By holistic self-

realization, the Romantics essentially meant the development of the entire person, such
that not only the intellect and character would be perfected (as Plato and Aristotle, in
addition to Enlightenment thinkers like Kant, advocated), but also the sensibility, the
faculty of sensation, desire, and feeling/emotion. As Beiser states, ―True to such holism,
the romantics insisted that we should educate not only reason but also sensibility, not
only the intellect but also feeling and sensation. They argued that sensibility—the power
to sense, feel, and desire— is no less human that reason itself.‖93
Yet the cultivation of the whole person, conceived of as both reason and
sensibility, was still too abstract, or universal, for the Romantics. Thus, in conjunction
with calling for the holistic enhancement of the self, Romanticism also advanced an
―ethic of individuality,‖ which encouraged the self to actualize its own particular
potentialities. In other words, although ultimately working in tandem, the holistic aspect
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of Bildung stressed the development of all of our ―characteristic human powers‖ (i.e.,
reason and sensibility), while the individualistic aspect of Bildung stressed the
development of our ―distinctive individual powers.‖94 Beiser notes this distinction, and
explains the significance of the latter, in the following:
Bildung should consist in the development of not only our characteristic
human powers, which we all share as human beings, but also our
distinctive human powers, which are unique to each of us. The romantics
stressed that each individual had to realize his human powers in his own
unique and individual fashion. No two persons were ever alike; each had
characteristics that distinguished him from everyone else; complete selfrealization demanded actualizing these distinctive characteristics no less
than our universal ones.95
It is in this way, of course, that Romanticism revised, or updated, the notion of Bildung
held by Plato and Aristotle, for whom self-realization was a general more so than a
specific process, since both stressed the development of our universal rather than
particular potentialities.

Having accepted the importance of individual freedom

illuminated by the Enlightenment (especially Kant), the Romantics sought to modernize
the classical conception of Bildung, by making it applicable to the newly emergent
autonomous subject. However, unlike Kant, who tended to see autonomy in mostly
moral terms, the Romantics attended more to ―personal decision, individual choice.‖ As
Beiser points out, the Romantics saw autonomy as the freedom to choose in accordance
with one‘s values, as opposed to supposedly universal laws:
[The romantics] interpreted autonomy not only in moral but also in
personal terms. Their emphasis on the value of individuality means that
sometimes decisions are right not because they fall under some universal
law but simply because they are individual. They sought to determine a
realm of ethics that does not fall under general moral laws but that
concerns the ultimate values by which a person leads his life. They will
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be good or bad, right or wrong, simply because I have chosen them, with
no expectation that anyone else will follow.96
Romanticism did not aim to completely undermine ethics, however.

To the

contrary, the holistic side of Bildung was intended precisely for the formation of what
Schiller called ―the beautiful soul‖ (die schöne Seele). The logic here was that, by
simultaneously developing reason and sensibility, the individual would act not solely
―from duty,‖ as Kantian ethics demands, but from duty and desire. As Beiser explains:
―In a graceful action, then, our desires and feelings are neither repressed according to
reason, nor indulged according to sensibility, but refined and ennobled, or, to use a
modern term, ‗sublimated‘.‖97

Equally dissatisfied by the moral stoicism of Kant‘s

ethics, particularly his categorical imperative, as well as by the cult of desire and emotion
worshiped by the Storm and Stress movement, Romanticism attempted to find a via
media between these two alternatives. However naively (it is no coincidence that today
the term romantic is all but synonymous with naiveté), the Romantics thought it possible
and of course desirable, that the individual, by harmonizing his/her reason and sensibility,
become akin to a beautiful work of art, which similarly harmonizes form and content,
respectively.
Yet here too the Romantics were also interested in the concrete individual, not
just the self in the abstract. Thus, in drawing a parallel between the individual and the
artwork, Romanticism saw a possible correlation between not only the latter‘s form and
content and the former‘s reason and sensibility, but also the freedom of the subject and
the autonomous work of art. In Beiser‘s words, to the Romantics ―both the self-realized
individual and the work of art exhibit freedom, the absence of constraint or outside
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interference, since both appear to follow their own internal laws, their own inner
dynamic, independent of external forces.‖98 Kant is again influential in this instance,
insofar as his aesthetics highlighted the ―purposiveness without purpose‖ of the artwork,
which is to say its freedom to follow to its own rules. However, contra Kant, who never
made such autonomy (completely) allowable for human beings, to the extent that for him
subjects must act in accordance with the moral law, the Romantics held that the
individual is, and should be, no less free than the artwork.

From Romanticism to Heidegger and Adorno
Given what we have learned of their own solutions to the problems of late
modernity in relation to the self, both Heidegger and Adorno appear to distantly echo this
ideal of Bildung. We have already seen how both encourage individualistic Bildung,
albeit to different ends (authenticity and autonomy). As for the holistic dimension of
Bildung, there is some justification for finding continuity here as well. For, just as the
Romantics strove for balance between reason and sensibility, so Heidegger
recommended balance between consciousness and being (hence the not-forgetting of
Being), and so Adorno called for a balance between the ego and the id (hence the
remembrance of nature). While these are three distinctive visions, to be sure, they all
tend to exalt the individual who is whole, as opposed to one-sided.
Yet, the difference between the Romantics, on the one hand, and Heidegger and
Adorno, on the other hand, is that the latter bore witness to late modernity, when
Romantic Bildung seemed either obsolete or well-nigh impossible to attain. For one
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thing, the metaphysical underpinnings of Bildung had been undermined by this time, a
―fact‖ that both Heidegger and Adorno accepted. For another, the rise of scientism,
industrialism, capitalism and mass society, which began in early modernity, was in full
swing by the twentieth century. For Adorno especially, this rapid growth of the ―whole‖
or the ―totality‖ rendered the individual all but helpless. For Heidegger, the dominance
of the ―press,‖ with its anonymous public audience, was one of the main reasons for
Dasein‘s fallenness in the they. Thus, although Heidegger and Adorno each, in their own
way, articulated the dangers of these conditions, and even pointed to potential ways out,
they simply lacked the hope that the Romantics possessed. Hence Heidegger‘s famous
phrase, ―Only a God can save us,‖ and Adorno‘s ―wrong life cannot be lived rightly.‖
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II.
Art: Strife and Semblance
Setting up a world and setting forth the earth, the work is the instigation of the strife in which the
unconcealment of beings as a whole, or truth, is won. – Heidegger, ―The Origin of the Work of Art‖
Art has truth as the semblance of the illusionless. – Adorno, Aesthetic Theory

The so-called high arts, along with the humanities, have been in decline for
decades. In our postmodern world, high art does not possess the aura it once did, having
come to be seen as equal parts irrelevant, obscure, and unsatisfying. The reasons for this
are manifold. For one thing, technology has brought about different aesthetic techniques,
forms, and media, which have made high art seem outdated, even obsolete. For another,
the rise of the marketplace has transformed art into a commodity that must meet mass
demand; the resultant surplus of low art has necessarily made high art appear enigmatic
and intimidating by comparison.

Finally, high art, as well as the humanities, are

generally regarded today as important, but not enjoyable. Thus, listening to Mozart or
looking at Monet is done dutifully for the most part, which is to say without desire or
passion. Arguably, this antipathy towards high art stems from the dominance today of
economic individualism mentioned in the previous chapter. In this context, the high arts
and humanities are no longer seen as catalysts for personal growth, but to the contrary,
obstructions to the growth of one‘s wealth.
When these changes were beginning to take hold, in the early to mid-twentieth
century, Heidegger and Adorno were two of the most prominent figures to defend high
art. Hence the former sought to protect ―great art‖ from the ever-encroaching ―art
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industry,‖ and more importantly, an ontology that reduced artworks to ―mere things‖; 1
thus for Heidegger, the task was to re-see great art as a site of revelation and even a ―new
beginning.‖ The latter likewise warned against the expansion of what he called the
―culture industry‖ (indeed, much more so than Heidegger), viewing it as destructive not
only of ―autonomous art,‖ but also of society as a whole; for Adorno, then, the central
challenge was to (re)discover the critical and utopian powers of autonomous art. Thus,
just as Heidegger and Adorno each valorized the self, even as they acknowledged its
levelling/liquidation by late modernity, so both valorized art, even as they recognized that
it too was endangered late modernity.
Hence, the second affinity between Heidegger and Adorno, to be explored in this
chapter, parallels the first. For, in what follows it will be shown how Heidegger and
Adorno appear to be aligned in that they have comparable negative and positive agendas
vis-à-vis art; on the one hand, both wish to rescue art from a degrading ontology
(Heidegger) and culture industry (Adorno), and on the other hand, each seeks to reaffirm
the value of great art (Heidegger) and autonomous art (Adorno). Furthermore, both seem
to valorize great art and autonomous art for similar reasons, to the extent that each
regards such art as a source of truth as well as transformation. Of course, as in Chapter I,
a closer look at this decidedly formal congruity will eventually give way to starker
differences at the level of content. For here again, Heidegger and Adorno could not be
more at odds when it comes to the sociopolitical dimensions of their aesthetic theories.
In navigating these convergences and divergences, I will first discuss some of the
most recent scholarship on Heidegger and Adorno in connection with art. Then, I will
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examine Heidegger‘s aesthetics, both its destructive and (re)constructive aspects, as
presented in ―The Origin of the Work of Art.‖ Next, I will rehearse Adorno‘s critique of
the culture industry, as given in Dialectic of Enlightenment, followed by a summary of
his theory of autonomous art as found in Aesthetic Theory (1970).

Finally, I will

conclude with a discussion of the fundamental differences between Heidegger and
Adorno where art, in addition to the sociopolitical dimensions of their thinking, is
concerned.

1. Heidegger-Adorno Scholarship
Because there is more scholarship on Heidegger and Adorno in relation to art than
to the self, in this chapter only the most relevant research, which also happens to be the
most recent, will be discussed. Thus I will address two essays, from Macdonald‘s and
Ziarek‘s Adorno and Heidegger: Philosophical Questions, which not only support my
position, but also constitute the leading edge commentary on this topic.

Nicholas Walker‟s “Adorno and Heidegger on the Question of Art: Countering Hegel?”
Walker‘s essay is a modest endeavor to highlight moments of proximity between
Heidegger and Adorno in their respective responses to Hegel‘s aesthetics. The qualifier
modest is necessary here because Walker‘s text brings Heidegger and Adorno together
only in the final pages, and there in a very preliminary way. Nevertheless, some of the
discoveries made over the course of his study are compelling in their own right, and
apropos of the concerns of this chapter. These include, for example, the several ways in
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which Heidegger and Adorno each differ from Hegel on the subject of art; Adorno,
insofar as he returns to the concept of mimesis, or imitation, which Hegel had rejected in
favor of viewing art as expression, and Heidegger, to the extent that he elevates the role
of ―earth,‖ that which the artwork ―sets forth,‖ in ―contrast to any idealist approach that
would ‗demote‘ (herabsetzen, as Hegel often puts it) the sensible material of art as a
‗means‘ of expressing a higher content.‖2
More important, however, are the similarities Walker highlights between the
aesthetics of Heidegger, Adorno, and Hegel. Not quite willing to go as far as Joseph
Kockelmans, who claims that Heidegger‘s theory of art should be read ―as an attempt to
retrieve the metaphysical aesthetics of Hegel,‖3 Walker asserts that Heidegger at times
―seems deliberately to echo, and profoundly transform and intensify Hegel‘s‖ aesthetics, 4
inasmuch as he views art as playing an essential role in society; that is, as we will see, by
―setting up a world‖ in which a ―historical people‖ finds meaning. As for Adorno,
Walker contends that he ―repeats, in a self-consciously critical and transformed key,
Hegel‘s insight that for us, in modernity, reflection has already penetrated the domain of
art itself,‖ although unlike Hegel, who assumed that this meant the ―death of art,‖ Adorno
maintains that the artwork ―represents a kind of persisting ‗enigma,‘ or Ratsel, and calls
for critical commentary to let it speak.‖5 Hence Adorno‘s claim in Aesthetic Theory, ―By
demanding its solution, the enigma points to its truth content. It can only be achieved by
philosophical reflection. This alone is the justification of aesthetics.‖6
Of course, where Heidegger and Adorno both come closest to Hegel, and thus to
each other, Walker argues, is in seeing art as a ―distinctive way of disclosing truth,‖ and
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furthermore, ―not of informative but of transformative ‗truth‘.‖7 Thus, as I will show
below, Heidegger claims that truth ―happens‖ in the artwork, and that this truth is that of
the ―unconcealment‖ of beings, while Adorno holds that there is a ―truth content‖ in
works of art that exposes social conditions for what they really are. It is for this reason,
despite Hegel‘s own subordination of art to philosophy, that Heidegger and Adorno cling
to this moment in Hegel‘s dialectic, sometimes even seeming to grant equal status to art
and philosophy. Hence Adorno is often charged ―with an ‗idealist‘ and anachronistic
over-valuation of art and the aesthetic,‖8 while in Heidegger‘s ―The Origin of the Work
of Art,‖ ―the ‗great‘ art whose death Hegel allegedly analyzes, confirms, and accepts is
reclaimed here at least as an imminent possibility of the present.‖9

Krzysztof Ziarek‟s “Beyond Critique? Art and Power”
Ziarek focuses more on art‘s critical capacity than its role as a site of truth and
transformation in the aesthetic theories of Heidegger and Adorno. More specifically,
Ziarek explores the idea that for both Heidegger and Adorno, art is not so much critical in
the overt sense as it is critical of traditional modes of critique, which therefore makes it
more or most critical. Hence the ―peculiar paradox‖ of art in Heidegger and Adorno,
whereby ―art is to be a critique, and, at the same time, in order to function as such, it
needs to undermine the very parameters that make critique possible.‖10 In the case of
Adorno, Ziarek shows how autonomous art is simultaneously critical and beyond
critique:
For Adorno, critiques, no matter how negative or revolutionary, are
necessarily fashioned within the categorial determinations available within
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the social sphere, and as such they cannot, despite their critical force,
undermine the very praxis from which they issue and within which they
operate. Art, on the other hand, by virtue of its autonomy, can negate
society in a more radical manner. What this capacity to negate or
denounce figured as art‘s form implies is that art has the specific force to
call into question the forms of critique available in the social sphere.11
Ziarek argues similarly of Heidegger, although this seems counter-intuitive. For,
as Adorno suggests, ―the concept of critique… has no place in Heidegger‘s
philosophy.‖12 Ziarek replies to Adorno‘s charge by suggesting that Heidegger‘s thought
in general, and theory of art in particular, is ―critical otherwise.‖ Thus in redefining art as
poiēsis, which ―lets be,‖ as opposed to technē, which renders useful, Ziarek views
Heidegger as implicitly questioning the ―techno-metaphysics of power and of
production‖ of modernity, and thereby pointing towards a paradigm that would be
―released from power and production.‖13 Hence Ziarek asserts the following with respect
to the critical potential of Heidegger‘s notion of poiēsis:
the artistic force of poiēsis eschews and empties power: instead of
rendering available, it ‗lets be,‘ as Heidegger puts it. It lets be in the
specific sense in which it releases what is from the technicity
characteristic of modern power, which produces and creates by putting in
place and enforcing availability and machination.14

Assessing Walker and Ziarek
For the purposes of the foregoing, Walker‘s insights will be most useful,
particularly his observation that both Heidegger and Adorno view art as a source of truth
and transformation. In exploring the positive dimensions of their aesthetic theories, I will
show how Heidegger associates great art with the ancient Greek word for truth, alētheia,
meaning un-concealment, and Adorno holds that autonomous artworks have truth
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content. Furthermore, I will demonstrate how these both Heidegger and Adorno connect
these notions of aesthetic truth with the possibility of tranformation; specifically, a new
relation to Being for Heidegger, and social transfiguration for Adorno.

Of course,

Ziarek‘s claims will also be borne out, especially when it comes to explaining how for
Adorno, the autonomous artwork critiques its social conditions. Even in Heidegger‘s
aesthetics, particularly his rejection of the ―equipmental‖ concept of art, the critique of
power and production that Ziarek detects in Heidegger‘s thinking will become readily
apparent.

2. Heidegger‘s Destruction of the Thing-Concept of Artworks
Like Being and Time, wherein Heidegger seeks to overcome the entire ontological
tradition, however much he does this more so for human being than Being in general,
―The Origin of the Work of Art‖ (Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes) also strives to displace
the prevailing ontology, only this time in the service of art. Originally a lecture delivered
first in 1935 in Freiburg, then in Zurich in 1936, and finally as a three-part series in
Frankfurt in late 1936 (Adorno could not have been in attendance, as he fled Germany in
1934), Heidegger‘s text must have struck its listeners as both in keeping with his earlier
thinking and divergent from it. The former because, again, the destruction of ontology so
integral to Being and Time is no less a part of this work, and the latter because herein
Heidegger moves beyond Being and Time‘s preoccupation with ―equipmental‖ beings by
engaging works of art. Indeed, in ―The Origin of the Work of Art‖ it is precisely the
conception of beings qua equipment from which Heidegger wishes to liberate art, since
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art is surely, like equipment, a human-made thing, but also above all a ―work‖ that is
irreducible to equipment.

The Three Thing-Concepts
That the artwork is both a thing, like equipment as well as ―mere things‖
(―lifeless‖ natural beings), and something more, is Heidegger‘s basic starting point in
―The Origin of the Work of Art.‖ Yet whereas the ―thing-being,‖ or ―thingly element,‖
of the work of art has historically been privileged, Heidegger sets out to explore its
―work-being,‖ or ―workly element.‖ Thus, the first part of his essay is devoted to
identifying and debunking three ―thing-concepts,‖ all of which have misinterpreted
beings in general, and one of which has misunderstood artworks in particular. In doing
so, Heidegger is not dismissing the thing-being of works of art; indeed, this remains a
pressing concern throughout the text. However, it is only by relinquishing the three
thing-concepts, specifically the hylomorphic (formed matter) thing-concept, Heidegger
proposes, that the ―essence‖ of the work of art can be unveiled.
The first thing-concept he examines, attributable to Aristotle, views beings in
terms of ―substance‖ and ―accidents,‖ as, for example, in the conception of a tall man as a
man (substance) who, among other things, happens to be tall (accident). In typical
fashion, Heidegger traces the etymological development of these terms from their
―primordial‖ source in ancient Greek (to hypokeimenon for substance and ta symbebekota
for accidents), through their respective Latin ―translation‖ into subjectum, or substantia,
and accidens, up to our own tendency to structure language, as well as thought itself, in
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terms of subjects and predicates. By doing so, Heidegger is not simply showing how
different cultures give similar or different names to the same things, but rather how in the
very naming or re-naming of something, the ―Being of that being‖ is revealed in a certain
way, and thus also partly concealed. Hence he contends, and this can be read as a kind of
apology for Heidegger‘s methodology as such, ―What seems natural to us is probably just
something familiar in a long tradition that has forgotten the unfamiliar source from which
it arose. And yet this unfamiliar source once struck man as strange and caused him to
think and to wonder.‖15 In the case of the substance/accidents thing-concept, Heidegger
claims that ―it does not lay hold of the thing as it is in its own being, but makes an assault
upon it.‖16
The second thing-concept that he criticizes is similarly obstructive, if for the
opposite reason. Thus Heidegger writes, ―Whereas the first interpretation keeps the thing
at arm‘s length from us, as it were, and sets it too far off, the second makes it press too
physically upon us.‖17

Kant, rather than Aristotle, is at issue here, as the former

expressly defines a thing as ―the unity of a manifold of what is given in the senses.‖18
The problem with this thing-concept is that while the first arbitrarily foists itself on a
given being, the second errs in taking it to be the sum of sensory impressions, which are
supposedly first received by the faculty of sensation, and then organized into a whole by
the faculty of understanding. Yet as Heidegger argues, we never actually experience
things in this manner, as if, say, music were initially a barrage of chaotic sounds that only
later take on a more orderly structure. Hence he states that ―Much closer to us than all
sensations are the things themselves. We hear the door shut in the house and never hear
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acoustical sensations or even mere sounds. In order to hear a bare sound we have to
listen away from things, divert our ear from them, i.e., listen abstractly.‖19 By breaking
down the thing into its sensible components, then, we lose sight of the very thing that we
were trying to capture, according to Heidegger. It is for this reason that he asserts, ―The
thing itself must be allowed to remain in its self-containment. It must be accepted in its
own steadfastness.‖20
The third thing-concept interprets beings as ―formed matter,‖ coming from the
ancient Greek words morphē and hyle respectively.

According to Heidegger, the

hylomorphic theory is applied to all beings, whether natural or equipmental (humanmade); in the Physics, for example, Aristotle sees both natural beings and artifacts as
formed matter. Thus this thing-concept is also used to define works of art, as when the
artwork is thought of as material (i.e., tone, color) given, by the artist, form (i.e., music,
painting). Yet the hylomorphic view is not simply one of many aesthetic concepts,
Heidegger points out, but the dominant thing-concept in this area, persisting from Greek
antiquity to our own time. As Heidegger notes, ―The distinction of matter and form is the
conceptual schema which is used, in the greatest variety of ways, quite generally for all
art theory and aesthetics.‖21 The task, then, for Heidegger, is to release the work of art as
well as natural beings from this ―conceptual machinery,‖ by showing how the
hylomorphic theory belongs not to artworks, nor natural beings, but rather only to
equipment.
He does this by suggesting that form implies not only shape, but also purpose, or
―usefulness.‖ Thus, while a natural being‘s form is a ―consequence‖ of its matter, the
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form of equipment ―determines‖ both the shape of its material and the kind of material
chosen: ―The form, on the contrary, determines the arrangement of the matter. Even
more, it prescribes in each case the kind and selection of the matter— impermeable for a
jug, sufficiently hard for an ax, firm yet flexible for shoes.‖22 Such determination and
prescription is done with an eye toward the ultimate usefulness of the equipment: ―The
interfusion of form and matter prevailing here is, moreover, controlled beforehand by the
purposes served by jug, ax, shoes.‖23 Thus, shoes are neither shaped like hands nor made
of paper, as this would render such equipment useless, and therefore not equipment. As
Heidegger explains,
Usefulness is the basic feature from which this being regards us, that is,
flashes at us and thereby is present and thus is this being. Both the
formative act and the choice of material—a choice given with the act—
and therewith the dominance of the conjunction of matter and form, are all
grounded in such usefulness. A being that falls under usefulness is always
the product of a process of making. It is made as a piece of equipment for
something. As determinations of beings, accordingly, matter and form
have their proper place in the essential nature of equipment. This name
designates what is produced expressly for employment and use. Matter
and form are in no case original determinations of the thingness of the
mere thing.24
But if the hylomorphic thing-concept is ultimately grounded in equipment, then
how has it come to have a ―special dominance‖ in relation to artworks as well as to
natural beings? Heidegger ventures that it is equipment‘s ―intermediate place‖ between
natural beings and works of art:
The matter-form structure, however, by which the Being of a piece of
equipment is first determined, readily presents itself as the immediately
intelligible constitution of every being, because here man himself as
maker participates in the way in which the piece of equipment comes into
being. Because equipment takes an intermediate place between mere
thing and work, the suggestion is that nonequipmental beings—things and
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works and ultimately all beings—are to be comprehended with the help of
the Being of equipment (the matter-form structure).25
Heidegger also proposes that the lingering influence of medieval ontology, which takes
beings (ens creatum) to be a unity of materia and forma, contributes to the omnipresence
of this thing-concept. While he notes that medieval ontology has since lost its authority,
Heidegger points out how it continues to shape our interpretation of beings, informing the
―metaphysics of the modern period‖: ―The idea of creation, grounded in faith, can lose its
guiding power for knowledge of beings as a whole. But the theological interpretation of
all beings, the view of the world in terms of matter and form borrowed from an alien
philosophy, having once been instituted, can still remain a force.‖26
Of course, whatever the reason for the hylomorphic theory‘s prevalence,
Heidegger is convinced that it, along with the other two thing-concepts, ―[shackle]
reflection on the Being of any given being,‖25 or ―fail to grasp the essence of the thing.‖28
This holds for beings in general and artworks in particular. For the three-concepts can
capture neither the thingly element of the former nor that of the latter: ―the dominant
thing-concepts are inadequate as means of grasping the thingly aspect of the work.‖29 As
regards artworks more specifically, since the hylomorphic theory is limited to equipment,
it cannot articulate the work of art‘s thing-being. What is worse, when it comes to the
workly aspect of works of art, the three thing-concepts are even more inadequate. Thus,
Heidegger concludes that both the thing-being and the work-being of artworks cannot be
known by way of this thing-concept. The only way to understand either, he surmises, is
to reverse the process of inquiry; rather than begin with the thingly aspect of the work of
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art, its workly aspect must be the starting point: ―the road toward the determination of the
thingly reality of the work leads not from thing to work but from work to thing.‖30

2. Heidegger‘s (Re)construction of the Aesthetic
Art and Philosophy
In characterizing its work-being, Heidegger gives the work of art a privileged
connection to alētheia, the ancient Greek word for truth, meaning literally unconcealment, as opposed to something like accuracy, correctness, or correspondence. In
this way, Heidegger at once distances art from the three thing-concepts and questions the
conventional correlation of art with beauty. The following passage illustrates this move:
The essence of art would then be this: the truth of beings setting itself to
work. But until now art presumably has had to do with the beautiful and
beauty, and not with truth. The arts that produce such works are called the
fine arts, in contrast with the applied or industrial arts that manufacture
equipment. In fine art the art itself is not beautiful, but is called so
because it produces the beautiful. Truth, in contrast, belongs to logic.
Beauty, however, is reserved for aesthetics.31
Yet, to assert that art has truth or is truthful is certainly no insignificant claim, especially
in the context of philosophy.

From its beginning, philosophy has greeted art with

suspicion, and even defined itself in terms diametrically opposed to art. Thus in Plato‘s
thought, philosophy, which literally means ―love of wisdom,‖ with wisdom denoting
knowledge of truth or reality, is set over against art, which is viewed as only a ―copy of a
copy‖ of truth/reality. The idea here is simply that whereas philosophy corresponds to
the Forms (eidos) (i.e., the Good, the Beautiful), or the ―really real‖ (ta ontos onta), art
only corresponds to mere imitations of the participants in these Forms. For example, a
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painting of a beautiful landscape is ultimately just a representation of a ―real‖ beautiful
landscape, which in turn is the representation of the ―really real‖ Form of the Beautiful.
The implication is that art is twice removed from truth/reality, whereas philosophy has
full access to it. Hence Socrates exiles art from the Republic insofar as it ―an inferior
thing cohabitating with an inferior and engendering inferior offspring.‖32
Of course, before Heidegger Hegel had discerned an element of truth in art,
arguing that in works of art, as in the products of labor, ―spirit‖ (Geist) comes to
understand itself, or discover the truth about itself; namely, its freedom. However, for
Hegel this truth was better expressed by philosophy than art, or religion for that matter,
since only the former, he held, can conceptualize what the latter indicate through
symbols, metaphors, images, etc. Heidegger thus differs from Hegel insofar as, for one
thing, his notion of truth does not designate the self-unfolding freedom of spirit, but
rather the un-concealment of Being, and for another, he resists Hegel‘s subordination of
art to philosophy. As Hubert Dreyfus asserts,
Heidegger is the first to have defined art in terms of its function of articulating the
understanding of being in the practices and to have worked out the ontological
implications. Thus, Heidegger… could deny Hegel‘s claim that philosophy was
superior to art, since what art showed symbolically, philosophy could rationalize
and so make explicit.33

Art and Truth
Heidegger claims that in works of art, the truth ―happens,‖ or ―sets itself to work.‖
This means, again, that the artwork un-conceals, or reveals, beings. However, there is
more to Heidegger‘s theory than simple un-concealment. In his phenomenology of Van
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Gogh‘s painting of a pair of ―peasant‖ shoes, he proposes that ―earth‖ (Erde) and ―world‖
(Welt) are revealed.34 Heidegger‘s notions of earth and world are not to be mistaken as
covert substitutes for matter and form respectively; by earth, Heidegger does not mean
the material out of which artworks are made (color in this case), nor does he mean by
world the form given to that material (the shoes).

Instead, in this case Heidegger

associates earth with the land that the peasant works, and world with her daily life. As he
describes,
In the shoes vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the
ripening grain and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of
the wintry field. This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining worry as
to the certainty of bread, the wordless joy of having once more withstood
want, the trembling before the impending childbed and shivering at the
surrounding menace of death. This equipment belongs to the earth, and it
is protected in the world of the peasant woman.35
Heidegger elaborates these terms in his discussion of an ancient Greek temple,
built for the pagan god Poseidon, in Paestum. The temple, he claims, ―sets forth‖ the
earth and ―sets up‖ a world. Here, Heidegger relates earth to the ancient Greek concept
of physis, or ―arising.‖ Earth thus connotes that out of which and to which beings arise
and return. It is helpful to quote Heidegger directly:
Tree and grass, eagle and bull, snake and cricket first enter into their
distinctive shapes and thus come to appear as what they are. The Greeks
early called this emerging and rising in itself and all things physis. It
illuminates also that on which and in which man bases his dwelling. We
call this ground the earth. What the word says is not to be associated with
the idea of a mass of matter deposited somewhere, or with the merely
astronomical idea of a planet. Earth is that whence the arising brings back
and shelters everything that arises as such. In the things that arise, earth
occurs essentially as the sheltering agent.36
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Yet earth cannot be properly understood without reference to world. If earth is the
―ground‖ of arising, then world is that which rests on this ground, ―gathering‖ and
―shaping‖ the arising. It is thus what ―first gives to things their look and to men their
outlook on themselves.‖37 In honoring Poseidon, then, the temple ―erects‖ a world
whereby all things are given meaning:
It is the temple-work that first fits together and at the same time gathers
around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and
death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline
acquire the shape of destiny for the human being. The all-governing
expanse of this open relational context is the world of this historical
people.38
World is thus neither a set of beings nor a ―framework‖ in which those beings
exist. The ―world worlds,‖ Heidegger claims, recalling his discussion of ―worldhood‖ in
Being and Time. As in the latter, world here is described as the ―ever-nonobjective to
which we are subject as long as the paths of birth and death, blessing and curse keep us
transported into Being.‖39 More simply, world is an ―open region,‖ which is ―held open‖
or ―made space for‖ by the work of art. Earth, then, is that which is set forth, as well as
―set back,‖ by world in artworks. Since the world is an open region, the work ―moves the
earth itself into the open region of world and keeps it there.‖40 Yet, in bringing earth into
the open region, earth is shown to be what it ―essentially‖ is— ―undiscosable‖ and ―selfsecluding.‖ Hence, to ―set forth the earth means to bring it into the open region as the
self-secluding.‖41 So while the artwork can never expose earth entirely, since earth
―shatters every attempt to penetrate it,‖ it at least shows earth for what it is: ―The work
lets the earth be an earth.‖42 Indeed, the work of art, in letting earth be, is precisely what
makes us realize earth‘s self-secluding nature, or that it can never be fully known.

69

Thus the relationship between earth and world is one of ―strife‖ (Streit). In
setting forth the earth and setting up a world, Heidegger claims, the work of art
―instigates strife.‖ However, strife is not to be understood as ―discord and dispute,‖
―disorder and destruction,‖ but rather as a complementary dynamic such that earth and
world ―raise each other into the self-assertion of their essential natures‖ while ―[letting]
themselves go into the intimacy of simple belonging to one another.‖43 Since earth is
essentially a ―concealing‖ and world is essentially a ―clearing,‖ their strife consists in the
latter‘s striving for openness and the former‘s tendency to be ―closed up.‖ But without
one another, neither could be what it is: ―The earth cannot dispense with the open region
of the world if it itself is to appear as earth in the liberated surge of its self-seclusion. The
world in turn cannot soar out of the earth‘s sight if, as the governing breadth and path of
all essentially destiny, it is to ground itself on something decisive.‖44 Hence strife is the
―intimacy with which opponents belong to each other.‖45
This strife of earth and world, Heidegger claims, is the ―essence of truth.‖ Again,
for Heidegger truth is not (only) propositional, that is a matter of making ―correct‖ claims
about the world. Instead, according to Heidegger, truth is the un-concealing of beings, or
the un-concealing of beings is truth.

This is not so much a displacement of the

correspondence theory of truth, as an attempt to go deeper than it. For Heidegger‘s point
is that without truth in the sense of un-concealment, there can be no truth in the sense of
correct propositions:
With all our correct representations we would get nowhere, we could not
even presuppose that there already is manifest something to which we can
conform ourselves, unless the unconcealment of beings had already
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exposed us to, placed us in that cleared realm in which every being stands
for us and from which it withdraws.46
If the work of art, then, in instigating the strife of earth and world, ―figures‖ (Gestalt) the
interplay of clearing and concealing, it follows that truth happens there: ―Setting up a
world and setting forth the earth, the work is the instigation of the strife in which the
unconcealment of beings as a whole, or truth, is won.‖47
The artwork therefore has a unique relation to truth, for Heidegger. It is a place
where truth, in the sense of un-concealment, occurs. This could only be discovered,
moreover, by examining the work-being of the work of art. Since the three thingconcepts, especially the hylomorophic theory, captured neither the thingly element nor
the workly element of the artwork, it was necessary to explore the latter. This led to the
discernment of ―two essential features in the work-being of the work‖— the setting up of
a world and the setting forth of earth. As we now know, this setting up of a world and
setting forth of earth figures a strife that embodies truth, inasmuch as in the work of art,
the world brings earth into un-concealment, albeit as the essentially self-secluding.

Art and Transformation
It is the happening of truth in the artwork that gives it, additionally, a social role.
Of course, Heidegger has in mind here exclusively ―great art‖ (großen Kunst): ―only such
art is under consideration here.‖48 For only great art, he claims, sets up a world that
bestows meaning on a ―historical people.‖

In this way, Heidegger echoes Hegel,

according to whom great art has a special place in society. As Kockelmans notes,
Heidegger ―accepts from Hegel that ‗great art‘ is art that has as essential function in the
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life of a people.‖49 This essential function, for Heidegger, is not only to provide a kind of
organizing principle for society, but also, as Hubert Dreyfus suggests, to reflect it in a
―glamorized exemplar‖: ―the special function of art is precisely to let each group of
historical people see the style of their own culture by showing it in a glamorized
exemplar… such a function is an ontological necessity.‖50 Hence Heidegger also refers
to the setting up of a world as a ―consecrating-praising erection.‖
Whether Heidegger thinks that art still has this place in society, or whether, as
Hegel does, he holds that the time for great art has passed, is difficult to tell. On the one
hand, that his main example of great art is an ancient Greek temple, which has since
suffered ―world-withdrawal and world-decay,‖ implies the latter. It is perhaps for this
reason that Kockelmans sees Heidegger as conceding Hegel‘s thesis of the ―death of art‖:
Heidegger does not subscribe to Hegel‘s conception of the Absolute and
the Absolute‘s function in Hegel‘s ―science‖. Yet for him, too, ―great art‖
is and remains something past in the sense that according to the spirit of
the modern era, art is no longer essential to understand the life of a people.
Today we understand Western man from the perspective of science and
technology, which as such are totally alien to art.51
Yet, on the other hand, while Heidegger certainly acknowledges the sway of science and
technology here and elsewhere, he also seems, as Walker suggests, to view great art as an
―imminent possibility.‖ His very discussion of the painting by Van Gogh, a modern
artist, suggests as much; as does his reference to C. F. Meyer, a nineteenth-century Swiss
poet.
Of course, the best evidence for maintaining that Heidegger regards art as still
relevant lies in the final pages of ―The Origin of the Work of Art.‖ Therein, he argues
that art is a ―founding in the triple sense of bestowing, grounding, and beginning.‖52 By
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this, Heidegger means that art effects history such that ―Whenever art happens—that is,
whenever there is a beginning—a thrust enters history; history either begins or starts over
again.‖53 Having just shown how each historical age (ancient, medieval, and modern) has
a (somewhat) different relation to Being, Heidegger seems to be insinuating that art could
still commence a new era, one in which beings are no longer interpreted as ―objects that
[can] be controlled and penetrated by calculation.‖54 However, it must not be forgotten
that Heidegger wrote this text in the mid-1930‘s, during which time he was an official
member of the Nazi Party. Thus, when he states that ―History is the transporting of a
people into its appointed task as entry into that people‘s endowment,‖55 as well as when
he closes with a quote from Hölderlin whose work, he asserts, ―still confronts the
Germans as a test to be stood,‖56 Heidegger‘s involvement with National Socialism
seems to have had a direction connection with his aesthetics.

3. Adorno‘s Critique of the Culture Industry
Although there is some mention in ―The Origin of the Work of Art‖ of the ―art
industry,‖ by which Heidegger primarily means the ―preservers‖ of art (i.e., museums,
collectors, and connoisseurs), this discussion lasts all of one and a half paragraphs, since
for Heidegger the ―art business‖ is not ultimately to blame for the decline of great art.
Even though he grants that many such artworks have been ―torn out of their own native
sphere‖ by the art industry, Heidegger holds that this generally takes place well after the
world of the work of art has already lost its influence. Hence he highlights how for
artworks like the ancient Greek temple, which remains firmly entrenched in its native

73

sphere, world-withdrawal or world-decay runs its course without any intervention by the
art business: ―when, for instance, we visit the temple in Paestum at its own site or the
Bamberg cathedral on its own square—the world of the work that stands there has
perished.‖57

Thus, Heidegger‘s usage of the term art industry bears only nominal

resemblance to Adorno‘s concept of the culture industry, which refers specifically to art
in the context of late capitalist society.
While Adorno wrote prolifically on autonomous art, as in his studies of Mozart,
Beethoven, Mahler, and Schoenberg, he also composed an equally voluminous body of
work on what he variously referred to as ―low,‖ ―popular,‖ ―light,‖ or ―mass,‖ art. Some
of his more well-known treatments of the latter, especially to American readers, include
his several essays on jazz, namely ―On the Fetish-Character of Music and the Regression
of Listening‖ (also a reply to Benjamin‘s ―The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical
Reproduction‖). Of course, none of these is as familiar, or as comprehensive, as the
chapter in Dialectic of Enlightenment entitled ―The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as
Mass Deception.‖ For herein, Adorno along with Horkheimer famously argue that the
culture industry, or ―entertainment industry‖ as it is now called, as such is destructive not
only of autonomous art, but also of society as a whole.
Hence, Adorno‘s appraisal of the culture industry is not simply a reflection of his
personal aesthetic taste, which is generally regarded as ―elitist‖ or ―mandarin.‖ Rather, it
is just as, even more so, grounded in a sociopolitical standpoint from which the culture
industry appears complicit in the domination wrought by late capitalism. In order to fully
understand Adorno‘s and Horkheimer‘s critique of the culture industry, then, it is
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important to grasp both its aesthetic and sociopolitical dimensions. To this end, I will
proceed largely according to the position of Lambert Zuidervaart, who holds that Adorno
implicates the culture industry for undermining ―three types of autonomy‖: art‘s
―societal‖ autonomy, the ―internal‖ autonomy of the artwork, and ―personal‖ autonomy.58
Zuidervaart offers a brief explanation of these distinctions in the following:
the internal and self-critical independence of authentic artworks, the
relative independence of (some of) high culture from the political and
economic system, and the autonomy of political and moral agents. I shall
label these three forms ―internal,‖ ―societal,‖ and ―personal‖ autonomy,
respectively.59
I will focus first on the societal and internal autonomy of art, and then on personal
autonomy, showing how Adorno and Horkheimer view the loss of the former as
ultimately detrimental to the latter.

The Culture Industry and Art‟s Internal and Societal Autonomy
As will be shown below, the autonomy of art for Adorno refers to both its inner
freedom and its (relative) freedom from society. More specifically, societal autonomy
denotes art‘s independence from the marketplace, while internal autonomy denotes its
dialectic of form and content which, in Zuidervaart‘s words, simultaneously expresses
and challenges the social conditions beyond the artwork.60 Upon the rise of the culture
industry, or ―the monopoly of culture,‖ however, art lost its societal autonomy, according
to Adorno and Horkheimer.61 In mass producing art for mass consumption, the culture
industry turned artworks – both ―high‖ and ―low‖ – into so many ―industrial cultural
products.‖ In other words, art became, under the culture industry, primarily a commodity,
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answerable to the demands of the marketplace as opposed to those of art itself. While
Adorno and Horkheimer concede that works of art had always been commodities
(Beethoven, he notes, ―proved a most experienced and stubborn businessman in
disposing of the last quartets‖62), they contend that in late capitalist society they do not
even pretend to be otherwise: ―What is new is not that it is a commodity, but that today it
deliberately admits that it is one; that art renounces its own autonomy and proudly takes
its place among consumption goods constitutes the charm of novelty.‖63
Art‘s loss of societal autonomy thus also meant a loss of its internal autonomy.
Since the artwork was now first and foremost a commodity, it could no longer be free to
follow its own ―inherent laws.‖ Hence Adorno and Horkheimer claim that whereas art
was once, in Kant‘s terms, ―purposive without a purpose,‖ it is now ―[purposeless] for the
purposes declared by the market.‖64 This is, in part, a claim about art produced within or
by the culture industry, more so than art appropriated by it (as when a ―Tolstoy novel is
garbled in a film script‖). For in order to meet the demands of the ―deceived masses‖ and
therefore generate profit, artists became or were replaced by ―aesthetic experts,‖ who
design so many ―ready-made clichés‖ or ―copies‖ with ―assembly-line character.‖ The
result has been, in Adorno‘s and Horkheimer‘s view, a ―constant reproduction of the
same thing,‖ a ―universal imposition‖ of ―cyclically recurrent and rigidly invariable
types.‖ Whatever variation exists, moreover, they see as mere ―pseudo individuality,‖
―from the standardized jazz improvisation to the exceptional film star whose hair curls
over her eye to demonstrate her originality.‖65

Thus, while there appears to be

―competition and range of choice,‖ Adorno and Horkheimer argue that this is only a
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―semblance,‖ behind which lies ―constant sameness‖ and ―ruthless unity.‖ As Espen
Hammer notes, Adorno‘s ―claim about standardization… does allow for a great deal of
surface plurality.‖66
Of course, Adorno and Horkheimer are also interested in the consumption or
reception of art under the culture industry. Their discussion of the ―shift in the internal
structure‖ of artworks is therefore additionally a commentary on how subjects‘ relation to
art has changed. Drawing on Marx‘s concept of commodity fetishism, Adorno and
Horkheimer claim that the ―use value‖ (or aesthetic value) of art has come to be
secondary to its ―exchange value‖ (or market value). Instead of enjoying a work of art in
itself, then, subjects fetishize its ―social rating.‖ As Adorno and Horkheimer write,
What might be called use value in the reception of cultural commodities is
replaced by exchange value… One simply ―has to‖ have seen Mrs.
Miniver, just as one ―has to‖ subscribe to Life and Time. Everything is
looked at from only one aspect: that it can be used for something else,
however vague the notion of this use may be. No object has an inherent
value; it is valuable only to the extent that it can be exchanged. The use
value of art, its mode of being, is treated as a fetish; and the fetish, the
work‘s social rating (misinterpreted as its artistic status) becomes its use
value—the only quality which is enjoyed.67
This can happen not just with the art produced by the culture industry, moreover, but also
with otherwise autonomous art.

As Hammer points out, ―In Adorno‘s view, the

experience of someone attending an opera tends to be no less commodified than that of
the consumer of soap-operas on television. Or rather: there is nothing intrinsic to the
opera, at least not in its traditional guises, that safeguards it from co-optation by the
culture industry.‖68
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The Culture Industry and Personal Autonomy
If the culture industry undermines art‘s societal autonomy and thereby its internal
autonomy, then it follows that it also undermines the autonomy of subjects, or personal
autonomy. I have just shown how for Adorno and Horkheimer, in commodifying art the
culture industry not only produces (aesthetically) purposeless artworks, but also alters the
reception of art such that exchange value displaces use value. Already, then, we can see
the negative consequences of the culture industry for subjectivity. Yet, this is not all that
Adorno and Horkheimer argue in this connection. In regarding the culture industry as an
―iron system‖ with ―absolute power‖ and ―central control,‖ they contend that it both
―produces‖ and ―controls‖ subjects. This is less a proto-Foucauldean claim about the
constitution and disciplining of subjectivity (although it can be construed as such), than it
is a theory that the culture industry ―manufactures‖ and ―manipulates‖ subjects,
particularly their ―needs,‖ so as to maximize profit. This, of course, diminishes personal
autonomy, not only when it comes to choice, but also when it comes to resistance.
Because the culture industry is or has a monopoly, in Adorno‘s and Horkheimer‘s
view, it must constantly fabricate new, ―false‖ needs in order to sustain itself. It does
this, in part, by ―classifying, organizing, and labeling‖ subjects or ―consumers‖ such that
―something is provided for all so that none may escape.‖69 Thus, ―consumers appear as
statistics on research organization charts, and are divided up by income groups into red,
green, and blue areas; the technique is that used for any type of propaganda.‖70 For each
group or ―type‖ a different ―category of mass product [is] turned out.‖ Adorno and
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Horkheimer therefore dismiss the argument that the culture industry simply supplies
demand; hence their claim, mentioned above, that it serves the deceived masses. Instead,
they see demand as created by the culture industry, which it then attempts to satisfy. In
this way, personal autonomy in the sense of the freedom to choose is always already
manipulated or mediated, according to Adorno and Horkheimer. Thus it is not just that
choice is a semblance, or illusion, or that it is the ―freedom to choose what is always the
same,‖ but also that demands, needs, and desires are themselves unfree.
The culture industry reinforces this ―circle of manipulation and retroactive need,‖
furthermore, by offering products that are ―fun‖ and ―amusing‖; hence Adorno and
Horkheimer also call the culture industry the ―pleasure industry‖ or a ―bloated pleasure
apparatus.‖ While they do not oppose aesthetic pleasure – as noted, they hold that art is
to be enjoyed, not fetishized – Adorno and Horkheimer see the culture industry as
providing pleasure that is ultimately repressive, especially of resistance.

Thus, in

functioning as a ―medicinal bath‖ or ―an escape from the mechanized work process,‖ the
culture industry ensures its own continuation as well as that of the societal status quo, by
allowing subjects to ―recruit strength in order to be able to cope with it again.‖71 In other
words, ―The paradise offered by the culture industry is the same old drudgery. Both
escape and elopement are pre-designed to lead back to the starting point. Pleasure
promotes the resignation which it ought to help to forget.‖72 Since ―to be pleased means
to say Yes,‖ more specifically, the culture industry effects the ―breaking down of all
individual resistance,‖ thus meeting its ideological objective: ―to defend society.‖
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However, just how little personal autonomy there is under the culture industry for
Adorno and Horkheimer is finally unclear. Whereas on the one hand they asserts that
subjects can ―see through‖ its products, being ―too sharp‖ to identify with them, on the
other hand they claim that subjects are already ―defeated,‖ having come to ―insist on the
very ideology that enslaves them.‖ This equivocation can perhaps be explained by
Adorno‘s and Horkheimer‘s tendency to view the culture industry in totalizing terms
even as they remained committed to the concept of the autonomous subject. This account
is upheld by Hammer, who holds that Adorno ―all too often reverts to a rather crude
version of manipulation modeled on his perception of fascist political propaganda,‖ while
discerning ―cracks and fissures‖ in the culture industry whereby ―there is some room for
the exercise of autonomy.‖73

4. Adorno‘s Aesthetic Theory
In contrast to the products of the culture industry, autonomous art is (more)
societally free, which allows it to be internally free, and potentially contributory to
personal freedom.74 In this section, I will focus primarily on the internal autonomy of the
autonomous or ―authentic‖ work of art, particularly as it relates to Adorno‘s notions of
form and ―truth content.‖ Of course, in doing so, I will also discuss the important role
autonomous art might play in promoting personal autonomy and even social
transformation, for Adorno. Here again I will take after Zuidervaart, who holds that
Adorno‘s aesthetic theory synthesizes the ―Kantian emphasis on form with Hegel‘s
emphasis on intellectual import (geistiger Gehalt) and Marx‘s emphasis on art‘s
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embeddedness in society as a whole.‖75 This constellation makes for a philosophy of art
as a social ―monad‖ which, in its autonomy, or semblance of autonomy, is able to
express, critique, and point beyond its social conditions.

Art and Form
Adorno follows Kant in identifying art with formal autonomy, or purposiveness
without purpose. As Zuidervaart writes, ―Adorno retains from Kant the notion that art
proper (―fine art‖ or ―beautiful art‖ – schöne Kunst – in Kant‘s vocabulary) is
characterized by formal autonomy.‖76 Thus in Aesthetic Theory (Äesthetitsche Theorie),
Adorno asserts that ―As little as art is to be defined by any other element, it is simply
identical with form.‖77

That form is or should be autonomous, however, was a

controversial position for Adorno to take, given his Marxist orientation. Since Marxist
aesthetic criticism had traditionally, owing to Lukács, been opposed to formalism, which
it saw as l‟art pour l‟art, it tended to favor ―committed‖ art á la Brecht‘s plays and the
later Sartre‘s literature.

Such works, it was argued, while exercising some formal

autonomy (i.e., Brecht‘s ―alienation effect‖), were clearly engaged in society.

By

contrast, the modernist art that Adorno endorsed – Schoenberg‘s atonal music, Kafka‘s
fantastic novels, Beckett‘s absurdist plays – were far removed from, and thus seemed
unconcerned with, class struggle. Hence Brecht‘s caricatures of Adorno as politically
detached.
Yet Adorno was not a formalist in the conventional sense. As Lydia Goehr points
out, Adorno‘s formalism was ―critical‖ or ―dialectical,‖ as opposed to ―traditional.‖
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Thus, she contends that formal autonomy for Adorno ―is not a naïve assertion of aesthetic
or artistic freedom. On the contrary, resistant works at most show that there exist
oppositional elements (spaces, fractures, or gaps) within administered society that might
give listeners the opportunity to tear the ideological web.‖78 To charge Adorno with
traditional formalism, then, is to misunderstand that for him (formally or internally)
autonomous artworks can be more critical than committed or ―didactic‖ artworks. This is
the case because, as Goehr indicates, Adorno sees certain forms as exposing society more
clearly. In his essay on Beckett‘s Endgame, for example, Adorno claims that precisely
by abandoning the conventional dramatic form – plot, character development, etc. – in
favor of something decidedly more dissonant, Endgame is most reflective, and therefore
most critical, of late capitalist, post-Auschwitz society. As Brian O‘Connor explains,
Endgame, Adorno proposes, is a play about meaninglessness. However, it
cannot name meaninglessness, as such. Nor, importantly, does the play
itself fall into meaninglessness in the sense that is says nothing at all. We
understand Endgame, he claims, when we recognize its
incomprehensibility without making that incomprehensibility equivalent to
meaninglessness. But what, we might ask, is socially revealing about
incomprehensibility? Adorno connects the process of understanding
Endgame – that it is unintelligible though formally coherent – with the
idea that bourgeois society resists intelligibility.79

Art and “Truth Content”
Adorno posits a direct relationship between formal autonomy and truth content
(Wahrheitgehalt), not to be confused with content (Inhalt), such that the greater the
former, the greater the latter. In Aesthetic Theory he writes, ―thoroughly formed artworks
that are criticized as formalistic are the most realistic works insofar as they are realized in

82

themselves and solely by means of this realization achieve their truth content, which is
spiritual in them, rather than signifying content.‖80 Thus by truth content Adorno means
neither the subjective idea of the artist, nor some objective idea that the artwork
supposedly exemplifies such as ―the tragic or the conflict of the finite and the infinite.‖81
Rather, truth content refers to the ―breath‖ that surrounds the work of art which, as
Hammer elucidates, tells the truth about society: ―What Adorno calls the spiritual
dimension of the work of art is its capacity to negate empirical reality. It negates it not
by leaving it behind, but by allowing empirical reality to appear as unreconciled and
scarred—that is, as what empirical reality really is.‖82 Hence Hammer notes how the late
Schubert‘s works, for example, ―pronounce truth directly and non-discursively,‖ insofar
as ―the coldness of their autonomously chosen principles‖ (form) expresses the violence
of the ―universal‖ (society).
Adorno‘s notion of truth content therefore involves a unique conception of truth.
As Zuidervaart states, in order to understand the idea of truth content, ―one must
temporarily suspend standard theories about the nature of truth (whether as
correspondence, coherence, or pragmatic success), and allow for artistic truth to be
dialectical, disclosive, and nonpropositional.‖83 Zuidervaart continues thus:
Such truth content is not a metaphysical idea or essence hovering outside
the artwork. But neither is it a merely human construct. It is historical but
not arbitrary; non propositional, yet calling for propositional claims to be
made about it; utopian in its reach, yet firmly tied to specific societal
conditions.84
Hence Adorno‘s concept of truth content contains Hegel‘s notion of import (Gehalt), by
which the artwork is seen as the incarnation of spirit (―the truth‖ for Hegel) in matter or
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nature, but coupled with the Marxist insight that works of art bear the truth of society‘s
material no less than its intellectual dimension. Adorno‘s ―monadological‖ theory of art
demonstrates this standpoint, insofar as it interprets artworks as social monads which,
while ―closed to one another, blind,‖ and hermetic, ―represent what is external.‖85

Art and Transformation
Even more essential to the Marxist aspect of Adorno‘s aesthetics is the view of art
as possibly transformative of social conditions. We have already seen how, through its
formal autonomy and truth content, the artwork negates or critiques society; that is, by
showing it as it truly is. Thus, as the ―social antithesis of society,‖86 or the ―negative
sublime‖ in Hammer‘s words, art can perhaps, like critical theory and resistant
subjectivity, effect social transformation.

This is so, more specifically, because in

negating society, art necessarily makes une promesse du bonheur.

The happiness

promised is not the ―childish‖ kind offered by the culture industry, however, but that of
―illusionless actuality.‖ Adorno explains in the following passage:
Art that forswears the happy brilliance that reality withholds from men
and women and thus refuses every sensual trace of meaning, is
spiritualized art; it is, in its unrelenting renunciation of childish happiness,
the allegory of the illusionless actuality of happiness while bearing the
fatal proviso of the chimerical: that this happiness does not exist.87
In other words, art is the ―negative appearance of utopia.‖88
Hence art is a semblance (Schein) for Adorno, though not in the deceptive sense
discussed above in connection with the culture industry. Rather, as Zuidervaart asserts, it
is a ―necessary illusion, a societally unavoidable and instructive semblance.‖89 The
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necessity of art for Adorno is similar to the necessity of religion for Marx, who viewed
religion as the ―heart of a heartless world, the spirit of spiritless conditions.‖ In this way,
art points beyond semblance, or ―has truth as the semblance of the illusionless,‖
according to Adorno.90 The illusionless would be utopia, a society of true/real happiness,
autonomy, etc. Thus the autonomy of the artwork, itself a semblance, since the artwork‘s
very existence depends on the unfree division of labor, signals the possibility of real
autonomy for society. The hope, then, is for society to take after the autonomous work of
art as much as the latter takes after the former. As Adorno writes, ―Ultimately, the
doctrine of imitation should be reversed; in a sublimated sense, reality should imitate the
artworks. However, the fact that artworks exist signals the possibility of the nonexisting.
The reality of artworks testifies to the possibility of the possible.‖91

5. Conclusion: Ontology v. Critical Theory, Nazism v. Marxism
In outlining both the negative and positive dimensions of their aesthetic theories,
I have shown several affinities between Heidegger and Adorno.

In terms of their

negative tasks, we saw how each seeks to protect art from certain aspects of late
modernity; an equipmental ontology that conceals artwork‘s thing-being and work-being
for Heidegger, and a culture industry that turns artworks into amusing commodities for
Adorno.

As for their positive projects, we found that both valorize great art and

autonomous art, and further that they view such art as a source of (disclosive) truth as
well as of (social) transformation. Hence Heidegger claims that the work of art has or is
truth insofar as it un-conceals beings, and thus figures the strife of earth and world, a
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strife that could begin a new relation to Being. And hence Adorno argues that the work
of art contains a truth content that exhibits society as it really is, thus negating it and
gesturing towards utopia. Of course, there are other affinities that I did not address, such
as each figure‘s focus on the artwork itself, as opposed to its creation and/or reception by
subjects. In this way, both Heidegger and Adorno turn away from subjectivist aesthetics
dominant from Kant to Nietzsche.
Yet, whatever similarities exist between Heidegger and Adorno in connection
with art are, in the final analysis, only formal ones. For in examining the content of their
aesthetic theories we learned, as we did in the case of their positions on the self, that each
thinker‘s deeper commitments preclude any full agreement.

Since for Heidegger

ontology is foremost, his aesthetics center on the being of artworks, as well as artworks‘
relation to Being. Thus the negative part of his aesthetics warns against seeing the being
of the artwork as formed matter, as this thing-concept belongs to equipment, while the
positive part corrects this view by (re)interpreting artworks as primarily works, which
figure the strife of un-concealing concealed Being. By contrast, because society is most
fundamental for Adorno, his aesthetic theory focuses on art‘s social ―mediatedness,‖ in
addition to its potential for social transfiguration. Hence the negative side of Adorno‘s
aesthetic theory attends to the loss of autonomy of art (societal, internal, and personal)
under the culture industry, while the positive side looks to art that remains (somewhat)
autonomous for a critique of society, and thus the semblance of utopia.
However, to explain the differences between Heidegger‘s and Adorno‘s theories
of art simply in terms of the ontology/critical theory distinction is not sufficient. The
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main problem with this is that, unlike his view of the self, which appears to be apolitical,
Heidegger‘s aesthetics, as given in ―The Origin of the Work of Art,‖ has a sociopolitical
component. This is partly because Heidegger, following Hegel, regards great art as
providing meaning to society as a whole, a role that he sees, unlike Hegel, as ―at least as
an imminent possibility of the present.‖92 Hence as mentioned above, in the closing
pages of ―The Origin of the Work of Art,‖ Heidegger seems to be hoping for a great
artwork to come along that would initiate a new relation to Being. An echo of this can be
heard in his later essay, ―The Question Concerning Technology,‖ in which he invokes art,
because of its ―poetic revealing,‖ as the antidote (or ―saving power,‖ in Hölderlin‘s
words) to the ―challenging revealing‖ of modern technology.
But unlike the technology essay, composed in the late 1940‘s, early 1950‘s, ―The
Origin of the Work of Art‖ was written in the mid-1930‘s, when Heidegger was an
official member of the Nazi Party.

For this reason, his allusions to ―a people‘s…

appointed task,‖ and more significantly his calling upon ―the Germans‖ directly in the
final line, must be regarded with suspicion. While some claim that by 1935 Heidegger‘s
Nazism had subsided, as he had resigned from the Nazi-appointed rectorship at the
University of Freiburg in May of 1934, others hold that it persisted into ―The Origin of
the Work of Art‖ and beyond. Emmanuel Faye, who takes the latter position, argues that
―the German people are explicitly at issue‖ in ―The Origin of the Work of Art,‖ and even
that Heidegger‘s reference to the ancient Greek temple was far from innocent. As Faye
points out, two months prior to Heidegger‘s first public presentation of ―The Origin of
the Work of Art‖ (on November 13, 1935), the congress of the National Socialist Party
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convened in Nuremberg, where an atmosphere inspired by the ancient Greek Pergamon
Altar had been recreated for Hitler‘s speech. To refer to an ancient Greek temple in his
lecture, then, was ―the way chosen by Heidegger to celebrate the congress of Nuremberg
of September 1935,‖ the very congress that enacted the ―law for the protection of German
blood and honor.‖93
Needless to say, if Faye is correct, and his case is compelling, then the
transformative role that Heidegger gives to art in ―The Origin of the Work of Art‖ is
diametrically opposed to the utopian capacity discerned in art by Adorno. For Adorno‘s
sociopolitical standpoint is inextricably bound up with the Enlightenment values of
freedom and equality, specifically those of Marxist humanism, ideals which Nazism
rejected in both theory and practice. Of course, even if by transformation Heidegger
meant something more ontological, that is a new, less controlling relationship between
humans and Being, his vision would still be at odds with that of Adorno. For again,
Adorno‘s hope is for a particular society, namely one in which the values promised by the
Enlightenment are realized.

Romantic Coda
Thus, the affinities between Heidegger‘s and Adorno‘s aesthetic theories posited
in this chapter hold only at the level of form or spirit. This spirit, as I suggested in the
introduction, is decidedly quasi-Romantic or neo-Romantic. That Heidegger and Adorno
each sought to defend art from late modernity, exalting it as a source of truth and
transformation, recalls the Romantic concern about the fate of art in early modernity, as

88

well as its belief that art was the solution to the problems caused by modernity. Indeed,
the transformative potential of art acknowledged by both Heidegger and Adorno
resembles the Romantic hope that art could overcome alienation in modern society.

Romantic Aesthetics
In noting the aesthetic dimension of Romanticism‘s ideal of Bildung – that is, that
self-realization involves making oneself, like the work of art, a harmonious, autonomous
whole – the importance of art for the Romantics has already been implied. For it is by
striving to be like the beautiful work of art, the Romantics proposed, that holistic and
individualistic Bildung can be achieved, and thus the first form of alienation (the division
within the self) can be overcome. It remains to be explained, however, what art meant
more specifically for the Romantics as well as how it would address the second and even
the third forms of alienation (the division between self and others and the division
between the self and nature, respectively).
It is well-known that whereas the Enlightenment prioritized reason, Romanticism
privileged art. Hence F. Schlegel‘s ―romantic imperative‖ (der romantische Imperativ),
which commanded aestheticization of all things (the self, social relations, the state,
nature, etc.). Less well-known, however, are the reasons for this exaltation of art, or what
Schiller called ―aesthetic education.‖

These have to do less with Romanticism‘s

philosophical differences with the Enlightenment than with its disillusionment with the
Enlightenment‘s political events; namely the French Revolution, which had infamously
given way to the Reign of Terror.

For in diagnosing the problem of the French
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Revolution, the Romantics concluded that the Enlightenment had rightly elucidated the
rationality of it, but failed to prepare the sensibility for it; hence, once the revolution had
ended, its ideals were quickly undermined by discordant desires and passions. As Beiser
writes, for Schiller and the Romantics,
The lesson to be learned from the failure of the Enlightenment and the
chaos of the revolution, Schiller argued, is that it is not sufficient to
educate the understanding alone. It is also necessary to cultivate feelings
and desires, to develop a person‘s sensibility so that he or she are inclined
to act according to the principles of reason. In other words, it was also
essential to inspire the people, to touch their hearts and to arouse their
imaginations, to get them to live by higher ideals.94
As mentioned in the previous chapter, part of Romanticism‘s faith in Bildung was that it
would bridge the divide between reason and sensibility, making for a more ethical self—
one that wanted to do his/her duty.

Thus there were sociopolitical implications of

Bildung as well, since insofar as each individual struck a balance between reason and
sensibility, so would there emerge a kind of collective harmony, or Bidlungsanstalt.
Indeed, this is what was envisioned by Schiller in his model of an ―aesthetic state‖
(ästhetischen Staat), which the early Romantics reaffirmed as in the case of Novalis‘
―poetic state.‖95
That the Romantics chose art as the means to this end, as opposed to philosophy,
of course, is what makes this vision all the more unique. Dissatisfied by what they
considered to be the shortcomings of the Enlightenment – again, that it fostered reason at
the expense of sensibility – the Romantics regarded philosophy as commensurate with the
Enlightenment, and thus something of which to be skeptical.

Yet, for all of their

nostalgia for the medieval era, the Romantics did not thereby attempt to resurrect
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religion. Rather, they accepted the critique of religion (as superstition, myth) leveled by
the Enlightenment, while simultaneously seeking to restore the passion religion inspired.
The result was a turn to art, which appeared to promise the best of both worlds, as it
were. Beiser explains this position in the following:
Art became so important for Schiller and the romantics because they saw
it as the only means to resolve this crisis. They argued that while
philosophy cannot stimulate action nor religion convince reason, art has
the power to inspire us to act according to reason. Because it appeals so
strongly to the imagination, and because it so deeply effects our feelings,
art can move people to live by the high moral ideals of a republic.96
Lest this seem hopelessly idealistic, it is important to clarify that what is meant here is
not that reading literature and/or listening to music morally improves the reader and/or
listener, but that, once more, in aspiring to become like a beautiful work of art
himself/herself, the individual harmonizes his reason and sensibility, which is precisely
what ethical and political life require.
But what is art more precisely according to the Romantics? The conventional
wisdom holds that art was synonymous with expression for the Romantics, and that
furthermore, expression designates something subjective and emotional. Counter to the
mimetic theory of art, which defines art as imitation, and specifically imitation of
objective reality, the Romantic conception of art is thus typically seen as marking a
radical break from traditional aesthetics, dominant since ancient Greece. While there is
doubtlessly truth to this position, the Romantic idea of art was in actuality, as Beiser
argues, a ―synthesis of the doctrines of imitation and expression.‖97 In defending this
thesis, Beiser points out that the standard interpretation of Romantic aesthetics stems
from relating the equation of art and expression to Kant‘s ―Copernican revolution,‖
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which replaced the theory of truth qua correspondence with the theory of truth qua
construction. On this reading, the Romantic artist simply does, albeit consciously, what
the Kantian subject does as a matter of course; that is, construct truth/reality. The
problem with this view, however, is that in fixating on the epistemological origins of
Romantic aesthetics, its no less crucial metaphysical sources are eclipsed. For unlike
Kant, for whom the Absolute was necessarily inaccessible, the Romantics believed not
only that the absolute could be experienced, but also that art in particular facilitated such
encounters.
Beiser argues that by ―the absolute‖ the Romantics did not mean anything
otherworldly, but rather the natural world as such. Hence he claims that ―in the end,
romantic aesthetics was little more than the capstone of its Naturphilosophie.‖98 Of
course, Naturphilosophie, and more precisely the ―organic theory of nature,‖ at this time
was a far-reaching worldview, as it aspired to account for nature as a whole or, as we
might put it today, the universe. Indeed, it is this tendency to see nature as a whole or an
organism that informs the central tenets of Romantic aesthetics. In addition to the
general stance that ―the creativity of the artist is nothing less than the self-realization and
self-manifestation of the powers in nature; in other words, what the artist creates is what
all of nature creates through him,‖99 Beiser underscores three supporting claims: 1) since
nature as a whole is comprised of parts, each of which reflects the whole, it follows that
the artist‘s work, also a part of nature, reflects nature as a whole (or as Novalis contends,
the work of art is a ―microcosm‖ of the cosmos); 2) as human activity is the ―highest‖
expression of nature, it stands to reason that the artist‘s creativity is the ―climax of all the
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powers inherent in nature itself;‖100 3) insofar as the artist‘s activity forms matter, or
actualizes its potential, it will ―embody, express, and develop all the natural forces acting
upon it.‖101 Thus, it is not that the Romantic artist expresses his/her subjective feelings,
but rather that s/he expresses nature itself or ―co-produces‖ with it; which is to say, in
expressing nature, Romantic art also imitates it.

From Romanticism to Heidegger and Adorno
There are important distinctions to be made between the Romantic conception of
art on the one hand, and Heidegger‘s and Adorno‘s respective theories of art on the other
hand. The major difference is that the Romantics‘ expressivist view of art, both its
subjective and objective sides, were suspect to Heidegger and Adorno. The former
because Heidegger and Adorno each attempt to theorize the artwork without reference to
the artist or the viewer/listener. For Heidegger, the origin of the work of art is not the
artist but art itself, in the sense of poiēsis, or ―bringing-forth.‖ For Adorno, as noted
above, artworks are irreducible to the artist‘s subjective intentions.

Heidegger and

Adorno also reject the objective side of Romantic aesthetics, rooted as it is in a
metaphysics of (subject/object) identity.

While opposed to subject/object dualism,

Heidegger saw the very concepts of ―subject‖ and ―object‖ as owing to a
misunderstanding of Being. According to his theory of ―negative dialectics,‖ Adorno
explicitly endorses a philosophy of non-identity between subject and object.
Still, there is continuity among the Romantics, Heidegger, and Adorno to the
extent that all affirm art, if for different reasons. Hence Heidegger‘s elevation of great art
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and, to quote Walker‘s claim again, Adorno‘s ―‗idealist‘ and anachronistic over-valuation
of art and the aesthetic‖102 each in their own way approximate the Romantics‘
valorization of art. Yet, as in the case of their views of the self, both Heidegger and
Adorno are much less sanguine than the Romantics about the actual prospects for art.
Whereas the Romantics thought that art would heal the divisions within the self, between
the self and others, and between humans and nature, Heidegger and Adorno strain to give
it even one of these roles. The reason for this, as suggested in the first chapter, is that in
the context of late modernity, Heidegger and Adorno simply could not be so optimistic.
Thus, for Heidegger the possibility of great art is increasingly endangered by a reductive
ontology, while for Adorno the promise of autonomous art is threatened by an everexpanding culture industry.
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III.
Nature: Enframing and Exploitation
―Nature becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry.‖ –
Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking
―The earth radiates disaster triumphant… nature is broken.‖ – Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of
Enlightenment

Nature as a whole is increasingly endangered today. It used to be that we worried
about endangered species, whether of the animal or plant variety. Now, however, each
part of nature including ourselves is in question. Thus, at every level there is a crisis.
When it comes to the air, there is global warming and/or climate change, due to the use of
fossil fuels like oil, gas, and coal, to generate energy. When it comes to the soil, there is
erosion/contamination, due to the use of synthetic fertilizers and pesticides in agriculture.
When it comes to the water, there is pollution, due to spills and dumps by fossil fuel and
chemical companies. When it comes to the flora and fauna, there is deforestation and a
general loss of biodiversity, due to the demands for food and shelter by an exponentially
growing, and consumptive, human population. These problems are mutually reinforcing,
moreover. For example, the agricultural practice of spraying synthetic pesticides on
plants contaminates not only the surrounding soil, but also the supporting ground water,
thus additionally posing a threat to the ecosystems of nearby streams, rivers, lakes, and
oceans, as well as to drinking water supplies for humans. Hence the health and even
survival of the human species itself also hangs in the balance. For in doing so much harm
to nature, we put ourselves, who are wholly dependent on nature, in harm‘s way.
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How did we get to this point? There are competing answers to this question.
Among the most compelling are those that have drawn on the thought of both Heidegger
and Adorno. Thus one explanation, offered by ―deep ecologists,‖ some of whom claim
Heidegger as an influence, is that our ecological problems can be traced back to a
particular (mis)relation to nature, rooted primarily in ―anthropocentrism,‖ or humancentrism, and its attendant subject/object dualism, whereby the human and non-human
are seen as (categorically) different and independent. In this way, deep ecology shares
the ontological perspective of Heidegger, according to which our (mis)understanding of
Being is fundamental. Another account, proposed by ―social ecologists,‖ for whom
Adorno is important, is that our ecological crises have to do not so much with our ideas
about nature as our actual interaction with it, which in our time is largely in service of
(economic) ―development,‖ ―growth,‖ or ―progress.‖ Hence social ecology takes the
materialist position of Adorno insofar as it regards society, especially its economic
dimension, as foundational.
That deep ecologists and social ecologists, along with ―ecofeminists,‖ have
looked to Heidegger and Adorno for theories about our maltreatment of nature is not
surprising.

Particularly in his later writings, Heidegger challenged modernity‘s

―calculative‖ view of nature as ―standing reserve‖ for human use. Hence in Discourse on
Thinking (1959) he questions how nature ―now appears as an object open to the attacks of
calculative thought,‖ which is to say ―a gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for
modern technology and industry.‖1 Similarly, throughout his works Adorno critiqued the
―instrumental‖ or ―identitarian‖ concept of nature, both ―internal‖ (in the Freudian sense
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of human nature) and ―external‖ (in the conventional sense of non-human nature), which
sees nature as the absolute Other. Thus in Dialectic of Enlightenment, for instance,
Adorno argues that Enlightenment reason has come to ―dominate‖ nature such that ―the
earth radiates disaster triumphant‖ or ―nature is broken.‖
Also of help to contemporary ecological theory are Heidegger‘s and Adorno‘s
respective solutions to our calculative and instrumental relations to nature, which in
Chapter I, following Habermas, we discussed in relation to their prescriptions for
subjectivity. Yet here too Heidegger‘s call for the not-forgetting of Being and Adorno‘s
appeal for the remembrance of nature not only have something in common, but also
suggest new ways of thinking about and acting towards nature. For Heidegger, notforgetting Being would entail, beyond simple remembrance or awareness, an ethic of
―releasement,‖ or ―letting be.‖ This ethic is perhaps best implied by Heidegger‘s claim,
in ―Letter on Humanism,‖ that ―Man is not the lord of beings. Man is the shepherd of
Being.‖2 For Adorno, the remembrance of nature, in terms of external or ―first‖ nature,
would mean a more ―mimetic‖ or open approach to nature, which might re-enchant its
―disenchantment.‖ This would require the loss of self discussed in the first chapter, only
in this context specifically a loss of self in the non-identical Other qua nature.
Thus it is evident that Heidegger and Adorno both have much to offer ecology,
and therefore can be said to approximate each other, as they do in the cases of the self
and art, when it comes to the topic of nature. What follows will continue to explore this
affinity, the third and final, between Heidegger‘s theory of the calculative view, or
―enframing,‖ of nature, and Adorno‘s concept of the domination, or ―exploitation,‖ of
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nature by ―instrumental reason.‖ However, unlike the previous chapters, which dealt
exclusively with Heidegger and Adorno, this one will go beyond them in examining the
appropriations of their theories by deep ecology and social ecology, respectively. Hence
the structure of the foregoing is different insofar as I will first outline Heidegger‘s idea of
enframing, as presented in ―The Question Concerning Technology,‖ and next discuss
deep ecology‘s linkages to Heidegger, before turning to a summation of Adorno‘s
concept of the domination of nature, as given in Dialectic of Enlightenment, and finally to
a look at social ecology‘s connections to Adorno. This discussion is also unique in that it
lacks a section on the Heidegger-Adorno scholarship, since as of now there is none on the
issue of nature.3 Of course, this chapter does resemble the first two inasmuch as it
advances a similar thesis; that is, that while Heidegger and Adorno appear to have similar
concerns for the status of nature in late modernity, as they do for the self and art, these
concerns stem from irreconcilable perspectives.

1. Heidegger‘s Destruction of the Enframing of Nature
Around the same time that he formulated the notion of calculative thinking, which
he introduced in 1955, Heidegger was also working on the related idea of enframing.
Initially outlined in one of four lectures given in late 1949 under the general heading,
―Insight into What Is‖ (the particular talks bore their own titles: ―The Thing,‖ ―The
Enframing,‖ ―The Danger,‖ and ―The Turning‖), Heidegger overhauled the second part,
in 1953, and renamed it ―The Question Concerning Technology‖ (Die Frage nach der
Technik). This essay, which seems to have incorporated all four of the topics engaged in
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the 1949 lectures, deals with the impact of modern technology, conceived of as
enframing, on Being in general and nature in particular.4

Being and Nature
Being and nature are not synonymous for Heidegger, as Being encompasses all
beings, whether natural or unnatural (i.e., human-made objects, psychological states),
since every being has Being. Thus the basic difference between Being on the one hand,
and nature on the other hand is that the former refers to the very ―is-ness‖ (to onta in
ancient Greek, entia in Latin) of beings, while the latter designates a particular realm of
beings (e.g., plants, animals, mountain ranges, clouds, etc.) which, while having Being,
are not Being itself. Hence today the natural sciences focus on certain kinds of beings –
astronomy on celestial beings (e.g., stars, planets, black holes, etc.), chemistry on
chemical beings (e.g., oxygen, helium, nitrogen, etc.) – without attending to the question
of the Being of these beings.
Yet, Heidegger holds that Being and nature have not always been regarded as
separate. In ancient Greek thought, he points out, the term for nature, physis, had a
special relation to the then-prevailing understanding of Being. Indeed, Heidegger argues
that it was this understanding of Being, as ―arising,‖ that informed the ancient Greek
view of nature. As he writes in An Introduction to Metaphysics (Einführung in die
Metaphysik, 1953), ―The Greeks did not learn what physis is through natural phenomena,
but the other way around: it was through a fundamental poetic and intellectual experience
of being that they discovered what they had to call physis.‖5 Thus the ancient Greek
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experience of Being as physis, which he also denotes as ―self-blossoming emergence,‖
―opening up,‖ ―unfolding,‖ and ―the power to emerge and endure,‖ applied not just to
nature, but also to ―human history, as a work of men and the gods,‖ as well as to ―the
gods themselves as subordinated to destiny.‖ ―Physis is being itself,‖ Heidegger states,
―by virtue of which [beings] become and remain observable.‖6
However, at a certain point, namely the translation of ancient Greek into Latin,
physis came to be associated exclusively with nature, as in the modern term ―physics,‖
which is taken to be a natural science. The result of this ―narrowing of physis in the
direction of ‗physics‘,‖7 according to Heidegger, has been a ―deformation‖ of the ancient
Greek understanding of both Being and nature. In the former‘s case, Being is no longer
thought of as physis, if it is thought of at all, but instead as ―inert duration.‖ In the latter‘s
case, the original meaning of physis as arising has been replaced by the conception of
nature as ―physical‖ or ―material.‖ Thus the ―nature‖ that physicists study is that of
physical particles— atoms, electrons, quarks, etc. Yet as Heidegger asserts, while ―We
oppose the psychic, the animated, the living, to the ‗physical‘… for the Greeks all this
belonged to physis…‖8

Physis and Poiēsis
In ―The Question Concerning Technology,‖ Heidegger seeks to reconnect our
contemporary view of nature with the ancient Greek idea of physis. As he defines it here,
physis refers to ―the arising of something from out of itself.‖9

To elaborate this

definition, he invokes the related ancient Greek concept of poiēsis. Poiēsis, Heidegger
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notes, simply means ―bringing-forth.‖ Because there are several kinds of bringing-forth,
he distinguishes the bringing-forth of technē, or artistic creation, from the bringing-forth
of physis, the ―bursting open‖ of nature.

Since the former bringing-forth requires

―another‖ (the artist), while the latter brings-forth ―in itself,‖ Heidegger claims that
physis, not technē, is ―poiesis in the highest sense.‖ He clarifies this distinction in the
following passage, wherein he echoes Aristotle‘s contrast of natural beings, which have
an ―internal principle of change,‖ with artifacts, which have an ―external principle of
change‖:
Physis is indeed poiesis in the highest sense. For what presences by
means of physis has the bursting open belonging to bringing-forth, e.g.,
the bursting of a blossom into bloom, in itself (en heautoi). In contrast,
what is brought forth by the artisan or the artist, e.g., the silver chalice, has
the bursting open belonging to bringing-forth not in itself, but in another
(en alloi), in the craftsman or artist.10

Enframing
The ―essence‖ of modern technology, Heidegger proposes, is ―nothing
technological.‖ It is neither a means to an end as the ―instrumental‖ view of technology
suggests, nor a human activity as the ―anthropological‖ view suggests. Nor is it a set of
―machine-powered‖ entities that developed as a consequence of modern physical science.
Rather, the essence of modern technology, according to Heidegger, is a certain way of
bringing-forth, or ―revealing‖ (das Entbergen): ―technology is a mode of revealing.‖11
The mode of revealing central to modern technology, Heidegger calls enframing (Gestell). Enframing is not the same revealing, however, as physis. Rather, enframing is a
―challenging‖ (Herausfordern) revealing, a revealing that ―sets upon‖ (stellen) while
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―presenting‖ (Dar-stellen). And what it sets upon, or ―orders,‖ is precisely nature. The
fundamental way that enframing reveals, or ―challenges-forth‖ nature is as ―standingreserve‖ (Bestand). Hence Heidegger writes, ―Enframing means the gathering together
of that setting-upon which sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in
the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve.‖12
In enframing nature as standing-reserve, modern technology challenges/reveals
nature as always on ―stand by.‖ ―Everywhere,‖ Heidegger contends, ―everything is
ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be
on call for a further ordering.‖13 He gives several examples of this such as a factory, for
which coal and in turn the sun are ―on call,‖ a hydroelectric plant, for which a river
becomes a ―water power supplier,‖ and the lumber and media industries, for which the
forests are ―available on demand.‖ Thus standing-reserve, Heidegger claims, is not to be
conflated with mere ―stock.‖ For there is a fundamental difference between, he argues in
another example, the stockpiling of a farmer who ―does not challenge the soil of the
field,‖ but ―places the seed in the keeping of the forces of growth and watches over its
increase,‖ and the standing-reserves of the ―mechanized food industry.‖14 Indeed, we can
observe this today in our own industrial food system, which sees in nature so many
standing-reserves of (especially) corn, which it ―processes‖ into cereals, condiments, and
sodas, as well as ―livestock,‖ which ―supply‖ fast food chains, restaurants, and
supermarkets.
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The Origin and Fate of Enframing
Heidegger holds, counter-intuitively, that modern technology qua enframing
preceded – ―historically,‖ not ―chronologically‖ – modern technology understood in the
conventional sense (as a set of human-made things possible only through modern
science): ―Chronologically speaking, modern physical science begins in the seventeenth
century. In contrast, machine-power technology develops only in the second half of the
eighteenth century. But modern technology, which for chronological reckoning is the
later, is, from the point of view of the essence holding sway within it, the historically
earlier.‖15

This leads to the question, if enframing came before machine-power

technology and even modern physical science, then why or how did enframing come
about? Heidegger‘s answer to this question is also counter-intuitive, inasmuch as he
locates enframing‘s origin outside of ―human doing‖ and ―human willing.‖ Enframing,
the challenging revealing of nature as standing-reserve, Heidegger claims, does not
―happen exclusively in man, or decisively through man.‖16 Rather, it is a ―destining‖
(Geschick) that ―holds complete sway over man.‖17
Yet, if enframing occurs beyond human ―freedom,‖ then what can be done – by
humans – about it? While Heidegger regards enframing as the ―supreme danger‖ and a
―threat to man,‖ he holds that there can be no ―mastering‖ it, as ―Human activity can
never directly counter this danger. Human achievement alone can never banish it.‖18
The implication here is that humanity must simply wait for a new, and hopefully better,
―destining of revealing.‖ However, citing Hölderlin‘s couplet ―But where danger is,
grows/The saving power also‖ (also quoted by Adorno and Horkheimer in Dialectic of
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Enlightenment), Heidegger suggests that the way out of enframing perhaps lies in
enframing itself. For if we ―pay heed to‖ and ―reflect on‖ the revealing of modern
technology, then we might recall the revealing of art (technē) which, rather than
simultaneously ―blocking‖ or ―concealing,‖ ―brings forth truth into the splendor of
radiant appearing.‖19 Thus Heidegger closes ―The Question Concerning Technology‖ by
invoking art as the saving power of enframing: ―Could it be that revealing lays claim to
the arts most primally, so that they for their part may expressly foster the growth of the
saving, may awaken and found anew our look into that which grants and our trust in
it?‖20

2. Heidegger and Deep Ecology
In the early 1970‘s, Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess (1912-2009) coined the
term ―deep ecology‖ to describe his own ecological theory, which he also came to call
Ecosophy T (the ―T‖ standing for Tvergastein, the name of Naess‘ mountain hut in
Norway), in opposition to mainstream environmentalism, or ―shallow ecology.‖ The
basic distinction between deep ecology and shallow ecology, according to Naess, is that
while the latter tends to offer reformist prescriptions such as recycling and resource
conservation, the former attempts to delve deeper not only where prescriptions are
concerned, but also in offering diagnoses like anthropocentrism and subject/object
dualism.
Hence Naess‘, and other deep ecologist‘s, interest in Heidegger, whose critiques
of humanism and (Cartesian) dualism could provide what Naess calls ―ultimate premises‖
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for deep ecology. Of course, Naess drew on a number of philosophers and religious
thinkers, especially Spinoza, Gandhi, and Zen Buddhists. Nor was Naess unaware of
Heidegger‘s involvement with the Nazis which, as I will address, bears some relation to
the ecological aspects of his thought. Thus the connections between Naess, the deep
ecology movement, and Heidegger are complicated at best. In order to navigate them, I
will first explore some of the main tenets of Naess‘ deep ecology, and then consider what
in Heidegger‘s thinking is relevant to these ideas.

Naess‟ Deep Ecology, or Ecosophy T
In the founding document of the deep ecology movement, a lecture delivered to
the third World Future Research Conference in Bucharest, Romania in 1972, entitled
―The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary,‖ Naess
distinguishes deep from shallow ecology by enumerating the former‘s ―deeper concerns.‖
Whereas shallow ecology is characterized by the ―Fight against pollution and resource
depletion‖ with the ―central objective‖ of ―the health and affluence of people in the
developed countries,‖21 deep ecology proceeds from the following ―norms and
tendencies‖: 1) a ―relational, total-field image‖ that rejects what he calls the ―human-inenvironment‖/―thing-in-milieu‖ concept, or subject/object dualism; 2) ―Biospherical
egalitarianism,‖ as opposed to anthropocentrism; 3) ―Principles of diversity and
symbiosis,‖ according to the ethic of ―live and let live‖; 4) an ―Anti-class posture,‖
especially where so-called developed and developing nations are concerned; 5) the ―Fight
against pollution and resource depletion,‖ though not exclusively; 6) ―Complexity, not
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complication,‖ since complication lacks the ―Gestalt or unifying principles‖ of
complexity; 7) ―Local autonomy and decentralization,‖ or self-sufficiency when it comes
to, for example, energy and food.
In ―The Apron Diagram,‖ another seminal text by Naess, he discusses these seven
points, or ―platform principles,‖ in the context of the ―total view‖ of deep ecology. Naess
provides an image of intersecting ―levels‖ that together resemble an apron. The platform
principles comprise Level 2, below which are levels 3 and 4, designating ―general views
(not concrete)‖ regarding ―policy and lifestyle,‖ and ―practical/concrete decisions,‖
respectively. Above Level 2 are the ultimate premises, which ―ground‖ deep ecology‘s
platform principles, and thereby the other levels.

Level 1 consists of ―verbalized

fundamental philosophical and religious ideas and intuitions.‖22 Naess suggests several
possible philosophical and religious ideas for this level, such as those found in Spinoza‘s
philosophy, Christianity, and Buddhism, which he also proposes combining, as ―One
must avoid looking for one definite philosophy or religion among the supporters of the
deep ecology movement.‖23 For example, both Christian and Buddhist ideas may help to
support the platform principle of biospherical egalitarianism, insofar as the former sees
all beings as ―good‖ (and thus worthy of respect) while the latter sees all beings as
―interdependent.‖ While Naess does not mention Heidegger here as a potential source of
such ultimate premises, he does elsewhere: ―Academic philosophers are increasingly
reflecting the ecological crisis in their writings. The sources of philosophic inspirations
are many: the works of Aristotle, Spinoza, Bergson, Heidegger, Whitehead, to name a
few.‖24
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Yet, although Naess references Heidegger explicitly in the title of his 1987 paper
―Self-Realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the World,‖ another of his key
writings, in the text itself Naess states that Heidegger was ―amateurish—to say the
least—in his political behavior,‖25 before going on to develop a theory of self-realization
owing more to Ghandi. Thus, in departing from Western individualism, which he views
as so many ―ego-trips,‖ Naess seeks to ―broaden and deepen‖ the ―narrow ego‖ to an
―ecological self‖ that develops through ―identification with others,‖ both human and nonhuman. In doing so, he looks to Ghandi‘s concept of atman, or ―the supreme or universal
Self,‖ as opposed to jiva, or the ―‗narrow‘ self,‖ as well as the related notion of advaita,
which posits an ―essential unity‖ between humans and nature. Of course, Naess also
talks herein of phenomenology and ―environmental ontology,‖ implying some influence
by Heidegger. However, in the latter case, Naess is not so much alluding to the Being of
nature as he is providing further backing for his ideal of self-realization. For rather than
making the ethical argument that we should or ought to realize ourselves through all
beings, Naess holds that we already do and must, since ―Self-realization is hindered if the
self-realization of others, with whom we identify, is hindered.‖26

(Deep) Ecological Aspects of Heidegger‟s Thought
While Naess himself downplayed any direct relation to Heidegger, there are
moments of overlap nevertheless. Michael Zimmerman has pointed out a connection
between their views of the self, for example.

In ―Heidegger, Buddhism, and deep

ecology,‖ Zimmerman parallels Naess‘ notion of (ego) ―insubstantiality,‖ Heidegger‘s

110

theory of Dasein as an openness/clearing, and Buddhism‘s idea of anatma, or
selflessness. This leads him to the conclusion that ―Buddhism, Heidegger, and Naess all
assign to human existence the special role of apprehending the groundless, empty play of
phenomena.

Humans exist most appropriately when their luminous openness is

unconstricted by dualistic ego-consciousness.‖25 Such openness, moreover, if adopted
widely, might curtail humanity‘s quest for ―total control‖ of nature, argues Zimmerman:
―Buddhism, Heidegger, and Naess argue that puncturing the illusion of permanent
selfhood would alleviate the infliction of such suffering by freeing one from the illusory
quest for total control.‖28 Zimmerman has also pointed out that Naess and Heidegger
share what he calls an ―ontological phenomenalism,‖ the doctrine ―that for something ‗to
be‘ means for it to be present or manifest.‖29
Yet it is Heidegger‘s anti-dualism and anti-humanism that most relate to Naess‘s
thought, particularly the latter‘s principles of the relational, total-field image and
biospherical egalitarianism, respectively.

Heidegger‘s anti-dualism amounts to a

rejection of (especially) the Cartesian distinction between the subject on the one hand,
and the object on the other hand, as a false problem. In Being and Time, Heidegger
shows how in our ―average everydayness,‖ we relate to other beings in a mostly fluid
way, as ―ready-to-hand.‖ Thus the Cartesian dilemma, whereby the self (subject) stands
over against everything else (objectivity) rarely emerges. It is only, Heidegger points out,
in exceptional cases, such as when things break down (―conspicuousness‖), go missing
(―obtrusiveness‖), or stand in our way (―obstinacy‖), that we become ―ontological,‖ or
begin to view (as if subjects) beings as ―present-at-hand‖ (as if objects). Yet, even in
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these situations, the self remains for Heidegger a being amongst other beings, that is a
being-in-the-world.
While Heidegger‘s criticism here of subject/object dualism obviously does not
address the humanity/nature binary, we can see how it might serve as an ultimate premise
for deep ecology‘s platform principle of a relational, total-field image. Naess describes
this principle, and how it differs from the dualism of the human-in-environment/thing-inmilieu image, thus:
Rejection of the human-in-environment image in favor of the relational,
total-field image. Organisms as knots in the biospherical net or field of
intrinsic relations. An intrinsic relation between two things A and B is
such that the relations belong to the definitions or basic constitutions of A
and B, so that without the relation, A and B are no longer the same things.
The total-field model dissolves not only the human-in-environment
concept, but every compact thing-in-milieu concept—except when talking
at a superficial or preliminary level of communication.30
Of course, by challenging the human-in-environment/thing-in-milieu concept, Naess
seems to be taking issue with Heidegger‘s very notion of being-in-the-world. But by
calling Dasein a being-in-the-world, it must be emphasized, Heidegger is opposing
precisely those theories that see the self as an independent entity.
Like his anti-dualism, Heidegger‘s anti-humanism also coincides with Naess‘
deep ecology, namely its principle of biospherical egalitarianism. In his ―Letter on
Humanism‖ (Brief über den “Humanismus”), Heidegger critiques humanism (whether
Greek, Roman, Christian, Marxist, or Existentialist) for misunderstanding the ―essence of
man.‖

According to ancient Greek humanism, for example, the human being is a

―rational animal.‖ The problem with this humanism, according to Heidegger, is that it
rests, like the others, on a metaphysics which, he holds, ―does not ask about the truth of
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Being itself.‖31 Yet ―Being is the nearest,‖32 Heidegger contends: ―It is the self-giving
into the open, along with the open region itself.‖33 Thus any account of human being
must consider its relation to Being. For Heidegger, then, the essence or ―substance‖ of
human being lies in its ek-sistence, or its ―ecstatic dwelling in the nearness of Being.‖
This dwelling in the nearness of Being, furthermore, entails ―guardianship,‖ ―care,‖ or
―letting be‖ of Being. Hence, ―Man is not the lord of beings. Man is the shepherd of
Being.‖34
While Heidegger‘s anti-humanism does not explicitly endorse Naess‘ biospherical
egalitarianism, it could provide an ultimate premise for it. In discussing biospherical
egalitarianism, Naess criticizes anthropocentrism, the view that humans are the superior
species, as detrimental not only to nature, but also to human beings themselves:
The ecological field-worker acquires a deep-seated respect, or even
veneration, for ways and forms of life. He reaches an understanding from
within, a kind of respect that others reserve for fellow humans and for a
narrow section of ways and forms of life. To the ecological field-worker,
the equal right to live and blossom is an intuitively clear and obvious
value axiom. Its restriction to humans is an anthropocentrism with
detrimental effects upon the life quality of humans themselves. This
quality depends in part upon the deep pleasure and satisfaction we receive
from close partnership with other forms of life. The attempt to ignore our
dependence and to establish a master-slave role has contributed to the
alienation of humans from themselves.35
Here, Naess argues that anthropocentrism depends on a negligence of nature, just as
Heidegger argues that humanism depends on a negligence of Being, while calling for an
ethic of human stewardship of nature, much like Heidegger‘s call for human beings to
guard or shepherd Being.
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One of the problems, of course, with anti-anthropocentrism, is that it risks being
inhumane. Thus Naess‘, and other deep ecologists‘, concerns about human ―levels of
crowding‖ or overpopulation, as being harmful to nature, have been interpreted as
―Malthusian‖ or in keeping with the ideas of Thomas Malthus (1766-1834). A British
political economist, Malthus held that human population increases exponentially,
whereas natural resources increase arithmetically, meaning that ―The power of population
is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for men.‖36 This
led him to accept ―positive checks‖ to the human population such as famine, disease, and
war. While there is arguably a mild Malthusian dimension in Naess‘ thinking, as when
he argues that ―The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a
substantial decrease of the human population. The flourishing of nonhuman life requires
such a decrease,‖37 other deep ecologists, like David Foreman, are more extreme. In an
interview with George Sessions, another deep ecologist, Foreman states the following:
When I tell people [that] the worst thing we could do in Ethiopia is to give
aid—the best thing would be to just let nature seek its own balance, to let
the people there just starve—they think this is monstrous. . . . Likewise,
letting the USA be an overflow valve for problems in Latin America is not
solving a thing. It's just putting more pressure on the resources we have in
the USA.38
Such views have understandably invited the criticism of deep ecology as ―ecofascism.‖ That Heidegger, who was involved with the fascism of National Socialism, is
associated with deep ecology, has given more weight to this criticism.

The social

ecologist Murray Bookchin, who will be discussed below, notes a direct connection
between deep ecology‘s appropriation of Heidegger, ―a former member of the Nazi Party
in spirit as well as ideological affiliation,‖39 and its ―neo-Malthusianism.‖ This raises the
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question of the relation between Heidegger‘s Nazism and the ecological aspects of his
thought. Zimmerman has argued that in one sense, the two are compatible, insofar as
Heidegger‘s critiques of humanism and modern technology converge with the Nazi
critique of modernity as ―rootless, cosmopolitan, urban, materialistic, and rationalistic
(i.e, according to the Nazis, altogether Jewish).‖40 Yet in another sense, Zimmerman sees
a distinction between what he calls the Nazi‘s ―racist naturalism‖ and Heidegger‘s
―anitnaturalistic ontology.‖ The former, he claims, by defining humans as animals, leads
to ―biological racism,‖ while the latter, by defining humans as distinct from animals,
leads away from such a view. Thus Zimmerman concludes, ―Heidegger abjured all forms
of ―naturalism‖… Heidegger‘s antinaturalism had the virtue of leading him to reject
Nazism‘s biological racism.‖41
Whether Heidegger‘s anti-naturalism undercuts his anti-humanism, moreover,
remains an open question. For as Zimmerman points out,
Heidegger‘s antinaturalistic attitude was so pronounced that one of his
former students, Karl Löwith, accused him of perpetuating the
anthropocentrism and dualism so characteristic of the metaphysical and
theological traditions which he purported to overcome! Another former
student, Hans Jonas, charged that Heidegger held the Gnostic view that
humanity is radically different from the natural world.42
If there is a way to reconcile these two positions, it would have to stress that while
Heidegger indeed views humans as different from animals, as well as all other beings
(primarily due to our capacity for language), he does not thereby view humanity as the
master of beings. As Zimmerman claims, in refusing to see the human being as a
―voracious, self-assertive, clever animal,‖ Heidegger was not elevating humans above
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beings, but instead suggesting that ―human existence is not the master of entities, but
rather is in the service of the self-disclosure of entities.‖43

3. Adorno‘s Critique of the Domination of Nature
From his early essay, ―The Idea of Natural-History‖ (1932) to his unfinished,
posthumously published Aesthetic Theory, Adorno took great interest in the concept of
nature. In the former, he defines nature dialectically, as the counterpart to history, while
in the latter he focuses on ―natural beauty.‖ Adorno also appreciated the object of nature,
or actual nature. ―A man of the mountains‖ as he reputedly called himself, Adorno often
visited a village in Visp, Switzerland, which overlooked his beloved Matterhorn.
Apparently, it was here that he spent his last days. It seems that Adorno never lost the
love of nature that he described in a ―school-leaving examination,‖ wherein he writes that
whoever goes into nature,
must have keen eyes and ears: but then he will encounter, quietly and
wide-eyed, all the secret things that had slipped through the fine mesh of
his net of ideas. That is why nature is loved by all those people who go
out in search of secret things much as the gypsies go out stealing – poets
and musicians and good-for-nothings, but also those who wrestle with the
ultimate and most secret truths with the wakeful courage of bold ideas;
they all loved nature, Goethe and Hölderlin, Schubert and Mahler,
Eichendorff and Nietzsche and Maupassant; all these dissimilar human
beings lost themselves in order to find themselves, they found their souls,
they were raised to their homeland.44
In this section, I will explore the later expressions of this love of nature found in
the young Adorno; that is, his critique of instrumental reason, which he holds dominates
external or first nature, as well as his view of natural beauty as, like autonomous art, a
semblance promising transfiguration. To this end, I will first outline Adorno‘s and
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Horkheimer‘s theory of instrumental reason‘s domination of nature, as given in Dialectic
of Enlightenment. This will, in addition, require a consideration of Steven Vogel‘s
problematization of Adorno‘s idea of domination, whereby it becomes uncertain whether
Adorno thinks that we dominate nature too much or not enough. Next, I will turn to
Aesthetic Theory, in which Adorno comes closest to articulating a concept of nature in his
discussion of natural beauty. Finally, I will present a characterization of social ecology,
particularly that of Murray Bookchin, who uses aspects of Adorno‘s thought in
developing his own theory of the domination of nature.

Fear of Nature
In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer trace the origin of the
Enlightenment back to a ―mythic fear‖ of nature ―turned radical.‖ In the struggle for selfpreservation, nature has always confronted humanity as alien and hostile. ―Men have
always had to choose,‖ Adorno and Horkheimer write, ―between their subjection to
nature and the subjection of nature to the Self.‖45

Yet, whereas in the so-called

mythological era humans attempted to subdue nature through mimesis – that is, by
imitating nature in magic and ritual – in the Enlightenment period, human subjugation of
nature ―was made the absolute purpose of life within and without.‖46 Hence it was at this
time, Adorno and Horkheimer argue, that humanity ―disenchanted nature,‖ stripping it of
its heretofore mythological character and turning it into ―mere objectivity.‖ (They cite,
as the battle cry of disenchantment, Bacon‘s claim that ―now we govern nature in
opinions, but we are thrall unto her in necessity: but if we would be led by her in
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invention, we should command her by action.‖47). With this, humanity, now conceived
of as the ―subject‖ standing over against nature qua ―meaningless object,‖ had overcome
or thought it had overcome its fear of nature, as ―Man imagines himself free from fear
when there is no longer anything unknown.‖48
However, according to Adorno and Horkheimer, ―enlightenment returns to
mythology, which it never really knew how to elude.‖49 This means that despite its claim
to have mastered nature, the Enlightenment remains fearful of it. Hence behind its
conception of nature as controllable, through primarily science and technology, lies
―human fear‖: ―both myth and science,‖ Adorno and Horkheimer assert, ―[originate] in
human fear.‖50 As Deborah Cook explains, in discussing Adorno‘s analysis of nature as a
―fearsome object,‖ ―Throughout most of our history, nature has been seen as so
overwhelmingly powerful that it is life-threatening. Even today, our attempts to subsume
nature under concepts for the purpose of controlling, manipulating and exploiting it,
reveal that nature continues to inspire fear, dread, even terror.‖51 The implication here is
that the fear of nature accounts for the very existence of concepts since, like the magic
and rituals of the mythological epoch, concepts help humanity (attempt to) subjugate
nature. ―Power and knowledge are synonymous,‖52 state Adorno and Horkheimer, citing
Bacon.

Instrumental Reason and the Domination of Nature
Indeed, Adorno holds that the human mind itself developed out of the fear of
nature. In Minima Moralia (1951), he writes, ―Mind arose out of existence, as an organ
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for keeping alive.‖53 Thus, mind, or reason, for Adorno, has always been ―instrumental,‖
insofar as reason has been the principle instrument or tool by which humanity has
preserved itself. Yet in the Enlightenment, instrumental or ―calculating,‖ reason becomes
something altogether different. Rather than serving as a basic survival mechanism, it
dominates and/or ―exploits‖ nature both within and without.

In the former case,

instrumental reason dominates what Adorno and Horkheimer call internal nature, which
they define in Freudian terms as instincts, particularly for pleasure. In the latter case,
instrumental reason dominates what they refer to as external, or first nature (―second
nature‖ meaning culture or society), which they see as the (alleged) absolute Other. As
Cook writes, in describing Adorno‘s theory of external nature qua Other,
Nature is usually always conceived in opposition to culture; it is matter as
opposed to mind, animal (even bestial) as opposed to human, irrational
and instinctual, determined rather than free, unconscious rather than
conscious. Whatever nature is said to be, we have almost invariably
defined ourselves in opposition to it.54
Instrumental reason dominates external nature, or facilitates this domination,
more specifically, by disenchanting it, which Adorno and Horkheimer theorize as a
process of abstraction, ―the tool of enlightenment.‖ In rejecting ―animism,‖ or the notion
that nature is imbued with spirit, as an ―anthropomorphism,‖ or a projection of the human
onto the non-human, the Enlightenment redefined nature as a ―disqualified‖ object of
―computation and utility.‖ In so doing, it paved the way for domination: ―What men
want to learn from nature is how to use it in order to wholly dominate it and other
men.‖55 As Kevin Deluca argues, in ―Rethinking Critical Theory: Instrumental Reason,
Judgment, and the Environmental Crisis,‖ instrumental reason for Adorno and
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Horkheimer is at once ―epistemology and practice.‖56 Epistemologically, Deluca claims,
instrumental reason is a ―formalism‖ which, ―characterized by abstraction,‖ leads to
―universalization and systematization,‖ or the ―mathematization of nature.‖

A

―manifestation‖ of this, ―technique,‖ the practical dimension of instrumental reason,
connects formalism to the ―life world.‖ For example, Deluca notes how ―Formalism is
deployed to invent techniques for increasing food production—tractors, pesticides,
fertilizers, biogenetics, and so on.57
Instrumental reason proceeds in this fashion, furthermore, without reflecting on
itself, according to Adorno and Horkheimer: ―On the way from mythology to logistics,
thought has lost the element of self-reflection.‖58 Focused strictly on means, instrumental
reason neglects ends, such as autonomy and happiness, with the obvious exception of that
of self-preservation. And because it is the prevailing form of reason, in Adorno‘s and
Horkeimer‘s view, it ―eclipses‖ other forms that would attend to such ends; for instance,
what Horkheimer calls ―objective reason,‖ which does ―not focus on the co-ordination of
behavior and aim, but on concepts… on the idea of the greatest good, on the problem of
human destiny, and on the way of realization of ultimate goals.‖59 It is for this reason
that Adorno and Horkheimer recommend the remembrance of nature. As an antidote to
instrumental reason and its domination of nature, the remembrance of nature would
achieve ―reconciliation‖ between humanity and nature, both internal and external.
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Vogel‟s Problematization of Adorno‟s Theory of the Domination of Nature
According to Steven Vogel, however, Adorno‘s and Horkeimer‘s positive
construal of nature is complicated by negative claims elsewhere. For, Vogel argues, the
―natural‖ also signifies for Adorno and Horkheimer that which (wrongfully) takes
precedence in the Enlightenment. In enumerating the ―three dialectics of enlightenment‖
(in epistemology, ethics, and politics) examined in Dialectic of Enlightenment, Vogel
writes, ―Science, in disenchanting nature, ends up disenchanting any human values
beyond the ‗natural‘ one of self-preservation; ethics too cannot find an argument against
the expression of sadistic ‗natural‘ impulses; political theory can do no more than defend
the ‗second nature‘ of the status quo.‖60 Hence Vogel asserts that nature is identified by
Adorno and Horkheimer ―at various points both with fascist terror and with that upon
which that terror is exercised.‖61 This ―significant ambivalence about nature‖ leads him
to question whether by the phrase ―domination of nature‖ Adorno and Horkheimer mean
the domination of/over nature (by the subject) or the domination by nature (of/over the
subject). Thus Vogel asks, ―What conclusion should we draw… that contemporary
society dominates nature and should not, or that it (so to speak) unfortunately doesn‘t
dominate it enough because nature in fact always returns to outwit us and take its
revenge?62
To account for, if not solve, this difficulty requires first emphasizing the
distinction Adorno and Horkheimer make between internal and external nature.63 The
former refers to the nature within the subject, with which Adorno and Horkheimer
associate, as Vogel points out, self-preservation and sadistic impulses, as well as the
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Freudian instinct for pleasure. The latter refers to the nature outside of the subject, or
first nature, by which Adorno and Horkheimer simply mean nature in the conventional
sense. Since he singles out ―self-preservation‖ and ―sadistic (natural) impulses‖ (aspects
of internal nature), Vogel‘s charge does not concern external nature. Thus we must
assume that he accepts as unambiguous Adorno‘s and Horkheimer‘s theory that
―contemporary society dominates nature and should not,‖ if by nature here we mean
external nature. However, if by nature we mean internal nature, then Vogel is correct to
wonder if Adorno and Horheimer hold that we do not ―dominate it enough.‖ For while
on the one hand they oppose the domination of internal nature, for being ―repressive‖ (of
pleasure), on the other hand they seem to promote the domination of internal nature when
it comes to self-preservation and (especially) sadistic impulses.
This ambivalence can be further explained by Adorno‘s and Horkheimer‘s
appropriation of Freudian theory. For Freud, the subject is comprised of, or driven by,
two forces that together form the id, or unconscious: the life drive (Eros), which Freud
largely correlates with sex, and the death drive (Thanatos), which he mostly identifies
with aggression (sadistic impulses). Operating according to ―the pleasure principle,‖ the
id comes into conflict with the ego, which operates according to ―the reality principle‖
(self-preservation), along with the superego, or conscience.

Thus, Freud‘s idea of

repression is that the ego, as well as the superego, represses the id, both its sexual and
aggressive aspects, particularly in the context of civilization.

For Adorno and

Horkheimer, the domination of internal nature is simply, in Freudian terms, the
repression of the id by the ego; that is, the domination of one part of internal nature by
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another part of internal nature. This domination is too much, in their view, when the ego
represses the id qua Eros; hence Adorno and Horkheimer critique Odysseus for
subordinating (sexual) ―pleasure‖ and ―desire‖ to self-preservation.

However, this

domination is not enough, they hold, when the ego fails to repress the id qua Thanatos
(sadistic impulses); hence their critique of fascist terror. In direct response to Vogel,
then, Adorno‘s and Horkheimer‘s apparent equivocation vis-à-vis the domination of
nature stems from their conception of internal nature as both creative and destructive.
The domination of the former they see as repressive; the domination of the latter they see
as necessary.

Adorno‟s Concepts of Nature and Natural Beauty
While Adorno‘s concept of internal nature is clear, his concept of external nature
is more obscure. Of course, we have noted his claim that external nature signifies the
absolute Other (of instrumental reason, humanity, freedom, consciousness, etc.).
However, this conception is not Adorno‘s, but the one that he (critically) ascribes to the
Enlightenment. Thus in order to grasp what Adorno himself means by external nature,
we must consider his epistemology, according to which the object of external nature is
thoroughly mediated by concepts as well as society, in addition to his aesthetic theory,
which sees external nature, particularly the beauty of external nature as, like the
autonomous work of art, ―the cipher of the not-yet-existing, the possible.‖64
Adorno‘s epistemology is equal parts Kantian, Hegelian, and Marxian. Like
Kant, Adorno argues that objects are not fully grasped by concepts. Like Hegel, Adorno
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holds that objects are always mediated by concepts, which change over history. Like
Marx, Adorno contends that the objects of our concepts are also always socially, or
materially, mediated; that is, altered by human labor. Given these positions, Adorno
views the object of external nature as the Kantian thing-in-itself, though not because, as
Kant believed, objects are necessarily ―noumena,‖ but rather since, as Hegel and Marx
argue, objects are always already conceptually and socially mediated, respectively. As
Cook writes, ―Nature is accessible to human beings only in mediated forms; it can be
grasped only indirectly or obliquely. Maintaining that nature remains fundamentally
distinct from its mediated forms, Adorno emphatically rejects the identification of nature
with the concepts and practices that we use to apprehend it.‖65
Thus the object of external nature, for Adorno, is objectively given, but cannot be
known in itself due to its ―total mediatedness.‖ Hence he claims that nature is the
―mediated plenipotentiary of immediacy.‖66

This does not mean that the object of

external nature is the same as other objects for Adorno, even as he regards objects in
general as non-identical (to their concepts). As Cook explains, contra Fredric Jameson,
who ―conflates nature and the nonidentical,‖ Adorno makes a distinction between objects
and natural objects: ―For Adorno, all objects are nonidentical with respect to our
concepts of them. The definition of nature as the nonidentical therefore fails to capture
what specifically characterizes natural objects.‖67 Yet what specifically characterizes
natural objects according to Adorno remains in question. As Cook states, ―when Adorno
writes that there are times when we come close to the objects we are trying to think, it is
unlikely that he considers nature to be among these objects.‖68
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However, in Aesthetic Theory, Adorno‘s discussion of natural beauty
(Naturschönheit) seems to justify Jameson‘s thesis. While conceding that the concept of
external nature as beautiful arose historically, as a consequence of humanity‘s having
―mastered‖ it, and while he admits that natural beauty today is an ―ideology,‖ serving to
―disguise mediatedness for immediacy,‖69 Adorno nevertheless views natural beauty as
holding ―promise.‖ Seeing it as, following Karl Kraus, ―what capitalism has oppressed:
animal, landscape, woman,‖70 Adorno asserts that natural beauty is the ―trace of the
nonidentical in things under the spell of universal identity.‖71 As the non-identical,
natural beauty points both backward, to the ―freedom‖ of earlier humanity, and forward,
since that old freedom was in fact ―unfreedom.‖ In this way, natural beauty resembles
the autonomous work of art, which signals freedom (the ―illusionless‖) as semblance.
Hence Adorno also describes natural beauty as an ―image,‖ or ―cipher of the not-yetexisting, the possible,‖72 and an ―allegory of [the] beyond.‖73 As Hammer writes, in
discussing natural beauty as a ―semblance of alterity,‖ ―natural beauty can only appear as
long as nature is being dominated. That is how its ambiguous and distant beauty is made
possible. Natural beauty is thus ‗an image‘ (ein Bild). It shares with images our essential
absence from the object of that image.‖74

4. Adorno and Social Ecology
While Adorno‘s thought lends itself to some aspects of deep ecology,75 it is to
social ecology that it most appropriately belongs. For unlike deep ecologists, who see
philosophical and religious ideas as the cause of as well as the potential solution to our
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ecological crises, social ecologists suggest that it is society, particularly its economic
dimension, with which these crises rise and fall. In the following section, I will discuss
this and other connections between social ecology and Adorno‘s thinking.

First,

however, I will explain Murray Bookchin‘s (1921-2006) distinction between social
ecology and deep ecology, in addition to the central tenets of his version of social
ecology.

Social Ecology v. Deep Ecology
Emerging at roughly the same time (social ecology in the 1960‘s and deep
ecology in the early 1970‘s), these two movements each sought to go beyond mainstream
environmentalism where diagnoses as well as prescriptions were concerned. As noted
above, deep ecology began as a challenge to shallow ecology, which it saw as lacking in
explanations for our ecological problems, and as failing to offer solutions other than
slight reforms in policy and lifestyle. Somewhat similarly, social ecology started as a
critique of mainstream environmentalism‘s negligence of the socioeconomic forces
behind our environmental ills, and its refusal to propose alternatives to those forces.
Thus, deep ecology and social ecology are alike insofar as they offer more insightful
accounts of our ecological crises than mainstream environmentalism (anthropocentrism
and dualism for deep ecology, socioeconomic conditions for social ecology), and more
far-reaching suggestions (biospherical egalitarianism for deep ecology, and nonhierarchical societies for social ecology).
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However, these similarities also point to the fundamental differences between
deep ecology and social ecology. For as Bookchin points out, in ―Social Ecology versus
Deep Ecology: A Challenge for the Ecology Movement,‖ deep ecology tends to see
humanity‘s maltreatment of nature as stemming from

a ―spiritual‖ source

(philosophically and religiously sanctioned anthropocentrism and dualism), whereas
social ecology looks to the material realm for the cause of this maltreatment. As he
(polemically) writes:
Deep ecology has parachuted into our midst quite recently from the
Sunbelt's bizarre mix of Hollywood and Disneyland, spiced with homilies
from Taoism, Buddhism, spiritualism, reborn Christianity, and in some
cases eco-fascism, while social ecology draws its inspiration from such
outstanding radical decentralist thinkers as Peter Kropotkin, William
Morris, and Paul Goodman, among many others who have advanced a
serious challenge to the present society with its vast hierarchical, sexist,
class-ruled, statist apparatus and militaristic history.76
Bookchin likewise takes issue with the prescriptions of deep ecology, particularly
the notions of biospherical egalitarianism and self-realization.

Biospherical

egalitarianism, he argues, is a ―Malthusian doctrine.‖ Citing Foreman‘s comment, quoted
above, that starvation must be permitted so as to ―let nature seeks its own balance,‖
Bookchin shows how overpopulation, the alleged cause of starvation, is the direct result
of social conditions, and thus can be addressed without Malthus‘ so-called positive
checks. It is worth quoting Bookchin at length here:
demography is a highly ambiguous and ideologically charged social
discipline that cannot be reduced to a mere numbers game in biological
reproduction. Human beings are not fruit flies (the species of choice that
the neo-Malthusians love to cite). Their reproductive behavior is
profoundly conditioned by cultural values, standards of living, social
traditions, the status of women, religious beliefs, socio-political conflicts,
and various socio-political expectations. Smash up a stable precapitalist
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culture and throw its people off the land into city slums, and due ironically
to demoralization, population may soar rather than decline. As Gandhi told
the British, imperialism left India's wretched poor and homeless with little
more in life than the immediate gratification provided by sex and an
understandably numbed sense of personal, much less social, responsibility.
Reduce women to mere reproductive factories, and population rates will
explode.77
Deep ecology‘s ideal of self-realization, taken from Naess, is also highly suspect
for Bookchin. Calling it a ―spirituality that emphasizes self-effacement,‖ he contends
that self-realization ultimately leads to ―deindividuation‖ inasmuch as, according to the
ethic of ―live and let live!‖ it promotes passivity. This passivity, according to Bookchin,
would be beneficial if taken up by ―giant corporations and State leaders who are
plundering not only the planet but also women, people of color, and the
underprivileged,‖78 but for everyone else it is self-defeating. Passive individuals, he
contends, become vulnerable to ―political and economic manipulation,‖ and could thus
surrender to ―the security afforded by corporations, centralized government, and the
military.‖79 What is needed, then, Bookchin claims, is not de-individuation, but rather
―reindividuation‖:
It is not deindividuation that the oppressed of the world require, much less
passive personalities that readily surrender themselves to the cosmic
forces---the ―Self‖ that buffet them around, but reindividuation that will
render them active agents in remaking society and arresting the growing
totalitarianism that threatens to homogenize us all as part of a Western
version of the ―Great Connected Whole.‖80

Bookchin‟s Social Ecology
In contrast to deep ecology, Bookchin defines social ecology as ―dialectical
naturalism.‖ This means that it sees ―first nature‖ as giving rise to ―second nature,‖
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which then reacts back upon first nature in an ongoing evolutionary process from
simplicity

to

complexity.

―environmentalism,‖

which

Bookchin
he

argues

thus
tends

distinguishes
to

view

―ecology‖

nature

statically

from
and

anthropocentrically, as so many ―resources‖ for human use. He is also careful to make a
distinction between social ecology and natural ecology. Natural ecology, as its name
suggests, attends to ―natural‖ or non-human eco-systems, as if the human and non-human
had little to do with one another. Social ecology, by contrast, attempts to incorporate
human society (second nature) into natural ecology. Hence Bookchin stresses that human
society emerged from nature, which continues to exist within it, and from which it can
never be totally autonomous. And thus second nature has a ―moral responsibility‖ to
respect first nature, and even ―function creatively in the unfolding of [its] evolution.‖81
Unfortunately, second nature has become increasingly destructive (of itself and
first nature) throughout its own evolution. Bookchin attributes this to the various ways in
which human societies form ―hierarchies,‖ whether along gender, race, class, or national
lines, as hierarchies promote domination of certain individuals and groups (women,
workers), and thus encourage the domination of nature.

Contrary to conventional

wisdom, moreover, such hierarchies are not natural, according to Bookchin. It is often
argued that hierarchical human societies are analogous to (supposedly) hierarchical
natural ecosystems, like beehives (with their ―queen‖ bees and ―worker‖ bees), or baboon
communities (with their ―alpha‖ males). Bookchin objects that such descriptions of
nature are anthropomorphic, mere projections that reveal more about second nature than
first nature. He also notes that much closer to humans than bees or baboons are the
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gibbons, which ―have no apparent ‗ranking‘ system at all.‖82 To the extent that there are
hierarchies in nature, Bookchin contends, they are fluid. Human hierarchies, by contrast,
are institutional or structural, and thus have no correlate in (nor justification by) nature.
Bookchin maintains that hierarchies have characterized second nature for much of
human history, beginning with patriarchal communities wherein men dominated women
and children. What is different today is that in addition to patriarchy, there are now
several other kinds of hierarchy, the most entrenched and widespread being those of
capitalism and, in its service, the nation-state. A class system, wherein one (smaller)
class exploits the labor of another (larger) class, capitalism is by definition hierarchical as
well as domineering. What is worse, it operates, as Bookchin puts it, according to the
(il)logic of ―grow or die.‖ This makes for the exploitation not only of an entire class of
human beings, but also of natural beings (i.e., ―fossil fuels‖ for energy, flora and fauna
for food and shelter, etc.), as it is ultimately nature that must satisfy the demands of the
ever-expanding marketplace. The nation-state, argues Bookchin, is complicit in all of
this. Following Marx, he sees the state, or the ―political elites,‖ as serving the (more
powerful) ―economic elites.‖ Thus the activities of the nation-state (e.g., trade, alliances,
war) are also beholden to the logic of grow or die, and therefore also pose a grave threat
to nature.
The practical dimension of Bookchin‘s social ecology, then, is to replace the
global capitalist economy and its nation-states with a ―decentralized‖ network of local,
largely independent (economically and politically) communities.

Alternately called

―bioregionalism‖ or ―libertarian municipalism,‖ this society would halt globalization, and
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thereby its destructive effects on second nature and first nature, and restore democracy by
substituting ―direct democracy‖ for ―representative democracy.‖ Simply stated, such
communities would be small enough to produce for and govern themselves. As Janet
Biehl explains,
Ultimately the decentralized city or town would… see the development of
local economic production. Green spaces could be created, where
residents could cultivate food in local gardens… the new and smaller
municipalities would also be undergoing a process of democratization.
This process of democratization, in fact, would be inseparable from
decentralization. Here the new, smaller municipalities would become the
sites of direct democracies.83
Equally important, communities on this scale would not, unlike nation-states, endanger
nature.

Social Ecology and Adorno
While he would later criticize Adorno, for his ―enormous pessimism about reason
and its destiny,‖84 elsewhere Bookchin lists the ―famous Frankfurt School‖ as one of
social ecology‘s major influences, along with Heraclitus, Aristotle, and Hegel. Indeed,
throughout his work, Boockhin uses a number of concepts found in Adorno‘s work,
particularly first nature, second nature, and domination. As discussed, Bookchin, like
Adorno, sees second nature, presently late (state) capitalist society, as dominating first
nature.
Again, for Adorno first nature is synonymous with external nature, while second
nature refers to culture or society. Adorno holds that first nature is mediated by second
nature. This is less an epistemological claim than a theory about second nature‘s literal
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domination of first nature. In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno asserts that human ―progress,
deformed by utilitarianism, does violence to the surface of the earth.‖85 Bookchin argues
similarly, viewing second nature and first nature dialectically. While ―Human society, in
fact, constitutes a ‗second nature,‘ a cultural artifact, out of ‗first nature,‘ or primeval
nonhuman nature,‖86 second nature has the ―capacity to intervene‖ in first nature, whether
in the ―best ecological sense or destructively in the worst ecological sense.‖87 Yet while
Bookchin sees humanity as a ―product of a significant evolutionary trend toward
intellectuality, self-awareness, will, intentionality, and expressiveness,‖88 he points out
that second nature is currently ―in danger of tearing down‖ first nature:
Second nature, far from marking the fulfillment of human potentialities, is
riddled by contradictions, antagonisms, and conflicting interests that have
distorted humanity's unique capacities for development. It contains both
the danger of tearing down the biosphere and, given a further development
of humanity toward an ecological society, the capacity to provide an
entirely new ecological dispensation.89
Of course, unlike Adorno, Bookchin contends that the domination of first nature
is rooted in the domination of humans by humans: ―We must emphasize, here, that the
idea of dominating nature has its primary source in the domination of human by
human.‖90 Whereas once ―people existed in a complementary relationship with one
another,‖91 and thus with first nature, Bookchin suggests that as soon as social hierarchies
came about humanity began to view first nature as something that is also ―hierarchically
organized and can be dominated.‖92

However, in his discussion of the hierarchy

established by capitalism, Boockhin‘s theory of the domination of first nature coincides
again with Adorno‘s. In transforming exchange from a ―means to provide modest needs‖
to the ―procreator of needs‖ and an ―explosive impetus to consumption and technology,‖
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Bookchin claims that capitalism has had a ―devastating ecological impact.‖ This recalls
Adorno‘s critique of exchange society as creating false needs, while doing ―violence to
the surface of the earth.‖ Moreover, Bookchin regards capitalism as a ―thoroughly
impersonal, self-operating mechanism,‖ proceeding by the logic of grow or die, and thus
as ―structurally amoral and hence impervious to any moral appeals;‖93 hence his claim
that it cannot be stopped by ―moral and spiritual change,‖ but rather by social change
such as decentralization. This too relates to Adorno‘s thought, inasmuch as Adorno sees
self-preservation as the only uncontested ethic in late capitalist society, one which stands
impervious to all other ethics.

5. Conclusion: Ontology v. Dialectics, Anti-Humanism v. Humanism
In outlining Heidegger‘s idea of the enframing of nature, and Adorno‘s theory of
the domination of nature, I have posited the third and final affinity between Heidegger
and Adorno. For Heidegger‘s view that modernity enframes nature as standing-reserve,
and Adorno‘s critique of the Enlightenment as dominating or exploiting external nature,
resemble each other in spirit and even, at times, letter.

Hammer has noted this

convergence, claiming that Adorno‘s concept of domination ―[echoes] Heidegger‘s
notion of enframing,‖ insofar as both show how, in ―enlightened modernity,‖ ―nature
becomes a resource to be exploited by humans; thus nothing – no animal, no
environment, no eco-system – counts as intrinsically valuable or worthy of protection.‖94
Moreover, Heidegger‘s and Adorno‘s similar criticisms of enframing and
domination seem to follow from a shared concern for nature. While having distinct
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concepts of nature – Heidegger seeing it as physis, or self-blossoming emergence,
Adorno theorizing it as mediated immediacy pointing to the possible or beyond – both
affirm nature, as they do the self and art. Hence Heidegger calls for an ethic of letting be
or releasement, which would save nature from the enframing of modern technology,
while Adorno suggests the remembrance of nature, which would counter the domination
of nature, both internal (qua Eros) and external (qua natural beauty).
However, in discussing deep ecology and social ecology, other aspects of
Heidegger‘s and Adorno‘s thinking about nature emerged that reveal fundamental
differences. Thus the basic distinction between deep ecology and social ecology, namely
that the former views ideas as the source of and solution to our ecological crises, whereas
the latter gives this role to society, points to the basic distinction between Heidegger‘s
ontological perspective, which prioritizes Being, and Adorno‘s materialist standpoint,
which underscores social conditions. More significantly, by examining deep ecologists‘,
particularly Naess‘, relation to Heidegger, it was shown how Heidegger‘s anti-humanism
and anti-dualism makes him a potential theoretical source for deep ecology, especially its
principles of biospherical egalitarianism and the relational, total-field image. Yet, as
Bookchin and others have pointed out, Heidegger‘s anti-humanism and deep ecology‘s
anti-anthropocentrism risk being Malthusian, which is to say inhumane.

While

Zimmerman argues that Heidegger‘s anti-humanism is anti-naturalistic, meaning that
Heidegger views humans as distinct from, not superior to, animals, we have seen how
deep ecologists like David Foreman can turn anti-anthropocentrism into neoMalthusianism or eco-fascism.
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Adorno, of course, diametrically opposed such anti-humanism. While he takes
issue with the humanism of German Idealism (constitutive subjectivity), for example, he
does not thereby reject humanism as such. Indeed, as underscored in the previous two
chapters, Adorno remained committed to the central values of the Enlightenment, of
which humanism was the most important. Thus, the affinities between Heidegger and
Adorno on the topic of nature are finally, as in the cases of the self and art, only formal
ones. At the level of content, it is clear that Heidegger‘s idea of enframing stems from
his ontological viewpoint, which is at odds with that of Adorno, whose critical theory
aims to expose the domination of nature not for the sake of a new relation to Being, but
rather for the sake of nature and humanity.

Romantic Coda
Yet the very fact that Heidegger and Adorno both affirm nature suggests a quasiRomantic or neo-Romantic moment in their thinking. For just as Heidegger and Adorno
each critique the enframing and domination of nature in late modernity, so the Romantics
contested the destruction of nature in early modernity. In particular, the Romantics
expressed concerns about industrial society‘s encroachment on nature, and the growth of
modern technology and mechanical physics, which ―made nature into an object of mere
use, having no magic, mystery, or beauty.‖95 Thus, they proposed a re-mystification of
nature that would overcome humanity‘s alienation from it.
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Romanticism and Nature
In the previous chapter it was noted that according to the Romantics, the artist
both expresses and imitates nature, co-producing with it.

This view, part of

Romanticism‘s larger metaphysics of identity, was also intended to alleviate the
alienation of humanity from nature. For if nature is seen as realizing itself through
human beings, then the two can no longer be thought of as divided. Of course, this
notion that nature is active, not to mention the claim that humanity is nature‘s ―highest‖
expression, is hardly self-evident. Thus, in order to understand this idea, as well as the
Romantic theory of nature in general, it is necessary to grasp the basic idea of Romantic
Naturphilosophie, particularly that of Schelling, who held that subjectivity, or mind, and
objectivity, or matter, were two parts of a larger whole, the former giving rise to and
developing out of the latter.
But before further characterizing Schelling‘s philosophy of nature, it is worth
noting another way in which ―aesthetic experience‖ (not necessarily the experience of art
proper) was thought to overcome the alienation of self from nature, according to the
Romantics. Schiller‘s ideal of aesthetic education, which the early Romantics elaborated,
was intended not only for ethical and political reunification, but also for the remystification of nature. Since the sensibility was the faculty of desire and emotion as
well as perception, its cultivation additionally meant reawakening or ―romanticizing‖ the
senses. For Novalis, who urged the development of both internal and external sensitivity
(the former to know one‘s inner depths), awakening the senses was meant, as Beiser
paraphrases, ―to make us aware of the magic, mystery, and wonder of the world; it is to
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educate the senses to see the ordinary as extraordinary, the familiar as strange, the
mundane as sacred, the finite as infinite.‖96 Becoming thus attuned, the Romantics
claimed, would restore humanity‘s ―lost unity‖ or ―primal harmony‖ with nature, which
civilization in general, and science in particular, had disrupted, by ―making [nature] into
an object to be dominated and controlled for human benefit.‖97
Of course, another way to regain unity with nature is to see it not as alien to
humanity, but rather as humanity‘s origin and essence. It was to this end that Schelling
devoted his philosophy of nature. Challenging modernity‘s general conception of nature,
which began with Bacon‘s and Descartes‘ subject/object dualism, but specifically that of
Kant, Schelling proposed a natural philosophy of subject/object identity. On this view,
subjectivity and objectivity (the mental and the physical, or the ideal and the real), were
seen as two parts of a larger, organic whole, and thus interdependent, as opposed to
independent. As Beiser explains:
If nature is an organism, then it follows that there is no distinction in kind
but only one of degree between the mental and the physical, the subject
and objective, the ideal and the real. They are simply different degrees of
organization and development of a single living force, which is found
everywhere within nature. These apparent opposites can then be viewed
as interdependent.
The mental is simply the highest degree of
organization and development of the living powers of the body; and the
body is only the lowest degree of organization and development of the
living powers of the mind.98
Thus contra Descartes, for example, according to whom subjects (―thinking things‖) and
objects (―extended things‖) are mutually exclusive, Schelling proposes that each is
dependent on the other; without objectivity, subjectivity could not be, and without
subjectivity (as its telos, or goal), objectivity could not be.
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To be sure, Kant, if not Descartes, allowed for such an organic theory of nature
(that is, the view that there is purposiveness or teleology in nature),99 however only as a
―regulative,‖ rather than a ―constitutive,‖ idea. Given the rules of his transcendental
idealism, which made concepts like purposiveness applicable to phenomena
(appearances), but not (without uncertainty) to noumena (things-in-themselves), Kant
held that while nature in itself might indeed be purposive, we can only speculate on this,
never know it for certain.

To claim the latter, he argued, would be to fall into

metaphysical dogmatism, which was precisely what his critical philosophy was intended
to disturb. Thus, according to Kant, we may think and act as if nature is purposive, and
he demands that we should, for the sake of morality as well as science, but we can never
be sure if our idea of nature corresponds to the reality of nature.
For the Romantics, particularly Schelling (along with the young Hegel), Kant‘s
position left something to be desired, since it did away with dogmatic metaphysics only
to make room for an unsatisfying skepticism. The way out of this impasse, in his
estimation, was to make the purposiveness of nature a constitutive idea. As Beiser
argues, by suggesting that the purposiveness of nature is the condition of possible
experience, Schelling not only turned Kant‘s thought against itself (insofar as he used
Kant‘s ―transcendental deduction‖ to arrive at this conclusion), but more importantly
offered a solution to the problem of Kant‘s phenomena/noumena dualism. Of course,
whether Kant or Schelling ultimately has the correct understanding of nature is a question
that remains to be answered. As Beiser frames it, for now the choice is a matter of taste,
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between ―Kantian modesty versus post-Kantian curiosity, Kantian skepticism versus
post-Kantian speculation.‖100

From Romanticism to Heidegger and Adorno
There is much in the Romantic philosophy of nature that differs from both
Heidegger‘s and Adorno‘s theories of nature. Again, neither Heidegger nor Adorno
endorse the doctrine of subject/object identity. Nor do they see nature as an organic
whole. For Heidegger, nature is physis or self-blossoming. For Adorno, nature is the
trace of the non-identical. Of course, there is some parity between the Romantics‘,
Heidegger‘s, and Adorno‘s concerns about modernity‘s impact on nature, to the extent
that all lament modernity‘s disenchantment of nature, as well as reaffirm nature as
something positive. Yet, for Adorno especially, Romanticism‘s exaltation of nature
depended on its domination, for originally humanity lived in fear of nature. Thus the
nostalgia for nature in Romantic thought is misplaced, in Adorno‘s view, as there was
never a time when humanity lived in harmony with nature. While Adorno himself
affirms natural beauty, he sees it as existing in the future rather than the past: ―nature, as
it stirs mortally and tenderly in its beauty, does not yet exist.‖101 However, given his
view of late modernity as totally domineering, Adorno‘s hope in such a future is minimal.
Even for Heidegger, whose critique of modern technology suggests that, like the
Romantics, he believed in a primal unity of humanity and nature, such an ideal is difficult
to maintain in the context of late modernity. Given his sense that modern technology has
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become all but inescapable, it is difficult to attribute to Heidegger the idealism of the
Romantics. Hence the modesty of his appeal to art as the saving power of enframing.
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Conclusion

In experimenting with Heidegger and Adorno, three affinities were discovered.
First, it was found that both not only destroy/critique the modern notion of the subject,
but also offer the alternative ideals of authenticity/autonomy, which each have subversive
status as well as neo-Romantic holistic and individualistic dimensions. Second, it was
seen that both take issue with modernity‘s degradation of art by way of its equipmental
ontology/culture industry, to which each responds with an affirmation of great
art/autonomous art that have a special relation to truth and transformation, á la Romantic
aesthetics.

Third and finally, it was observed how both challenge modernity‘s

enframing/exploitation of nature, and thus call for a quasi-Romantic not-forgetting of
Being/remembrance of nature. In these three instances, then, Heidegger and Adorno
exhibit elective affinities when brought together, like certain chemicals or the characters
in Goethe‘s novel.
Of course, these affinities were also imposed by the experiment. For it is not as if
Heidegger and Adorno were simply put together and left to intermingle on their own.
Rather they were urged, perhaps even forced, to interact, and to do so in circumscribed
ways. Hence in each case it was essential to emphasize larger differences looming in the
background.

These larger differences, it was argued, generally stem from the

fundamental distinction between Heidegger‘s ontological perspective on the one hand,
and Adorno‘s critical theory standpoint on the other hand. Thus, when it came to the
self, it was stressed that Heidegger rejects the modern (Cartesian) subject on the grounds
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that it forgets Being, and that his notion of authenticity, insofar as it serves to replace
Cartesian subjectivity, entails an awareness of one‘s (temporal) being-there. By contrast,
Adorno‘s critique of the modern (Baconian and Kantian) subject was shown to highlight
the social constitution of the self, while his concept of autonomy was seen as advocating
sociopolitical resistance.

Vis-à-vis art, it was demonstrated how Heidegger blames

modern ontology for misunderstanding art, and how according to his (re)interpretation
great art could begin a new relation to Being, one which, however, might have coincided
with the program of National Socialism. Adversely, Adorno was shown to implicate the
culture industry for undermining autonomous art, which he regards as a possible source
of social transfiguration in the name of Enlightenment or Marxist humanism. Lastly, it
was established that for Heidegger the enframing of nature comes from a challenging
revealing of Being, whereas for Adorno the exploitation of nature is due to instrumental
reason which, while rooted in a mythic fear of nature, now dominates external/first
nature, internal nature, and second nature.
All three affinities, then, hold only at the level of form, or spirit, as opposed to
content, or letter. In other words, although Heidegger and Adorno each (re)affirm the
self, art, and nature, they do so from contrasting, even contrary, positions. Thus, in
concluding this comparison of Heidegger and Adorno, their deeper divergences must be
maintained, even as several compelling convergences have been exposed. This does not
mean that these findings are negligible, however. For in conducting this experiment it
has been demonstrated that and how two antithetical thinkers can come together, if
minimally and momentarily.

Nor in combining Heidegger and Adorno have the
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progressive ideals of Adorno been compromised, as Sherman suggests.1 While this
project has been more open to dialogue and communication than others might allow, it
has also been careful to identify and condemn Heidegger‘s regressive tendencies, and to
keep them far from Adorno‘s much more preferable sociopolitical position.

__________

Indeed, the focus here on the self, art, and nature was not only necessitated by the
concerns of Heidegger and Adorno themselves, or the connection to those of
Romanticism, but also inspired by the sense that these values continue to hold promise
today. For our own time is just as, arguably more so, in need of them as that of the
Romantics and that of Heidegger and Adorno. The reason being that the negative effects
of modernity, in spite of the warnings of these figures, have persisted unabated, even
worsened. We see this now most acutely in the various crises threatening our ecosystem,
and thus our very survival. Yet in the other areas too – subjectivity and the arts and
humanities – we also face grave challenges. What is worse, these dilemmas are mutually
reinforcing, such that solving any requires addressing the others.
The problem with subjectivity today is that it is conceived of in almost
exclusively economic terms. Thus self-realization or self-development is equated with
material acquisition, and self-expression with the display of consumer goods. More
alarming still is the way potentially rival forms of subjectivity often capitulate to
economic individualism. Hence Andrew Potter argues, in The Authenticity Hoax: How
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We Get Lost Finding Ourselves, that so-called authentic subjectivity, in spite of opposing
―hollow individualism,‖ usually involves little more than expressing ―individuality
through the consumption of products.‖2 The trouble here is not just that ―conspicuous
authenticity,‖ as Potter calls it, makes a mockery of true authenticity (or authentic
authenticity perhaps), which for Heidegger at least means an acceptance of one‘s finitude,
but also that it demonstrates just how deeply entrenched economic individualism is; it is
the center around which all other kinds of subjectivity orbit.
This entrenchment has also been detrimental to the arts and humanities. Since
personal growth is inextricably hitched to ―growing one‘s business‖ or ―growing one‘s
wealth,‖ the arts and humanities can only appear as obstacles. This explains, in part, the
decades-long decline in the arts and humanities at colleges and universities in the United
States. In Education‟s End: Why Our Colleges and Universities Have Given up on the
Meaning of Life, Anthony Kronman attributes the ―collapse of the authority‖ of the
humanities in particular to ―careerism,‖ along with the uncontested hegemony of the
natural and social sciences.3 Kronman contests that between the assumption that ―a
fulfilling life can be lived only within the channels of a career, which defines a pathway
with more or less fixed expectations and rewards,‖4 and the natural and social sciences‘
(alleged) ability to satisfy the desire for understanding, many in higher education
(students, teachers, and administrators alike) have abandoned the humanities.5 This is
tragic, Kronman holds, since only the humanities can address our current ―spiritual
crisis.‖
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This spiritual crisis, in turn, relates to our environmental crisis. According to
Kronman, our spiritual crisis, or ―spiritual emptiness,‖ emanates from an increasingly
technological world that renders us ―forgetful‖ of mortality, which Kronman claims (like
Heidegger) is the very ground of meaning. Indeed, our technology is now so advanced
that we can drill for oil miles below the earth‘s surface. The danger of this technology is
thus not only that it eclipses our mortality, which is to say our own naturalness, but also
that it alters nature in ways that are already making it inhospitable to humans as well as
other forms of life. In his new book, Eaarth, Bill McKibbon argues that contrary to
popular belief, which holds that global warming or climate change will be an issue for
future generations, ―the earth has changed in profound ways, ways that have already
taken us out of the sweet spot where humans so long thrived… It‘s a different place. A
different planet. It needs a new name. Eaarth.‖6 It seems, then, that in forgetting our
mortality or naturalness we created a world in which we will be constantly reminded of it.

__________

Hence the importance of the topics examined herein. For in exploring alternative
forms of subjectivity, the truthfulness and transformative capacity of art, and the
importance of remembering nature both within and without, possible responses to the
destructive aspects of modernity have been highlighted.

These responses are

philosophically and literally romantic, in the sense of being idealistic or impractical;
indeed, they offer no concrete steps forward. However, pragmatism has always needed
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idealism as its inspiration and guide. Thus, what is needed now, in addition to practical
solutions, is new ideals. These ideals, if anything concrete can be suggested, would
revolve around a reinterpretation of growth, development, or progress. If we could reimagine personal and social development, then we would at once enrich the self and
society, restore the arts and humanities, and save nature.
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Notes
1

Sherman argues that the ―move toward rapprochement is a sign of the political times,‖ by which he means
the rightward movement of leftist politics. David Sherman, Sartre and Adorno: The Dialectics of
Subjectivity (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 55.
2
Andrew Potter, The Authenticity Hoax: How We Get Lost Finding Ourselves (New York: HarperCollins,
2010), 121.
3
Anthony T. Kronman, Education‟s End: Why Our Colleges and Universities Have Given Up on the
Meaning of Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).
4
Kronman, Education‟s End: Why Our Colleges and Universities Have Given Up on the Meaning of Life,
256.
5
Neil Postman makes a stronger statement of the effect of careerism or, as he calls it, the ―god of Economic
Utility,‖ on education: ―Its driving idea is that the purpose of schooling is to prepare children for competent
entry into the economic life of a community. It follows from this any school activity not designed to
further this end is seen as a frill or an ornament--which is to say, a waste of valuable time." Neil Postman,
The End of Education: Redefining the Value of School (New York: Knopf, 1995), 27-28.
6
Bill McKibbon, Eaarth (New York: Times Books, 2010), 2.
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